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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2025–05–26
three papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Hua, Tony |
| Abstract: | People often avoid information to evade social obligations and justify selfish behavior. However, such behavior unfolds within a social context, where beliefs about others’ actions shape individual choices. This study examines how social expectations, shaped by perceived norms and decision framing, influence individuals’ willingness to avoid information. In a modified moral wiggle-room game, participants first predict how often others acquired information, then receive feedback about others’ information-seeking behavior before making their own decision as the dictator. The experiment manipulates (1) the feedback on norms participants receive, reflecting varying rates of information avoidance, and (2) whether they know in advance that they will be making the decision themselves, thereby inducing either a \textit{self-referential} or \textit{socially} framed perspective. Individuals were more likely to acquire information when exposed to norms favoring transparency, with pessimistic participants—those who believed ignorance was common—responding most strongly. Optimistic individuals showed little adjustment. Contrary to expectations, there was little evidence that participants distorted their beliefs about others to justify selfish behavior. However, a notable gender difference emerged: female participants, when primed with self-referential framing, were significantly less responsive to normative cues than males. Finally, an exploratory comparison with previous experiments suggests that belief elicitation itself, even in the absence of normative cues, significantly reduces information avoidance, highlighting a promising and scalable intervention for promoting transparency. |
| Keywords: | information avoidance; moral wiggle-room; social norms; social appropriateness; experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D8 D83 |
| Date: | 2025–04–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:124363 |
| By: | Daniel L. Chen (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Ambiguity aversion is the interpretation of the experimental finding (the Ellsberg paradox) that most subjects prefer betting on events whose probabilities are known (objective) to betting on events whose probabilities are unknown (subjective). However in typical experiments these unknown probabilities are known by others. Thus the typical Ellsberg experiment is a situation of asymmetric information. People may try to avoid situations where they are the less informed party, which is normatively appropriate. We find that eliminating asymmetric information in the Ellsberg experiment while leaving ambiguity in place, makes subjects prefer the ambiguous bet over the objective one, reversing the prior results. |
| Keywords: | Uncertainty aversion, Probabilistic sophistication, Sources of ambiguity, Ellsberg paradox |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05012232 |
| By: | Evan Friedman; Suanna Oh; Duncan Webb |
| Abstract: | Accurately measuring preferences and beliefs in surveys is crucial for social science research, but standard monetary incentives cannot be used when responses cannot be verified. We study two psychological mechanisms for improving answer quality that can be applied to unverifiable questions: (i) an unexpected bonus payment designed to trigger reciprocity towards the researcher, and (ii) telling respondents that they will later be paid to accurately restate their previously-given answers, which could motivate careful initial answers that are naturally easier to reconstruct. In a large online experiment (N=2, 428), the bonus method modestly improves both answer correctness and consistency, driven by increased effort and reciprocity. The restatement method, however, does not consistently improve answer quality, primarily because participants exert effort trying to memorize their answers instead of answering carefully. These results demonstrate the potential and limitations of using psychological mechanisms to improve the quality of survey responses. |
| Keywords: | restatement method, bonus method, incentives, survey. |
| JEL: | C81 C83 C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11859 |