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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2025–04–28
three papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Lorenzo Corno (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Giovanni Dosi (Istituto di Economia, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Italy); Luigi Marengo (Dipartimento di Impresa e Management, LUISS, Italy) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an overview of behaviors and learning of heterogeneous economic agents - whether individuals or firms—within complex evolving economies. It aims to explore the microfoundation of agency and learning, two fundamental aspects that constitutively contribute to the emergence of micro, meso, and macro stylized facts of modern capitalist economies, conceived as complex evolving systems. The investigation begins at the individual level, drawing on insights from cognitive and social sciences and identifying relevant micro-evidence concerning the cognitive, psychological, behavioral, and social dimensions of human agency in complex and uncertain environments. It then shifts to the epistemological level organization, where individual behaviors and learning are interwoven with those of other members and embedded within the genuinely collective dimensions and emergent properties of the firm—such as organizational capabilities, heuristics, and power configurations—on which the analysis will focus. This perspective interprets the firm as a sort of primitive problem-solving entity and acknowledges that organizational behaviors and learning are "more" than what can be grasped by attending solely to insulated parts. The primary objective of this work is to contribute to a positive theory of behaviors and learning in complex evolving economies, while also offering a fertile ground for theoretical and modeling developments in search of realistic building blocks. |
| Keywords: | Complex Evolving Economies, Firm Behaviour, Human Cognition and Agency, Heuristics, Microfoundations |
| JEL: | B41 B52 D01 D21 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2025-14 |
| By: | Eléonore Dodivers (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Ismaël Rafaï (Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse School of Management) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates Artificial intelligence Large Language Models (AI-LLM) social preferences’ in Dictator Games. Brookins and Debacker (2024, Economics Bulletin) previously observed a tendency of ChatGPT-3.5 to give away half its endowment in a standard Dictator Game and interpreted this as an expression of fairness. We replicate their experiment and introduce a multiplicative factor on donations which varies the efficiency of the transfer. Varying transfer efficiency disentangles three donation explanations (inequality aversion, altruism, or focal point). Our results show that ChatGPT-3.5 donations should be interpreted as a focal point rather than the expression of fairness. In contrast, a more advanced version (ChatGPT-4o) made decisions that are better explained by altruistic motives than inequality aversion. Our study highlights the necessity to explore the parameter space, when designing experiments to study AI-LLM preferences. |
| Keywords: | Artificial Intelligence, Large Language Models, Dictator Games, Experimental Economics, Social Preferences |
| JEL: | D90 O33 C02 C91 |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2025-09 |
| By: | Columbus, Simon; Feld, Lars P.; Kasper, Matthias; Rablen, Matthew D. |
| Abstract: | This study investigates how institutional rules and fairness in enforcement affect cooperation and compliance in heterogenous groups. In a preregistered online experiment (n = 1, 254), we vary both the existence of a rule governing contributions to a public good as well as whether enforcement of the rule is biased against some players. We find that merely stating a rule has a stronger effect on behaviour than rule enforcement. Specifically, institutional rules promote cooperation by strengthening personal and social norms, which in turn sustains contributions over time. In contrast, in the absence of a rule, norms are weaker and contributions decline. Fair rule enforcement reduces free-riding and increases compliance, but it also crowds out full cooperation. Finally, we find no evidence that biased rule enforcement erodes norms, reduces cooperation, or diminishes rule compliance. Our findings highlight the crucial role of institutional rules in strengthening norms and sustaining cooperation in heterogeneous groups, even in the absence of enforcement or when rule enforcement is biased. |
| Keywords: | public goods, rule compliance, rule enforcement, social norms |
| JEL: | H41 C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:aluord:315749 |