New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2005‒02‒06
one paper chosen by

  1. Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains By Michel Le Breton; John A. Weymark

  1. By: Michel Le Breton (GREMAQ and IDEI, Universite de Toulouse 1); John A. Weymark (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)
    Abstract: This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.
    Keywords: Social choice, Arrow's Theorem, restricted domains
    JEL: D71
    Date: 2002–04

General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.