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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2006‒02‒26
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Barry O'Neill (University of California, Los Angeles); Bezalel Peleg (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) |
| Abstract: | A two-house legislature can often be modelled as a proper simple game whose outcome depends on whether a coalition wins, blocks or loses in two smaller proper simple games. It is shown that there are exactly five ways to combine the smaller games into a larger one. This paper focuses on one of the rules, lexicographic composition, where a coalition wins G_1 => G_2 when it either wins in G_1, or blocks in G_1 and wins in G_2. It is the most decisive of the five. A lexicographically decomposable game is one that can be represented in this way using components whose player sets partition the whole set. Games with veto players are not decomposable, and anonymous games are decomposable if and only if they are decisive and have two or more players. If a player's benefit is assessed by any semi-value, then for two isomorphic games a player is better off from having a role in the first game than having the same role in the second. Lexicographic decomposability is sometimes compatible with equality of roles. A relaxation of it is suggested for its practical benefits. |
| Keywords: | simple games, voting, game composition, game decomposition, semi-value, decisiveness, fairness |
| JEL: | C71 D71 |
| Date: | 2006–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1559&r=cdm |
| By: | António Caleiro (Department of Economics, University of Évora) |
| Abstract: | This note shows in what circumstances output persistence may invert the pattern of the electoral cycle when inflation expectations are of the adaptive or rational type and the government preferences are quadratic over output and inflation. |
| Keywords: | Electoral Cycles, Output persistence |
| JEL: | E23 E32 E52 E61 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:evo:wpecon:04_2006&r=cdm |
| By: | António Caleiro (Department of Economics, University of Évora) |
| Abstract: | The paper offers an analysis of the issues related to the election dates synchronisation between two countries. The first purpose of the paper is to analyse the circumstances in which a government of a single country, considered to be a small economy, has incentives, or not, to synchronise the domestic election dates with the election dates (not necessarily determined in an endogenous way) of a country performing the role of an ‘anchor’, considered to be a big economy. To achieve this purpose, the paper uses an asymmetric version of MILLER and SALMON’s (1990) model in order to derive the optimal domestic electoral period length, which, in this sense, can be said to be endogenously determined. The second main purpose of the paper is to re-analyse the situation being studied by considering that the foreign government also determines its election dates in an optimal way, this leading to a differential game played by the two incumbents from which incentives to totally synchronise the election dates may result. The paper shows that the interests of both economies in what concerns the existing electoral period length in the other economy are not always compatible. |
| Keywords: | Differential Games, Electoral business cycles, Election dates, Mandates durations, Synchronisation of elections |
| JEL: | C73 E32 E61 F42 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:evo:wpecon:05_2006&r=cdm |
| By: | Barry O'Neill; Bezalel Peleg |
| Abstract: | A two-house legislature can often be modelled as a proper simple game whose outcome depends on whether a coalition wins, blocks or loses in two smaller proper simple games. It is shown that there are exactly five ways to combine the smaller games into a larger one. This paper focuses on one of the rules, lexicographic composition, where a coalition wins in G1 => G2 when it either wins in G1, or blocks in G1 and wins in G2. It is the most decisive of the five. A lexicographically decomposable game is one that can be represented in this way using components whose player sets partition the whole set. Games with veto players are not decomposable, and anonymous games are decomposable if and only if they are decisive and have two or more players. If a player's benefit is assessed by any semi-value, then for two isomorphic games a player is better off from having a role in the first game than having the same role in the second. Lexicographic decomposability is sometimes compatible with equality of roles. A relaxation of it is suggested for its practical benefits. |
| Date: | 2006–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp415&r=cdm |
| By: | John F. Helliwell; Haifang Huang |
| Abstract: | In this paper we employ World Values Survey measures of life satisfaction as though they were direct measures of utility, and use them to evaluate alternative features and forms of government in large international samples. We find that life satisfaction is more closely linked to several World Bank measures of the quality of government than to real per capita incomes, in simple correlations and more fully specified models explaining international differences in life satisfaction. We test for differences in the relative importance of different aspects of good government, and find a hierarchy of preferences that depends on the level of development. The ability of governments to provide a trustworthy environment, and to deliver services honestly and efficiently, appears to be of paramount importance for countries with worse governance and lower incomes. The balance changes once acceptable levels of efficiency, trust and incomes are achieved, when more value is attached to building and maintaining the institutions of electoral democracy. |
| JEL: | H11 I31 P52 |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11988&r=cdm |