| By: |
Nisvan Erkal (Department of Economics, University of Melbourne);
Boon Han Koh (Department of Economics, University of Exeter);
Nguyen Lam (Department of Economics, University of Melbourne) |
| Abstract: |
Many economic activities rely on teamwork where groups of individuals work
together for a common goal by pooling their resources or skills. However,
cooperation within teams can be challenging due to the social dilemma problem
which arises when individual incentives interfere with operational
effectiveness. We study teamwork in a dynamic public goods game setting where
individuals make multiple contribution decisions to a team project and face
strategic uncertainty about the behavior of their team members. We examine
whether providing feedback about the team’s progress at regular intervals
(time-based feedback) or based on the achievement of milestones
(milestone-based feedback) is more beneficial for increasing aggregate
contributions. Our results reveal that providing milestone-based feedback
leads to a significant increase in aggregate team contributions as compared to
time-based feedback. This impact is largely driven by conditional cooperators.
Findings from a follow-up experiment reveal evidence of a goal effect, a
signaling effect, and an information effect arising from the use of milestones
on the behavior of conditional cooperators. |
| Keywords: |
teamwork, public good provision, milestones, feedback, voluntary contribution mechanism |
| JEL: |
C92 D83 D91 H41 |
| Date: |
2023–09–12 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exe:wpaper:2310&r=cbe |