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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2024‒02‒05
seven papers chosen by |
| By: | Roland Bénabou (Princeton University, NBER, CEPR, IZA, BREAD, and briq); Armin Falk (University of Bonn); Luca Henkel (University of Chicago and University of CEMA, CESifo, JILAEE) |
| Abstract: | Choosing what is morally right can be based on the consequences (ends) resulting from the decision – the Consequentialist view – or on the conformity of the means involved with some overarching notion of duty – the Deontological view. Using a series of experiments, we investigate the overall prevalence and the consistency of consequentialist and deontological decision-making, when these two moral principles come into conflict. Our design includes a real-stakes version of the classical trolley dilemma, four novel games that induce ends-versus-means tradeoffs, and a rule-following task. These six main games are supplemented with six classical self-versus-other choice tasks, allowing us to relate consequential/deontological behavior to standard measures of prosociality. Across the six main games, we find a sizeable prevalence (20 to 44%) of non-consequentialist choices by subjects, but no evidence of stable individual preference types across situations. In particular, trolley behavior predicts no other ends-versus-means choices. Instead, which moral principle prevails appears to be context-dependent. In contrast, we find a substantial level of consistency across self-versus-other decisions, but individuals’ degree of prosociality is unrelated to how they choose in ends-versus-means tradeoffs. |
| Keywords: | morality, deontological, consequentialist, Kantian, ends-versus-means, trolley dilemma, prosocial, altruism, social preferences |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D64 |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:275&r=cbe |
| By: | Zvonimir BaÅ¡ić (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, UK); Parampreet C. Bindra (University of Innsbruck); Daniela Glätzle-Rützler (University of Innsbruck, Austria); Angelo Romano (Leiden University, Netherlands); Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, University of Cologne, Germany, University of Innsbruck, Austria, IZA Bonn, Germany, and CESifo Munich); Claudia Zoller (Management Center Innsbruck) |
| Abstract: | We study the developmental roots of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest and is more effective as a means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that already children aged 3 act in a conditionally cooperative way. Yet, direct and indirect reciprocity do not increase overall cooperation rates beyond a control condition. Compared to the latter, punishment more than doubles cooperation rates, making it the most effective mechanism to promote cooperation. We also find that children’s cognitive skills and parents’ socioeconomic background influence cooperation. We complement our experimental findings with a meta-analysis of studies on cooperation among adults and older children, confirming that punishment outperforms direct and indirect reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, reciprocity, third-party punishment, children, parents, prisoner’s dilemma game, experiment, meta-analysis |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D01 D91 H41 |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2024_02&r=cbe |
| By: | Pietro Guarnieri; Lorenzo Spadoni |
| Abstract: | In this experimental study, we delve into the role of personal and social norms in an anti-coordination decision, such as the choice between staying home or going out in the El Farol Bar Game. Our design consists of two interconnected studies: in Study 1, we elicit either empirical or normative expectations before subjects make their decision in a one-shot El Farol Bar Game; in Study 2, subjects play two El Farol Bar games with different social-expectation primes. Our results reveal that the majority of subjects believe that staying home is the right thing to do and tend to act in accordance with their normative belief. Nevertheless, there is no prevailing consensus on what others believe is normatively right (normative expectations), and subjects do not base their decisions on these expectations. Conversely, a substantial majority of subjects expects that the predominant behavior is staying home (empirical expectations), and subjects tend to adhere to their empirical expectations. As far as social-expectation primes are concerned, they only lower subjects’ propensity to go out. This happens only when the prime conveys an empirical expectation to go out or a normative expectation to stay home. Furthermore, we observe a relatively low rate of change in the second El Farol Bar decision, and this does not hinge on the prime content. |
| Keywords: | Wealth; anti-coordination games; social expectations; normative beliefs |
| JEL: | C90 D83 D84 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pie:dsedps:2024/303&r=cbe |
| By: | Ximeng Fang (University of Oxford); Lorenz Goette (University of Bonn); Bettina Rockenbach (University of Cologne); Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, University of Cologne, University of Innsbruck); Verena Tiefenbeck (Friedrich-Alexander Universität Nürnberg-Erlangen, ETH Zurich); Samuel Schoeb (University of Bamberg); Thorsten Staake (University of Bamberg, ETH Zurich) |
| Abstract: | Behavioral policy often aims at influencing behavior by mitigating biases due to, e.g., imperfect information or inattention. We study how this is affected by the simultaneous presence of multiple biases arising from different sources, through a field experiment on resource conservation in an energyand water-intensive everyday activity (showering). One intervention, shower energy reports, primarily targeted knowledge about environmental impacts; another intervention, real-time feedback, primarily targeted salience of resource use. We find a striking complementarity. While only the latter induced significant conservation effects when implemented in isolation, each intervention became more effective when implemented jointly. This is consistent with predictions from a theoretical framework that highlights the importance of targeting all relevant sources of bias to achieve behavioral change. |
| Keywords: | behavioral public policy, pro-environmental behavior, limited attention, information provision, real-time feedback, policy interactions |
| JEL: | D83 D90 Q41 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2023_13&r=cbe |
| By: | Thomas Graeber (Harvard Business School); Shakked Noy (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Christopher Roth (. University of Cologne, ECONtribute, CEPR, briq and MPI for Collective Goods Bonn) |
| Abstract: | For many decisions, people rely on information received from others by word of mouth. How does the process of verbal transmission distort economic information? In our experiments, participants listen to audio recordings containing economic forecasts and are paid to accurately transmit the information via voice messages. Other participants listen either to an original recording or a transmitted version and then state incentivized beliefs. Our main finding is that, across a variety of transmitter incentive schemes, information about the reliability of a forecast is lost in transmission more than twice as much as information about theforecast’s level. This differential information loss predictably distorts listeners’ belief updates: following transmission, reliable and unreliable messages converge in influence and average belief updates from new information are weakened. Mechanism experiments show that the differential loss is not driven by transmitters deliberately trading off the costs and benefits of transmitting different kinds of information. Instead, it results from memory constraints during transmission, which can be overcome through targeted reminders. |
| Keywords: | Information Transmission, Word-of-mouth, Narratives, Reliability |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:272&r=cbe |
| By: | McGee, Andrew (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); McGee, Peter (University of Arkansas) |
| Abstract: | What can employers learn from personality tests when applicants have incentives to misrepresent themselves? Using a within-subject, laboratory experiment, we compare personality measures with and without incentives for misrepresentation. Incentivized personality measures are weakly to moderately correlated with non-incentivized measures in all treatments. When test-takers are given a job ad indicating that an extrovert (introvert) is desired, extroversion measures are positively (negatively) correlated with IQ. Among other characteristics, only locus of control appears related to faking on personality measures. Our findings highlight the identification challenges in measuring personality and the potential for correlations between incentivized personality measures and other traits. |
| Keywords: | personality; measurement; hiring; screening; experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D82 M50 |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2023_012&r=cbe |
| By: | Diekert, Florian; Goeschl, Timo; König-Kersting, Christian |
| Abstract: | Can Attribution Science, a method for quantifying – ex post – humanity’s contribution to adverse climatic events, induce pro-environmental behavioral change? We conduct a conceptual test of this question by studying, in an online experiment with 3, 031 participants, whether backwards-looking attribution affects future decisions, even when seemingly uninformative to a consequentialist decision-maker. By design, adverse events can arise as a result of participants’ pursuit of higher payoffs (anthropogenic cause) or as a result of chance (natural cause). Treatments vary whether adverse events are causally attributable and whether attribution can be acquired at cost. We find that ex-post attributability is behaviorally relevant: Attribution to an anthropogenic cause reduces future anthropogenic stress and leads to fewer adverse events compared to no attributability and compared to attribution to a natural cause. Average willingness-to-pay for ex-post attribution is positive. The conjecture that Attribution Science can be behaviorally impactful and socially valuable has empirical merit. |
| Keywords: | Extreme event attribution; attribution science; behavioral change; cause dependence; online experiment |
| Date: | 2024–01–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0741&r=cbe |