nep-cbe 2025-05-19 papers

on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics

Issue of 2025–05–19
two papers chosen by
Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

Solidarity and Discrimination Within and Between Generations: Evidence from a Dutch Population Sample By Arno Riedl; Hans Schmeets; Peter Werner
The Supply of Motivated Beliefs By Michael Thaler

Solidarity and Discrimination Within and Between Generations: Evidence from a Dutch Population Sample

By:	Arno Riedl; Hans Schmeets; Peter Werner
Abstract:	Using an artefactual field experiment, we elicit revealed preferences for solidarity of different age groups towards the same and other age groups among a large and heterogeneous sample of the Dutch population. Preferences are elicited with a solidarity game and linked to a rich and unique administrative database, enabling us to explore demographic and socio-economic correlates of the elicited preferences. In the solidarity game a winner of a money amount is asked ex-ante how much they are willing to transfer to a loser who receives no money. We find that participants on average have a strong preference for ex-ante solidarity, as they are willing to transfer about 40% of the money they receive. At the same time, there is a mismatch between belief in solidarity and actual solidarity. Participants are overly pessimistic about what others will transfer. Moreover, we observe age-based discrimination because a significant share of participants exhibits stronger solidarity preferences with their own age group than with other age groups. Using questionnaires, we also measure stated solidarity preferences in various domains and observe that revealed solidarity preferences correlate with some self-reported attitudes about general solidarity. We also correlate revealed solidarity preferences with opinions on social security systems and self-reported field behavior involving solidarity and find some relation between them.
Keywords:	solidarity, age groups, group identity, social security systems, large population sample.
JEL:	D63 D64 D91 C93
Date:	2025
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11841

The Supply of Motivated Beliefs

By:	Michael Thaler
Abstract:	When people choose how to communicate, they must consider whether their audience will be biased in interpreting their messages. This paper experimentally examines how politically-motivated reasoning affects information transmission. Senders are randomly matched with receivers whose political parties' stances happen to be aligned or misaligned with a truthful statement, and either face incentives to be rated as truthful or face no incentives. Incentives for senders to be rated as truthful backfire, causing senders to be less truthful. Backfiring occurs because incentivized senders tailor false messages to better align with receivers' politically-motivated beliefs. Receivers are naive to these incentives' adverse effects.
JEL:	C91 D83 D91
Date:	2025
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11828

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