New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2006‒03‒18
three papers chosen by
  1. Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation By Helios Herrera; David K Levine; Cesar Martinelli
  2. Partisan impacts on the economy: evidence from prediction markets and close elections By Erik Snowberg; Justin Wolfers; Eric Zitzewitz
  3. School choice : in the context of differentiation by ability and income By Saïd Hanchane; Mostafa Tarek
  1. By: Helios Herrera; David K Levine; Cesar Martinelli
    Date: 2005–10–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:618897000000000935&r=cdm
  2. By: Erik Snowberg; Justin Wolfers; Eric Zitzewitz
    Abstract: Political economists interested in discerning the effects of election outcomes on the economy have been hampered by the problem that economic outcomes also influence elections. We sidestep these problems by analyzing movements in economic indicators caused by clearly exogenous changes in expectations about the likely winner during election day. Analyzing high frequency financial fluctuations on November 2 and 3 in 2004, we find that markets anticipated higher equity prices, interest rates, and oil prices and a stronger dollar under a Bush presidency than under Kerry. A similar Republican-Democrat differential was also observed for the 2000 Bush-Gore contest. Prediction market based analyses of all presidential elections since 1880 also reveal a similar pattern of partisan impacts, suggesting that electing a Republican president raises equity valuations by 2-3 percent, and that since Reagan, Republican presidents have tended to raise bond yields.
    Keywords: Federal government ; Political science ; Economic policy
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2006-08&r=cdm
  3. By: Saïd Hanchane (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - http://www.univ-aix.fr/lest - [CNRS : UMR6123] - [Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille I][Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II] - []); Mostafa Tarek (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - http://www.univ-aix.fr/lest - [CNRS : UMR6123] - [Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille I][Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II] - [])
    Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium on the market for schooling where both public and private schools coexist and where individuals are differentiated by income and ability. We study the distribution of students across sectors while examining the conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium in the context of non single peaked preferences. Finally, we examine the existence of a hierarchy of school qualities, as a consequence of the discriminating pricing strategy used by private schools to internalize the effect of peer groups.
    Keywords: Education market; Majority voting equilibrium; Peer group effect; Pricing discrimination; Educational opportunity
    Date: 2006–03–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00009533_v1&r=cdm
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