nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2025–06–30
two papers chosen by
Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale


  1. Estimating Behavioral Inattention By Jonathan Benchimol; Lahcen Bounader; Mario Dotta
  2. The Attention–Information Tradeoff By Marta Serra-Garcia

  1. By: Jonathan Benchimol; Lahcen Bounader; Mario Dotta
    Abstract: Bounded rationality and limited attention significantly influence expectation formation and macroeconomic dynamics, yet empirical quantification of these behavioral phenomena remains challenging. This paper provides the first cross-country estimation of both micro- and macro-level attention parameters using a structurally identified behavioral New Keynesian model. Employing Bayesian techniques on harmonized data from 22 OECD countries (1996-2019) and ensuring robust parameter identification, we document substantial heterogeneity in behavioral inattention across countries. Our cognitive discounting estimates range from 0.76 to 0.98, with higher values indicating greater attention. We establish three key empirical regularities: (1) attention parameters are positively associated with macroeconomic volatility, supporting rational inattention theory; (2) surprise movements in key macroeconomic variables and online information-seeking behavior significantly influence attention allocation; and (3) institutional quality, particularly government effectiveness, is correlated with attention levels. These findings reveal that attention is both a behavioral and a structural phenomenon, responding to institutional factors and economic conditions. Our results provide an empirical foundation for calibrating country-specific models and yield important implications for the design and transmission of monetary policy under bounded rationality, showing that policy effectiveness may systematically vary with the macroeconomic environment.
    Keywords: cognitive discounting, myopia, attention, Bayesian estimation, behavioral macroeconomics
    JEL: E37 E52 E58 E70 E71
    Date: 2025–06
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2025-34
  2. By: Marta Serra-Garcia
    Abstract: How does information transmission change when it requires attracting the attention of receivers? This paper combines an experiment that varies freelance professionals’ incentives to attract attention about scientific findings, with several online experiments that exogenously expose receivers to the content created. Attention incentives lead to significantly less information being transmitted, but not more factually inaccurate content. These incentives increase information demand and the knowledge of interested receivers. However, among the majority of receivers who do not demand more information, attention incentives lower knowledge and increase biases in beliefs, revealing that missing information can be a channel through which misperceptions arise.
    Keywords: attention, incentives, information, experiment
    JEL: D83 D91 C72 C91
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11885

This nep-cbe issue is ©2025 by Marco Novarese. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.