nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2026–10–12
four papers chosen by
Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale


  1. Pinocchio's Clock: Using Response Time to Detect Deception in Sender-Receiver Games By Xin Jiang; Bohan Ye
  2. Trust as a social norm? A lab-in-the-field experiment with refugees in Switzerland By Stefanie S Baumgartner; Fabio Galeotti; Thierry Madiès; Marie Claire Villeval
  3. Bias Composition and Information Transmission in Organizations By Takashi Shimizu
  4. The Influence of the Vocal Few: Evidence from Social Media Comments By Dante Donati; Lena Song

  1. By: Xin Jiang (University of Southern California); Bohan Ye (Department of Economics, University of California Riverside)
    Abstract: Timestamps that reveal response times (RTs) have become a common feature of contemporary social media platforms and messaging applications. What information does RT reveal when users have conflicting interests, and can they use this information to improve communication outcomes? We conduct a sender–receiver experiment to examine the relationship between RT and message honesty. We find that longer RTs are associated with a higher likelihood of deception, consistent with a cognitive-conflict mechanism under which lying involves greater cognitive struggle. Receivers, however, rely more consistently on senders’ message frequency than on RT when assessing message credibility.
    Keywords: lie detection; response time; information acquisition; cognitive conflict
    JEL: C92 D01 D91
    Date: 2026–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucr:wpaper:202608
  2. By: Stefanie S Baumgartner (UNIFR - Université de Fribourg = University of Fribourg); Fabio Galeotti (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - UJM EPE - Université Jean Monnet (EPSCPE) - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Thierry Madiès (UNIFR - Université de Fribourg = University of Fribourg); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - UJM EPE - Université Jean Monnet (EPSCPE) - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Trust plays a crucial role in refugees' integration. This study examines how social information about trust levels among peers from home and host countries affects non-Western refugees' trust. Using a trust game, we experimentally measured trust levels among Swiss citizens, Turkish refugees, and Afghan refugees. We found that Turkish refugees exhibited higher trust levels than Afghan refugees, but no significant differences in trust were observed between Swiss participants and either refugee group. Turkish refugees adjusted their trust to match Swiss levels when receiving social information, but observation by compatriots reduced this effect. By contrast, Afghan refugees exhibited a more limited response to social information, except when told their behavior would be revealed, which led them to align more closely with Swiss trust levels. These findings highlight the complex impact of social information on refugee trust behavior and suggest that trust can be a social norm.
    Keywords: Social norms, Lab-in-the-field experiment, Social information, Trust, Refugees
    Date: 2026–09–28
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05001907
  3. By: Takashi Shimizu (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University)
    Abstract: We study information transmission within organizations, focusing on how biased Subordinates should be combined to elicit truthful information. We assume that the directions of the Subordinates’ biases are common knowledge, whereas their magnitudes are privately known to each Subordinate. We show that a homogeneous composition of Subordinates is preferable to a heterogeneous one. The intuition is that, under a homogeneous composition, the effect of an individual false report is amplified by false reports from other Subordinates. Anticipating this amplification effect reduces each Subordinate’s incentive to misreport and thereby promotes truthful information transmission.
    Keywords: Cross-holdings: Organization; Information transmission; Cheap talk; Bias; Homogeneous mode; Heterogeneous mode
    JEL: D23 D82
    Date: 2026–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:2614
  4. By: Dante Donati; Lena Song
    Abstract: Online comment sections let a small number of vocal individuals reach far beyond their own networks. We conduct a large-scale field experiment on Facebook that randomizes the presence and stance of comments beneath posts for a racial justice organization, reaching around one million U.S. users. Opposing comments increase reactions, comments, and link clicks by 15–43 percent relative to no comments, whereas supportive comments have little effect. A complementary survey experiment shows that similar opposing comments make attitudes less progressive and reduce donations to the organization. Through a common feature of online platforms, the vocal few can exert outsized influence.
    Keywords: social media, comments, user-generated content, social influence, field experiments
    JEL: C93 D72 D83 D91 J15 L82 L86
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13018

This nep-cbe issue is ©2026 by Marco Novarese. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the Griffith Business School of Griffith University in Australia.