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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2025–04–07
three papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Valeria Fanghella (EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management); Lisette Ibanez (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); John Thøgersen (Aarhus University [Aarhus]) |
| Abstract: | Recent research suggests that people are willing to pay to avoid requests for prosocial behavior. However, it is unknown whether this applies to private pro-environmental requests. To study this, we conducted a preregistered, incentivized online experiment where participants played two consecutive dictator games with an environmental charity of their choice. In stage 1, we varied the type of dictator game and the information provided in a 2 × 2 factorial between-subject design: (i) a standard dictator game versus one with a costly opt-out option; (ii) with or without social information about the average donation made by participants in a previous session. All participants played a standard dictator game in stage 2, the primary aim of which was to capture temporal spillovers from stage 1. Overall, 9 % of participants opted out, leading to lower donations in the dictator game with the costly opt-out option. Providing social information decreases donations in the standard dictator game and appears to increase opt-outs when the costly opt-out option is available, but not statistically significant. Distinct spillover effects emerged depending on the options available and decisions made in stage 1, indicating that the context and motivation of the initial behavior affect the direction of the temporal spillover. |
| Keywords: | Dictator game, Opt-out option, ENGO, Temporal spillover, Social information |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:gemptp:hal-04982503 |
| By: | Alice Soldà (Emlyon business school, CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France); Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We investigated whether individuals use narratives about the role of luck to influence decision-makers’ interpretation of noisy performance signals in a tournament setting. In an experiment, pairs of workers were either rewarded for accurately estimating their relative performance (Control treatment), persuading a manager they outperformed their competitor (Strategic treatment), or both (Trade-Off treatment). Results show that workers were most likely to adopt self-serving narratives attributing signals of lower performance to bad luck in the Strategic treatment. This tendency was reduced in the Trade-Off treatment where accuracy incentives were introduced. While self-serving narratives influenced managers’ decisions regarding the allocation of the winner’s prize, they did not change workers’ beliefs, suggesting that the narratives did not deceive them. |
| Keywords: | Narratives, persuasion, beliefs, tournament, performance evaluation, online experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D83 J33 M52 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2505 |
| By: | Michele Garagnani; Petra Schweinhardt; Philippe N. Tobler; Carlos Alos Ferrer |
| Abstract: | Numerical self-report scales are extensively used in economics, psychology, and even medicine to quantify subjective feelings, ranging from life satisfaction to the experience of pain. These scales are often criticized for lacking an objective foundation, and defended on the grounds of empirical performance. We focus on the case of pain measurement, where existing self-reported measures are the workhorse but known to be inaccurate and difficult to compare across individuals. We provide a new measure, inspired by standard economic elicitation methods, that quantifies the negative value of acute pain in monetary terms, making it comparable across individuals. In three preregistered studies, 330 healthy participants were randomly allocated to receive either only a high- or only a low-pain stimulus or a high-pain stimulus after having double-blindly received a topical analgesic or a placebo. In all three studies, the new measure greatly outperformed the existing self-report scales at distinguishing whether participants were in the more or the less painful condition, as confirmed by effect sizes, Bayesian factor analysis, and regression-based predictions. |
| Keywords: | Self-Reported Scales, Preference Elicitation, Pain |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:421926304 |