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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2026–09–14
three papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Eszter Timár (Corvinus University of Budapest); Hubert János Kiss (ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies; Corvinus University of Budapest); Dániel Horn (ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies; Corvinus University of Budapest) |
| Abstract: | Response time is increasingly used as a window to look into decision-making process in economic experiments. Yet its interpretation is ambiguous: a fast response may reflect quick comprehension or an impulsive choice. We show that the source of this ambiguity is conceptual and can be resolved by a simple design feature: the separation of instruction and decision screens. Using data from approximately 1, 100 students in a lab-in-the-field experiment linked to standardized test scores, we decompose total response time into comprehension time and deliberation time. We show that each component is informative in its own right. Comprehension time is correlated with cognitive ability, providing a cost-free ability proxy in any experiment with split screens. Deliberation time is independent of ability but responds to the structure of the choice: heuristic choices are faster and decisions near the indifference point take longer. The decomposition recovers behavioral patterns that total response time obscures. |
| Keywords: | response time; comprehension; deliberation; cognitive ability; experimental economics |
| JEL: | C90 C91 D83 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:2611 |
| By: | Cesar Chavez Padilla; Shuaizhang Feng; James J. Heckman; Zhe Yang |
| Abstract: | Using rich data on Chinese schoolchildren, we study the relationships of IQ and personality traits with children’s risk preferences and how they affect the precision with which those preferences are measured. Our structural model separates preferences from deliberation noise and guessing, and relates guessing to deliberation noise. Psychological measures have weak direct influences on preferences but strongly affect deliberation noise and guessing behavior. Shocks to choice have persistent individual-specific components and are not independent. Socioeconomic background has little direct influence on preferences or deliberation noise once traits are accounted for. Background variables affect psychological traits, however. Risk preferences differ across and within genders. For small gambles, girls are less risk averse than boys, but the opposite holds for larger gambles. |
| JEL: | D12 D90 I21 J24 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35526 |
| By: | Mohlin, Erik (Swedish Defense University); Rigos, Alexandros (University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We present a model of how an individual’s preference for a specific behaviour can evolve as an adaptation to her social environment. Our key assumptions are that the decision maker (DM) (i) is boundedly rational in her ability to process information and evaluate which actions yield the highest payoff and (ii) can develop a subjective preference for actions. A stronger preference for an action reduces the probability of not taking it when it is optimal (omission error), but it also increases the probability of taking the action when it is suboptimal (commission error). The optimally adapted preference strikes a balance between these errors and depends on the DM’s environment. DMs are typically better off (in objective terms) if they are endowed with subjective preferences that deviate from maximisation of expected objective payoff. Importantly, if DMs can evaluate actions perfectly, they do not develop such biases. The results extend in an intuitive manner to n-player, two-strategy supermodular games. Our framework can be used to interpret preferences for specific actions or strategies (e.g., conditional cooperation, truth-telling, or norm-following) as psychological and cultural consequences of material incentives and social organisation. |
| Keywords: | Preference evolution; Bounded rationality; Culture; Cooperation; Cognitive economics; Logit choice; Monotone comparative statics; Supermodular games |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D01 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–09–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2026_008 |