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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2025–12–15
five papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Shohei Yamamoto; Rebecca McDonald; Daniel Read |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how outcome modality in intertemporal choice influences time preferences and whether the process differs across cultures, specifically Japan and the United States. Uni-modal choices are those when the outcomes being compared over time are very similar, and cross-modal choices are those when the outcomes are very different. The cross-modal effect, previously shown in the U.S., is that there is greater patience in cross-modal decisions. In Experiment 1, we employed a between-participants design, in which participants either made uni-modal or cross-modal decisions. In Experiment 2, we employed a within-participants design in which everyone made both types of decision. In both Experiments we replicated the cross-modal effect. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect did not vary with factors known to relate to time preference, such as cognitive ability and social status, and it did not differ across cultures, even though Japanese participants were much more patient than American ones. The effect was stronger in the between- than within-participants experiment. These results strengthen the conclusion that the cross-modal effect is universal and strengthens the argument that it is due to the fundamental process of attentional dilution. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.23126 |
| By: | Adam Zylbersztejn (Université Lyon 2, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, Emlyon Business School, GATE, CNRS, 69007, Lyon, France; research fellow at Vistula University Warsaw (AFiBV), Warsaw, Poland); Zakaria Babutsidze (SKEMA Business School, Université Côte d’Azur (GREDEG), Nice, France); Nobuyuki Hanaki (Institute of Social and Economic Research, the University of Osaka, Japan, and University of Limassol, Cyprus); Astrid Hopfensitz (Emlyon Business School, Université Lyon 2, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, GATE, CNRS, 69007, Lyon, France) |
| Abstract: | In social interactions, humans care about knowing their partner’s face. Some experiments report that facial information facilitates trustworthiness detection, while others find it does not. We add to this literature by exploring heterogeneity in the demand for, and in the usefulness of, facial information. The incentivized experimental task consists in predicting strangers’ trustworthiness from neutral portrait pictures. Using data from a three-stage laboratory experiment (N = 357) including two independent sets of stimuli coupled with two distinct sources of predictions, we document substantial heterogeneity in facial informativeness. However, we find that trustworthiness detection from facial information is not an ability. Nonetheless, individuals assign excessive value to receiving facial information about others. |
| Keywords: | trustworthiness, inference, facial information, individual heterogeneity, hidden action game, economic experiment |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2527 |
| By: | James C. Cox; Cary Deck; Laura Razzolini; Vjollca Sadiraj |
| Abstract: | Deviations from choices predicted by self-regarding preferences have regularly been observed in standard dictator games. Such behavior is not inconsistent with conventional preference theory or revealed preference theory, which accommodate other-regarding preferences. By contrast, experiments in which giving nothing is not the least generous feasible act produce data that is inconsistent with conventional preference theory including social preference models and suggest the possible relevance of reference point models. Two such models are the reference-dependent theory of riskless choice with loss aversion and choice monotonicity in moral reference points. Our experiment includes novel treatments designed to challenge both theoretical models of reference dependence and conventional rational choice theory by poking holes in or adding to the dictator's feasible set along with changes to the initial endowment of the players. Our design creates tests that at most one of these models can pass. However, we do not find that any of these models fully capture behavior. In part this result is due to our observing behavior in some treatments that differs from previous experiments for reasons attributable to implementation differences across studies. |
| Keywords: | Rational Choice Theory, Reference Dependence, Behavioral Models, Laboratory Experiments |
| JEL: | C7 C9 D9 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2025-02 |
| By: | Abigail Barr (University of Nottingham); Uzma Afzal (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT)); Daniele Nosenzo (Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | We present three lab-in-the-field studies investigating systematic heterogeneity in cooperative decision-making across spouses in arranged and love-matched marriages in Pakistan, where the former is the tradition and the latter is associated with modernization. In Study 1, we engaged married couples in a one-shot, two-person, sequential public goods game, in which we applied the strategy method to the second mover. Using hierarchical clustering to analyze the strategy data, we categorized spouses into cooperative types and found that spouses in love-matched marriages are significantly more likely to be unconditionally cooperative. Spouses in love-matched marriages are also significantly more cooperative overall. In Study 2, we replicated our findings from Study 1 in a new sample of villages similarly close to a city but found that, as distance from the city increased, the love-matched effect declined. We interpreted this as suggestive evidence that there is less tolerance and support for love matches in more remote areas. In Study 2, by also engaging the spouses in games with neighbors, we established that the observed differences in cooperation between spouses in love-matched versus arranged marriages could not be explained by the selection of unconditionally cooperative people into love-matched marriages. Finally, in Study 3, we confirmed that there is indeed a social norm prescribing arranged marriage and that this norm is stronger in more remote villages. |
| Keywords: | Creativity; Associative Thinking; Methodology |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2025-02 |
| By: | Dhiraj Jagadale; Kavita Vemuri |
| Abstract: | Mutual trust is a key determinant of decision-making in economic interactions, yet actual behavior often diverges from equilibrium predictions. This study investigates how emotional arousal, indexed by skin conductance responses, SCR, relates to trust behavior in a modified centipede game. To examine the impact of uncertainty, the game incorporated both fixed and random termination conditions. SCRs were recorded alongside self-reported measures of mutual and general trust and individual risk-taking propensity. Phasic SCRs were significantly higher under random termination, particularly following the opponent take actions, indicating increased emotional arousal under uncertainty. Mutual trust scores correlated positively with risk propensity but not with general trust. Behaviorally, higher mutual trust was associated with extended cooperative play, but only in the fixed-turn condition. These findings suggest that physiological arousal reflects emotional engagement in trust-related decisions and that uncertainty amplifies both arousal and strategic caution. Mutual trust appears context-dependent, shaped by emotional and physiological states that influence deviations from equilibrium behavior. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.18738 |