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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2005‒01‒23
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Ortona, Guido |
| Abstract: | he choice of the electoral system should be delegated to the citizens. However, citizens are not sufficiently informed to choose the system directly. It is argued that they may instead state their preferences for two basic characteristics of a Parliament, i.e. Governability and Representativeness. It is then possible to choose the system through a purely technical procedure. An experiment illustrates the method. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uca:ucapdv:42&r=cdm |
| By: | Eguia, Jon X. |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents in a larger electorate can obtain by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all in one direction. We show under which conditions an agent will benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, whether being part of it or stepping out is most advantageous for an individual agent and what are the different optimal internal voting rules to aggregate preferences within the coalition. |
| Keywords: | voting bloc, coalition formation, voting rule |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1208&r=cdm |
| By: | Barbieri, Stefano; Mattozzi, Andrea |
| Abstract: | We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods. |
| Keywords: | public goods, associations, dynamic global games, heterogeneous commuities |
| Date: | 2004–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1206&r=cdm |
| By: | Franz Dietrich (University of Konstanz, Germany); Christian List (London School of Economics, United Kingdom) |
| Abstract: | It is known that majority voting among several individuals on logically interconnected propositions may generate irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds some (proposition-specific) threshold. After characterizing quota rules, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions under which their outcomes satisfy various rationality conditions. We also consider sequential quota rules, which adjudicate propositions sequentially, letting earlier judgments constrain later ones. While ensuring rationality, sequential rules may be path-dependent. We characterize path-independence and prove its equivalence to strategy- proofness under mild conditions. Our results generalize earlier (im)possibility theorems. |
| Keywords: | Judgment aggregation, quota rules, collective rationality, path-dependence, strategy-proofness, formal logic |
| JEL: | D70 D71 D79 |
| Date: | 2005–01–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0501005&r=cdm |