nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2024‒10‒21
three papers chosen by
Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale


  1. The Virtual Bingo Blower: An open-source tool to generate ambiguity and risk in experiments By Andersson, Ola; Castillo, Geoffrey; Wengström, Erik
  2. Revealing choice bracketing By Ellis, Andrew; Freeman, David J.
  3. Personality, Weak Signals, and Workplace Relevant Morality By Dickinson, David L.; Masclet, David

  1. By: Andersson, Ola (Uppsala University, Department of Economics); Castillo, Geoffrey (Nottingham Trent University); Wengström, Erik (Department of Economics, Lund University)
    Abstract: We propose the Virtual Bingo Blower (VBB) as a way to generate credible risk and ambiguity in computerized experiments. Using a physics engine—a computer simulation of a physical system—the VBB simulates a conventional bingo blower. Different aspects of the VBB, such as the number of balls, their color, and their speed, can be easily modified. In an online experiment, we measure ambiguity attitudes and vary the source of ambiguity, using either the VBB or natural events. We find that the VBB and natural events result in a similar degree of ambiguity aversion. Further, we find that, by manipulating the number of balls, the VBB can be used to manipulate the perceived level of ambiguity.
    Keywords: ambiguity; risk; bingo blower; online experiment; experimental tools; randomization
    JEL: C91 D81
    Date: 2024–09–30
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2024_008
  2. By: Ellis, Andrew; Freeman, David J.
    Abstract: Experiments suggest that people fail to take into account interdependencies between their choices—they do not broadly bracket. Researchers often instead assume people narrowly bracket, but existing designs do not test it. We design a novel experiment and revealed preference tests for how someone brackets their choices. In portfolio allocation under risk, social allocation, and induced-value shopping experiments, 40–43 percent of subjects are consistent with narrow bracketing, and 0–16 percent with broad bracketing. Adjusting for each model's predictive precision, 74 percent of subjects are best described by narrow bracketing, 13 percent by broad bracketing, and 6 percent by intermediate cases.
    Keywords: AAM requested
    JEL: D12 D81 D91
    Date: 2024–09–20
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:125470
  3. By: Dickinson, David L. (Appalachian State University); Masclet, David (University of Rennes)
    Abstract: Employers use applicant signals to help solve an asymmetric information problem in organizations. In this paper, we examine the impact of validated Dark versus Light personality traits on incentivized behaviors important to organizations: task effort, honesty, and reciprocity. A second study examined the behavioral impact of two weak signals: regular participation in religious activities (public and private) and a history of time in prison. Study 1 found that Dark relative to Light types were more likely to cheat and shirk in the honesty task, put forth less task effort (i.e., were less productive), but neither type showed evidence for negative cross-task reciprocity (i.e., a spillover from one task to another). In Study 2, ex-Prisoners were more productive than Religious participants in the effort task, and more likely to have shirked in the honesty task. Additionally, ex-Prisoners were more likely to exhibit negative cross-task reciprocity. These findings indicate that both Dark types and ex-Prisoners exhibited behaviors that would be considered undesirable or counterproductive in the workplace, which validates the effectiveness of such characteristics or traits as behavioral signals.
    Keywords: experiment, personality traits, honesty, personnel economics, screening, effort
    JEL: C9 D9 M5
    Date: 2024–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17280

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