nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2006‒02‒19
five papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
Universita del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details By Torsten Persson; Guido Tabellini
  2. United We Vote By Jon X. Eguia
  3. BARGAINING, VOTING, AND VALUE By Federico Valenciano; Annick Laruelle

  1. By: Torsten Persson; Guido Tabellini
    Date: 2006–02–08
  2. By: Jon X. Eguia (California Institute of Technology)
    Abstract: This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting rules that aggregate preferences within the coalition.
    Keywords: Voting bloc, Coalition formation, Voting rule
    JEL: D72 D71
    Date: 2006–01
  3. By: Federico Valenciano (Universidad del País Vasco); Annick Laruelle (Universidad de Alicante)
    Abstract: This paper addresses the following issue: If a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives 'in the shadow' of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a 'winning coalition' supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: What influence can the voting rule used to settle (possibly non-unanimous) agreements have on the outcome of negotiations? To give an answer we model the situation as an extension of the Nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity to settle agreements by n players. This provides a setting in which a natural extension of Nash's solution is obtained axiomatically. Two extensions admitting randomization on voting rules based on two informational scenarios are considered.
    Keywords: Bargaining, voting, value, bargaining in committees.
    Date: 2004–04
  4. By: Carmen Herrero Blanco (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas); Ricardo Martínez (Universidad de La Rioja)
    Abstract: In this work we deal with rationing problems. In particular with claims problems with indivisible goods, that is, problems in which a certain amount of indivisible units (of an homogeneous good), has to be distributed among a group of agents, when this amount is not enough to satisfy agents' demands. We define discrete rules to solve those problems that involve notions of fairness similar to those supporting the constrained-equal awards and the constrained-equal losses rules in the continuous case. Axiomatic characterizations of those solutions are provided.
    Keywords: indivisible goods, claims problems, equal awards solution, equal losses solution.
    JEL: D63
    Date: 2004–05
  5. By: Ascensión Andina (Universidad de Alicante)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes an electoral game where candidates have private information on their own types. Candidates propose non-binding platforms and run for office. Voters make inferences on the politicians' types and cast their votes. We show that in this set-up, the existence of a media industry is desirable, as it improves the quality of the political game by increasing the accuracy of the candidates' signals. In particular, it induces politicians to discard the use of pooling strategies. We show that this monitoring role of the media is more likely to appear in societies with large numbers of swing voters, or with great competition among the media. We do this analysis in a context of a neutral media. We also analyze the case of an ideological media and show that ideology is not harmful per se, but the possibility of asymmetries in the support of different candidates may well be.
    Keywords: Uncertainty, electoral campaigns, media.
    JEL: D72 D82
    Date: 2004–09

This nep-cdm issue is ©2006 by Marco Novarese. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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