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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2026–11–02
five papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Charlotte Saucet (UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Compared to neutral settings, skepticism is significantly lower when it is self-threatening, and not enhanced when it is self-serving. These results shed light on a new channel that individuals can use to protect their beliefs in communication situations: they exercise skepticism in a motivated way, that is, in a way that depends on the desirability of the conclusions that skeptical inferences lead to. We propose two behavioral models that can generate motivated skepticism. In one model, the Receiver freely manipulates his beliefs after having made skeptical inferences. In the other, the Receiver reasons about evidence in steps and the depth of his reasoning is motivated. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous depth of reading, Motivated beliefs, Skepticism, Unraveling result, Hard information, Disclosure games |
| Date: | 2025–05–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03770685 |
| By: | Thomas W. Graeber; Christopher Roth; Florian Zimmermann |
| Abstract: | This article reviews how different types of information shape belief formation. We organize the discussion around two distinctions: whether information supplies evidence or a framework for interpreting evidence, and whether it is qualitative or quantitative. Stories describe individual instances in qualitative terms, whereas statistics summarize many observations numerically. Narratives and quantitative models provide qualitative and quantitative frameworks, respectively, for interpreting evidence. We examine how learning from evidence and learning from models interact: models shape responses to existing and subsequent evidence, while evidence can prompt model revision. We argue that qualitative information engages associative cognitive processes, such as mental simulation and memory retrieval, which tend to give it a larger and more lasting influence on beliefs than quantitative information. We then discuss implications for strategic communication and the supply of information in media markets, and identify challenges and open questions for future research. |
| Keywords: | stories, statistics, narratives, beliefs, learning, qualitative information, models |
| JEL: | D83 D91 C90 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13082 |
| By: | Hannah H. Chen (Department of Finance, National Central University); Cary Deck (Department of Economics, University of Alabama & Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Rachel J. Huang (Department of Finance, National Central University); Larry Y. Tzeng (Department of Finance, National Taiwan University); Lin Zhao (School of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics) |
| Abstract: | Economic decisions often involve uncertainty in both wealth and time. We introduce an axiom requiring the trade-of between wealth and time to remain invariant across both domains. Together with standard axioms, it characterizes Expected Additive Time-Wealth Utility (EATWU). We provide an alternative characterization based on consistency in higher-order risk preferences and extend risk apportionment to decisions involving wealth, time, and both. Our model predicts consistent risk allocations across these domains within each order. A laboratory experiment examining second-, third-, and fourth-order risk preferences fnds systematic relationships across domains that are broadly consistent with the model’s predictions. |
| Keywords: | Time and Wealth, Cross-Domain Stationarity, Higher-Order Risk Preferences, Risk Apportionment, Experimental Economics |
| JEL: | C9 D8 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:26-13 |
| By: | Thomas Graeber; Christopher Roth; Florian Zimmermann |
| Abstract: | This article reviews how different types of information shape belief formation. We organize the discussion around two distinctions: whether information supplies evidence or a frame work for interpreting evidence, and whether it is qualitative or quantitative. Stories describe individual instances in qualitative terms, whereas statistics summarize many observations numerically. Narratives and quantitative models provide qualitative and quantitative frame works, respectively, for interpreting evidence. We examine how learning from evidence and learning from models interact: models shape responses to existing and subsequent evidence, while evidence can prompt model revision. We argue that qualitative information engages associative cognitive processes, such as mental simulation and memory retrieval, which tend to give it a larger and more lasting influence on beliefs than quantitative information. We then discuss implications for strategic communication and the supply of information in media markets, and identify challenges and open questions for future research. |
| Keywords: | Secondary employment, Labor supply, Worker preferences, Discrete choice experiment. |
| JEL: | C25 J22 J28 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_790 |
| By: | Mickael Beaud (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); Yujiang Sun (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); Marc Willinger (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier) |
| Abstract: | While various models of inequality aversion predict different effects of background risk on giving, empirical evidence remains mixed. This study presents a laboratory experiment using a modified dictator game to examine whether exposure to an additive, zero-mean background risk affecting endowments influences giving behavior. Our results show that such exposure does not significantly affect average donation amounts, the likelihood of giving nothing, or the tendency to split resources equally. These findings are consistent with ex ante inequality concerns under risk neutrality; however, overall, our experimental data do not support the behavioral predictions implied by purely ex post inequality aversion. |
| Keywords: | Inequality aversion, Background risk, Dictator game |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05777756 |