New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2005–09–02
two papers chosen by
Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale
  1. Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting By Hummel, Patrick
  2. Commercial Television and Voter Information By Andrea Prat; David Strömberg
  1. By: Hummel, Patrick
    Keywords: perfect information games, extensive games, backward induction, weakly dominated strategies, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, binary voting agendas, sequential voting
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1236
  2. By: Andrea Prat; David Strömberg
    Date: 2005–08–31
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000363
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