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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2025–07–21
nine papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Daniela Grieco; Patrick Llerena; Anne-Gaëlle Maltese |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how individuals perceive open versus closed tasks in creative contexts and how this perception influences their choice between these tasks. We find that perceptions of task openness align with existing assumptions in the creativity literature regarding goal clarity and the freedom to explore. Additionally, we show that the likelihood of choosing an open task increases with the perceived freedom to explore, while it decreases with goal clarity, particularly when incentives are present. The effects of self-selection on creative performance are then investigated. |
| Keywords: | creativity; openness; perception; constraints; self-selection. |
| JEL: | C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2025-16 |
| By: | Daniela Di Cagno; Werner Güth; Francesca Marazzi; Luca Panaccione |
| Abstract: | We analyze a public goods game with linearly increasing marginal returns to contributions, leading to a non-monotonic group payoff. By allowing the incentive to freeride to persist at all contribution levels, we preserve the usual social dilemma of voluntary public goods provision. We compare two conditions in which both let participants face the voluntary contribution task over a finite number of rounds: one implements it as a static game (Baseline condition), and the other implements it as a dynamic game with four successive stages of simultaneous contribution choices within each round (Milestone condition). Our data show that cooperation in the Baseline condition is rare and mostly limited to the first few rounds. The evidence for the Milestone condition is much more encouraging: contributions beyond suffering are substantial and fairly stable across rounds, although full contributions remain rare. This evidence suggests that the Milestone protocol is a promising institutional device for enhancing voluntary cooperation. |
| Keywords: | experiments, public goods, increasing marginal incentives to contribute, freeriding |
| JEL: | C72 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11988 |
| By: | Armin Falk; Luca Henkel; Thomas Neuber; Philipp Strack |
| Abstract: | We study response behavior in surveys and propose a method to identify and improve the informativeness of survey evidence. First, we develop a choice model of survey response behavior under the assumption that responses imperfectly reveal respondents' characteristics due to limited self-knowledge, inattention, or lack of engagement. Respondents receive individual-specific signals about their characteristics and choose their responses accordingly. We identify the conditions under which this process leads to biased inference from survey evidence and demonstrate how focusing on respondents with high signal precision mitigates bias. Importantly, we show that a respondent's signal precision can be inferred from observed response patterns. Second, based on these insights, we develop a consistent and unbiased estimator for a respondent's signal precision. Third, we provide experimental and survey evidence concerning the performance of the model and estimator. We experimentally test the model's key predictions in a context where the researcher knows the true characteristics. The data confirm both the model's predictions and the estimator's validity. Using a large survey, we show how our estimator can be used to improve survey evidence. Our estimator significantly increases the explanatory power of self-assessments and their association with behavior, and performs well relative to alternative methods proposed in the literature. |
| Keywords: | survey research, rational inattention, online experiment, non-cognitive skills, preferences |
| JEL: | C83 D83 C91 D91 J24 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11968 |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Philipp Sternal (UZH - Universität Zürich [Zürich] = University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We propose a two-stage experiment in which people receive feedback about their relative intelligence. This feedback is a noisy message reminded at every stage, so that subjects cannot forget this ego-relevant information. Instead, we exogenously vary whether the informativeness of the message is reminded in the second stage. We investigate how this treatment variation affects the informativeness reported by subjects, and their posterior beliefs about their intelligence. We show that subjects report informativeness in a self-serving way: subjects with negative messages report that these messages are significantly less informative in the absence of reminder than with it. We also show that the lack of reminder about message informativeness allows subjects to keep a better image of themselves. These results are confirmed by complementary treatments in which we decrease messages informativeness: subjects tend to inflate the informativeness of positive messages that should now be interpreted as bad news. |
| Keywords: | Controlled experiment, Motivated beliefs, Overconfidence, Noisy feedback |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05064934 |
| By: | Buschinger, Christiane; Eyting, Markus; Hett, Florian; Kessler, Judd B. |
| Abstract: | How does polarization - as measured by mistreatment of political rivals - spread? In an online experiment, participants choose between splitting financial resources equally or discriminating against a member of the opposing political party. We vary the information subjects receive about others' choices and justifications for discrimination. Exposure to extreme justifications for discrimination increases discrimination - particularly in a polarized environment, when many others are already discriminating - and it leads participants to adopt more extreme justifications themselves. Our findings suggest a self-reinforcing dynamic that may fuel polarization: Exposure to extreme statements increases polarization and the prevalence of extreme reasoning. |
| Keywords: | political polarization, peer effects, justifications, outgroup discrimination, social norms |
| JEL: | C9 D01 D9 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:320434 |
| By: | Jiakun Zheng (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ling Zhou (School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics) |
| Abstract: | Narrow bracketers who are myopic in specific decisions would fail to consider preexisting risks in investment and neglect hedging opportunities. Growing evidence has demonstrated the relevance of narrow bracketing. We take a step further in empirical investigation and study individual heterogeneity in narrow bracketing. Specifically, we use a lab experiment in investment and hedging that elicits subjects' preferences on rich occasions to uncover the individual degree of narrow bracketing without imposing distributional assumptions. Combining prospect theory and narrow bracketing can explain our findings: Subjects who invest more also insure more, and subjects insure significantly less in the loss domain than in the gain domain. More importantly, we show that the distribution of the individual degree of narrow bracketing is skewed at two extremes, yet with a substantial share of people in the middle who partially suffer from narrow bracketing. Neglecting this aspect, we would overestimate the severity of narrow bracketing and misinterpret its relation with individual characteristics. |
| Keywords: | Hedging, Narrow bracketing, Prospect theory, Subject heterogeneity |
| Date: | 2025–04–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05063379 |
| By: | Wohlschlegel, Julian; Jussupow, Ekaterina |
| Abstract: | In algorithm augmented decision-making, humans must successfully judge when to follow or reject algorithmic advice. Here, research showed that humans tend to reject algorithmic advice after experiencing algorithmic errors. This more severe response to incorrect algorithmic advice compared to incorrect human advice gave rise to the definition of, and research on, the phenomenon of algorithm aversion. However, empirical findings on algorithm aversion are conflicting and mostly focused on the decision itself while neglecting the cognitive processes from receiving incorrect advice to deciding. Using a multi-trial mouse tracking experiment, we aim to better understand the emergence of algorithm aversion by investigating decisional conflicts reflected in cognitive process data. Through our research, we mainly aim to contribute to research on algorithm aversion and the IS community’s methodological toolkit while our insights on decisional conflicts can further inform practitioners on how to responsibly enable and onboard users of algorithms. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:155418 |
| By: | Cristina Figueroa (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Jantsje Mol (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Ivan Soraperra (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Joël Van der Weele (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute) |
| Abstract: | Social preferences depend on emotional states like compassion and anger. Since emotions are fleeting and subject to manipulation, they may generate demand for commitment. We investigate the use of commitment strategies in an online experiment (n=1, 400), where subjects decide to watch or avoid videos before engaging in a charitable giving task. We find that a video with emotional content increases giving, but is also avoided more than non-emotional videos. We estimate a structural model of state-dependent social preferences, and show evidence for sophisticated commitment to selfishness and altruism. We argue that giving can be fruitfully analyzed as a self-control problem. |
| Date: | 2025–03–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250023 |
| By: | Brice Corgnet (EM - EMLyon Business School); Simon Gächter; Roberto Hernán-González |
| Abstract: | In many contractual arrangements where product or service delivery occurs sometime after contracts have been concluded, conditions may change, leading to disputes that need to be resolved often by a third party (arbitrator/mediator). In this paper we introduce the Contractual Dispute Resolution Game (CDRG), which allows us to study dispute resolution through arbitration. Unlike prior research studying arbitration at impasse using zero-sum bargaining games, we analyze a situation where parties can create additional value. We introduce a novel real-effort task, the Car Assembly Real-effort Task (CART), and show in two studies how automated arbitration rules (Study 1) and human arbitrators (Study 2) affect dispute resolution and surplus creation. In Study 1, we find that high-accuracy arbitration enhances efficiency. In Study 2, we find that arbitrators who are incentivized based on the total surplus of the negotiation do also promote greater efficiency. The CDRG provides a valuable tool for examining the effects of arbitration and mediation in settings where contracts are incomplete and can be impacted by shocks. |
| Keywords: | Contractual disputes, Cooperation, Arbitration, Fairness, Risk-sharing, Laboratory experiments, Real-effort experiments, Car Assembly Real-effort Task (CART), Contractual Dispute Resolution Game (CDRG) |
| Date: | 2025–03–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05053021 |