New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2005‒12‒01
five papers chosen by

  1. Migration and the Welfare State: The Economic Power of the Non-Voter? By Boerner, Kira; Uebelmesser, Silke
  2. Economic Outcomes and the Decision to Vote: The Effect of Randomized School Admissions on Voter Participation By Justine S. Hastings; Thomas J. Kane; Douglas O. Staiger; Jeffrey M. Weinstein
  3. Group Formation and Voter Participation By Cesar Martinelli; Helios Herrera
  4. A Dynamic Theory of Endogenous Constitutions By Matteo Cervellati; Uwe Sunde; Piergiuseppe Fortunato
  5. Dynamics of Westminster Parliamentarism By Tasos Kalandrakis

  1. By: Boerner, Kira; Uebelmesser, Silke
    Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of emigration on the political choice regarding the size of the welfare state. Mobility has two countervailing effects: the political participation effect and the tax base effect. With emigration, the composition of the constituency changes. This increases the political influence of the less mobile part of the population. The new political majority has to take into account that emigration reduces tax revenues and thereby affects the feasible set of redistribution policies. The interaction of the two e¤ects has so far not been analyzed in isolation. We find that the direction of the total e¤ect of migration depends on the initial income distribution in the economy. Our results also contribute to the empirical debate on the validity of the median-voter approach for explaining the relation between income inequality and redistribution levels.
    JEL: D72 D31 H50 F22
  2. By: Justine S. Hastings; Thomas J. Kane; Douglas O. Staiger; Jeffrey M. Weinstein
    Abstract: We provide empirical evidence on the determinants of voter turnout using the random assignment of economic outcomes to potential voters generated by a school choice lottery. This is the first paper to use random assignment of real outcomes resulting from a policy experiment to understand the factors that influence voter turnout. We show that school lottery losers are significantly more likely to vote in the ensuing school board election than lottery winners. The asymmetric effect increases with income and past election participation. The results support a model of 'expressive' voting where negative economic outcomes increase the probability of voting. Such results may account for loss minimizing behavior by public officials, particularly for voters in middle and higher income neighborhoods.
    JEL: D72 I28
    Date: 2005–11
  3. By: Cesar Martinelli; Helios Herrera (CIE Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico)
    Keywords: Voter's Paradox, Endogenous Leaders
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2005
  4. By: Matteo Cervellati; Uwe Sunde (Economics IZA); Piergiuseppe Fortunato
    Keywords: Endogenous Constitutions, Democratic Transition, Public Goods, Redistribution
    JEL: H10 H40 N40
    Date: 2005
  5. By: Tasos Kalandrakis (Political Science University of Rochester)
    Keywords: Policy dynamics; 2-party system; median voter.
    JEL: D72 D78
    Date: 2005

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