nep-cdm 2005-02-06 papers

on Collective Decision-Making

Issue of 2005‒02‒06
one paper chosen by
Marco Novarese
Università del Piemonte Orientale

Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains By Michel Le Breton; John A. Weymark

Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains

By:	Michel Le Breton (GREMAQ and IDEI, Universite de Toulouse 1); John A. Weymark (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)
Abstract:	This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.
Keywords:	Social choice, Arrow's Theorem, restricted domains
JEL:	D71
Date:	2002–04
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:0206&r=cdm

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