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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2024‒03‒04
seven papers chosen by |
| By: | Greiner, Ben; Grünwald, Philipp; Lindner, Thomas; Lintner, Georg; Wiernsperger, Martin |
| Abstract: | Managerial decision-makers are increasingly supported by advanced data analytics and other AI-based technologies, but are often found to be hesitant to follow the algorithmic advice. We examine how compensation contract design and framing of an AI algorithm influence decision-makers’ reliance on algorithmic advice and performance in a price estimation task. Based on a large sample of almost 1, 500 participants, we find that compared to a fixed compensation, both compensation contracts based on individual performance and tournament contracts lead to an increase in effort duration and to more reliance on algorithmic advice. We further find that using an AI algorithm that is framed as incorporating also human expertise has positive effects on advice utilization, especially for decision-makers with fixed pay contracts. By showing how widely used control practices such as incentives and task framing influence the interaction of human decision-makers with AI algorithms, our findings have direct implications for managerial practice. |
| Keywords: | artificial intelligence; algorithmic advice; human-augmented algorithmic advice; trust; financial incentives; decision-making |
| Date: | 2024–01–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus055:60237853&r=cbe |
| By: | Roggenkamp, Hauke C. (Univerisity of St. Gallen) |
| Abstract: | I revisit the dynamic public goods game developed by Gächter et al. (2017) to study cooperation under dynamic interdependencies. Collecting data from both a convenient (students) and an inconvenient (general population) sample, I not only reproduce some of the authors' original observations but also test their novel game's generalizability. Appending a charitable dictator game, I find no correlations between behavior in the charitable context and the dynamic game. This applies to students and the general population sample alike. Because the study of inexperienced general population samples raises methodological challenges, such as fatigue and dropouts, this research approaches them. In doing so, I provide simple solutions to run reliable interactive experiments online. Furthermore, this article showcases the use of literate programming and version control which I argue are convenient tools to make pre-registrations more credible and flexible. |
| Date: | 2024–02–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:6rn97&r=cbe |
| By: | Elias Bouacida; Renaud Foucart; Maya Jalloul |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of external advice on the relative performance of chess players. We asked players in chess tournaments to evaluate positions in past games and allowed them to revise their evaluation following advice from a high or a low ability player. While our data confirms the theoretical prediction that high-quality advice has the potential to act as a “great equalizer, †reducing the difference between high and low ability players, this is not what happens in practice. This is in part because our subjects ignore too much of the advice they receive, but also because low ability players pay – either due to overconfidence or intrinsic preference – a higher premium than high ability ones by following their initial idea instead of high-quality advice. |
| Keywords: | decreasing differences, expert, advice, chess, control |
| JEL: | C78 C91 C93 D91 J24 O33 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:408394204&r=cbe |
| By: | Moritz A. Drupp; Menusch Khadjavi; Rudi Voss |
| Abstract: | Academic honesty is crucial for scientific advancement, yet replication crises and misconduct scandals are omnipresent. We provide evidence on scientists’ truth-telling from two incentivized coin-tossing experiments with more than 1, 300 scientists. Experiment I, with predominantly European and North-American scientists, shows that fewer scientists over-report winning tosses when their professional identity is salient. The global Experiment II yields heterogeneous effects. We replicate Experiment I’s effect for North-American scientists, but find the opposite for Southern European and East-Asian scientists. Over-reporting correlates with publication metrics and country-level measures of academic and field-experimental dishonesty, suggesting that country-level honesty norms also guide truth-telling by scientists. |
| Keywords: | truth-telling, lying, identity, science, cross-country, experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D82 K42 J45 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10897&r=cbe |
| By: | Grunewald, Andreas; Klockmann, Victor; von Schenk, Alicia; von Siemens, Ferdinand |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the potential reinforcement of motivated beliefs when individuals with identical biases communicate. We propose a controlled online experiment that allows to manipulate belief biases and the communication environment. We find that communication, even among like-minded individuals, diminishes motivated beliefs if it takes place in an environment without previously declared external opinions. In the presence of external plural opinions, however, communication does not reduce but rather aggravates motivated beliefs. Our results indicate a potential drawback of the plurality of opinions-it may create communication environments wherein motivated beliefs not only persist but also become contagious within social networks. |
| Keywords: | Belief bias, Social interaction, Motivated beliefs |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D83 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wuewep:282999&r=cbe |
| By: | de Courson, Benoît; Frankenhuis, Willem; Nettle, Daniel (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In situations of poverty, do people take more or less risk? Some theories state that poverty makes people 'vulnerable': they cannot buffer against losses, and therefore avoid risk. Yet, other theories state the opposite: poverty makes people 'desperate': they have little left to lose, and therefore take risks. Each theory has some support: most studies find a negative association between resources and risk taking, but risky behaviors such as crime are more common in deprived populations. Here, we test the 'desperation threshold' model, which integrates both hypotheses. The model assumes that people attempt to stay above a critical level of resources, representing their 'basic needs'. Just above the threshold, people have too much to lose, and should avoid risk. Below it, they have little to lose, and should take risks. We conducted preregistered tests of this prediction using longitudinal data of 472 adults over the age of 25 in France and the UK, who completed a survey once a month for 12 months. We examined whether risk taking first increased and then decreased as a function of objective and subjective financial resources. Results supported this prediction for subjective resources, but not for objective resources. Next, we tested whether risk taking varies more among people who have fewer resources. We find strong evidence for both more extreme risk avoidance and more extreme risk taking in this group. We rule out alternative explanations related to question comprehension and measurement error, and discuss implications of our findings for welfare states, poverty, and crime. |
| Date: | 2024–02–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:gqjkm&r=cbe |
| By: | Lozano, Lina (New York University, Abu Dhabi); Riedl, Arno (Maastricht University); Rott, Christina (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus ('pie size'). We find that the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and that the effects depend on the information players have. Players who are informed about the pie size are less compromising during ovulation and receive higher payoffs conditional on reaching an agreement. Uninformed players achieve higher final payoffs during ovulation, which is mainly driven by higher agreement rates. |
| Keywords: | bargaining, asymmetric information, menstrual cycle, biological factors |
| JEL: | C78 C91 D87 J16 |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16768&r=cbe |