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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2026–10–26
five papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Antoine Malezieux (BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne, CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur les Entreprises - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne); Eli Spiegelman (BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne, CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur les Entreprises - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - ESC Dijon-Bourgogne) |
| Abstract: | Over the last four decades, a broad stream of experimental literature has been published using the Common Pool Resource (CPR) game to study how people react to congestible resources, and how to keep such resources from socially harmful overexploitation. With the goal of providing guidance to future work on this still-important paradigm, we provide a narrative review of the literature, summarizing the results for several key aspects of the experimental operationalization. We classify these aspects into two broad categories. The first describes ‘environmental' assumptions on the modeled resource problem itself. This refers to aspects of the experimental environment reflecting factors such as group size, resource size and asymmetry of access, which generally constitute the nature of the dilemma. The second category involves ‘institutional' issues related to how people might solve the problem, such as user communication between subjects, information about previous subjects' choices, and regulatory measures. |
| Keywords: | Climate change, Common pool, Commons dilemma, Experiment, Harvesting |
| Date: | 2025–05–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05797893 |
| By: | Daniel Evans (University of Bonn); Georg Schneider (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Many important decisions are made jointly by groups. While groups can draw on and discuss diverse perspectives, they may also suffer from counterproductive dynamics, such as herding and gridlock. To investigate this tension, we study three features that distinguish joint from individual decision-making: composition, communication, and collaborative aggregation. Simple comparisons between joint and individual decisions cannot distinguish their effects. To separate them, we design an experiment in which subjects construct portfolios to maximize returns and minimize volatility, first individually and then in one of three decision modes; each mode differs from adjacent modes by a single feature. We find that composition drives the benefits of joint decision-making: simply pooling two individuals' independent submissions together reduces portfolio concentration and volatility. Communication attenuates these gains by inducing partners to converge on similar portfolios and to prioritize maximizing returns over managing risk. Collaborative aggregation has little effect on average, but is beneficial when partners hold differing beliefs. Disentangling these features reveals an offsetting cost of communication that limits the ability of groups to make full use of members' inputs. |
| Keywords: | Group decision-making, Wisdom of crowds, Communication, Portfolio choice |
| JEL: | C92 D70 D91 G41 M54 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:436 |
| By: | Dominik Atella-Suri (University of Bonn); Annalena Tetzner (University of Bonn); Sebastian Kube (University of Bonn); Jan Börner (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Negative income shocks may increase households' reliance on common-pool resources and thereby undermine sustainable resource management. We study this in a preregistered laboratory experiment with 120 participants playing a dynamic resource extraction game framed around a community forest. Participants in the Control condition play the baseline game three times, whereas participants in the Shock condition experience a temporary loss of exogenous income in the second part before income is restored in the third. This design allows us to distinguish responses to the income shock from common changes associated with repeated play and to observe behavior after the shock ends. We find that forest extraction increases in Part 2 for the Shock treatment relative to the ongoing baseline in the Control condition. After income is restored in Part 3, extraction decreases and the forest partially recovers. However, the equivalence tests do not clearly show whether behavior fully returns to its pre-shock level or whether some of the shock effect remains. Our findings support previous evidence that economic hardship can increase pressure on shared natural resources. |
| Keywords: | Resource extraction game; Forest commons; Income shock; Lab experiment; Cooperation |
| JEL: | D70 Q20 Q23 Q50 Q56 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:432 |
| By: | Garcia, Thomas; Lambert, Claudia; Pancaro, Cosimo; Rimbaud, Claire; Soldà, Alice |
| Abstract: | Holding limits are a central design feature of proposed retail central bank digital currencies (CBDC). While such limits mechanically prevent individuals from exceeding a maximum balance, they may also generate behavioral responses whose directions are a priori unclear. We conducted an incentivized online experiment with participants from four euro-area countries, exogenously varying the presence and level of a holding limit to causally separate direct mechanical effects from behavioral effects. We find that behavioral responses increase holdings of the means of payment subject to the holding limit, consistent with an attraction effect. This effect is material only when the limit is high enough. Enabling reverse waterfall —automatic conversion into this limited means of payment— increases adoption while reducing holdings. These results suggest that combining holding limits with automatic funding mechanisms can support CBDC use while containing holdings, thereby helping to mitigate potential financial stability risks. JEL Classification: E42, C91, D14, E58 |
| Keywords: | behavioral economics, CBDC, digital currency, experimental economics, holding limits |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20263300 |
| By: | Samuel D. Hirshman; Anna Ignatenko |
| Abstract: | How do firms transmit macroeconomic shocks to consumers through retail prices? We show that pricing frictions induced by behavioral biases play a central role in shaping how cost shocks pass-through to consumers. We document that import tariffs are transmitted primarily through prices that do not end in nine, while nine-ending prices exhibit substantially lower pass-through. After the tariffs, annual inflation is meaningfully larger for non-nine-ending priced products, even products that are not tariffed. These findings identify channels through which consumer biases constrain firms' responses to macroeconomic shocks. |
| Keywords: | left-digit bias, pass-through, tariffs, behavioral pricing |
| JEL: | F13 F14 D91 L11 M31 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13056 |