nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2025–01–27
five papers chosen by
Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale


  1. Motivated Skepticism By Jeanne Hagenbach; Charlotte Saucet
  2. RISK IN TIME: The Intertwined Nature of Risk Taking and Time Discounting By Thomas F Epper; Helga Fehr-Duda
  3. Motivated Information Acquisition and Social Norm Formation By Eugen Dimant; Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval
  4. Intergenerational Intergroup Cooperation: “Future†ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation in the minimal and natural group contexts By Hirotaka Imada; Yukako Inoue; Alice Yamamoto-Wilson; Tatsuyoshi Saijo; Nobuhiro Mifune
  5. Metacognition biases information seeking in assessing ambiguous news By Valentin Guigon; Marie Claire Villeval; Jean-Claude Dreher

  1. By: Jeanne Hagenbach (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, WZB - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung); Charlotte Saucet (UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We experimentally study how individuals read strategically transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Compared to neutral settings, skepticism is significantly lower when it is self-threatening, and not enhanced when it is self-serving. These results shed light on a new channel that individuals can use to protect their beliefs in communication situations: they exercise skepticism in a motivated way, that is, in a way that depends on the desirability of the conclusions that skeptical inferences lead to. We propose two behavioural models that can generate motivated skepticism. In one model, the Receiver freely manipulates his beliefs after having made skeptical inferences. In the other, the Receiver reasons about evidence in steps and the depth of his reasoning is motivated.
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04821601
  2. By: Thomas F Epper (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IÉSEG School Of Management [Puteaux]); Helga Fehr-Duda (UZH - Universität Zürich [Zürich] = University of Zurich)
    Abstract: Standard economic models view risk taking and time discounting as two independent dimensions of decision making. However, mounting experimental evidence demonstrates striking parallels in patterns of risk taking and time discounting behavior and systematic interaction effects, which suggests that there may be common underlying forces driving these interactions. Here we show that the inherent uncertainty associated with future prospects together with individuals' proneness to probability weighting generates a unifying framework for explaining a large number of puzzling behavioral regularities: delay-dependent risk tolerance, aversion to sequential resolution of uncertainty, preferences for the timing of the resolution of uncertainty, the differential discounting of risky and certain outcomes, hyperbolic discounting, subadditive discounting, and the order dependence of prospect valuation. Furthermore, all these phenomena can be predicted simultaneously with the same set of preference parameters.
    Keywords: risk preferences, time preferences, preference interaction, increasing risk tolerance
    Date: 2024–02–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03473431
  3. By: Eugen Dimant; Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We examine the effect of self-selected peer information on individual behavior and social norm formation via two experiments (N=1, 945; N=2, 414) using a lying game and political identification. A self-serving bias emerges in endogenous information search, wherein lenient sources (i.e., sources containing more tolerant empirical or normative information regarding dishonesty), especially those aligned with political identification, are preferred. Selecting lenient sources about peer perception of social norms boosts dishonesty, while peer behavior information chiefly influences expectations about dishonesty, with a minor impact on own behavior. Importantly, peer approval expectations stay largely unaltered by both information types. In a follow-up experiment with exogenously assigned sources, the influence of social information on behavior and expectations is diminished.
    Keywords: Social Norms, Information Acquisition, Peer Effects, Group Identity, Dishonesty, Experiment Design
    Date: 2024–08–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04199140
  4. By: Hirotaka Imada (Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London); Yukako Inoue (Department of Social Psychology, Yasuda Women’s University); Alice Yamamoto-Wilson (Independent Researcher, Tokyo, Japan); Tatsuyoshi Saijo (Kyoto University of Advanced Science); Nobuhiro Mifune (Research Institute for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology)
    Abstract: Issues related to sustainability (e.g., climate change and over-fishing) manifest themselves as intergenerational social dilemmas, and people are constantly faced with a choice between self-serving unsustainable behavior and sustainable, personally costly behavior. Extending the previous literature on intergroup (non-international) cooperation, we tested whether group membership of the future generations influences sustainable decision making. Two preregistered studies focusing on the minimal group (N = 1393) and the natural group (Japan vs. China, N = 1781), we revealed future ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation; individuals are more and less likely to make a sustainable decision when they believe that their current behavior benefits future ingroup and outgroup members, respectively. Future ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation were primarily driven by the increased felt responsibility for future generations and the reduced sense of reputational concern.
    Keywords: intergenerational decision-making, intergenerational cooperation, future generation, sustainability, ingroup favoritism
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2025-1
  5. By: Valentin Guigon (ISC-MJ - Institut des sciences cognitives Marc Jeannerod - Centre de neuroscience cognitive - UMR5229 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-Claude Dreher (ISC-MJ - Institut des sciences cognitives Marc Jeannerod - Centre de neuroscience cognitive - UMR5229 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Abstract How do we assess the veracity of ambiguous news, and does metacognition guide our decisions to seek further information? In a controlled experiment, participants evaluated the veracity of ambiguous news and decided whether to seek extra information. Confidence in their veracity judgments did not predict accuracy, showing limited metacognitive ability when facing ambiguous news. Despite this, confidence in one's judgment was the primary driver of the demand for additional information about the news. Lower confidence predicted a stronger desire for extra information, regardless of the veracity judgment. Two key news characteristics led individuals to confidently misinterpret both true and fake news. News imprecision and news tendency to polarize opinions increased the likelihood of misjudgment, highlighting individuals' vulnerability to ambiguity. Structural equation modeling revealed that the demand for disambiguating information, driven by uncalibrated metacognition, became increasingly ineffective as individuals are drawn in by the ambiguity of the news. Our results underscore the importance of metacognitive abilities in mediating the relationship between assessing ambiguous information and the decision to seek or avoid more information.
    Date: 2024–12–19
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04848999

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