nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2023‒07‒10
five papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Financial literacy, experimental preference measures and field behavior – A randomized educational intervention By Matthias Sutter; Michael Weyland; Anna Untertrifaller; Manuel Froitzheim; Sebastian O. Schneider
  2. Testing Isomorphic Invariance Across Social Dilemma Games By Irene Maria Buso; Lorenzo Ferrari; Werner Güth; Luisa Lorè; Lorenzo Spadoni
  3. Strategic decisions and eye tracking data By Gelden, Victoria
  4. When Fairness Is Not Enough: The Disproportionate Contributions of the Poor in a Collective Action Problem By Malthouse, Eugene; Pilgrim, Charlie; Hills, Thomas; Sgroi, Daniel
  5. Anti-social behaviour and economic decision-making: panel experimental evidence in the wake of COVID-19 By Lohmann, Paul M.; Gsottbauer, Elisabeth; You, Jing; Kontoleon, Andreas

  1. By: Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Michael Weyland (Ludwigsburg University of Education); Anna Untertrifaller (University of Cologne); Manuel Froitzheim (University of Siegen); Sebastian O. Schneider (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
    Abstract: We present the results of a randomized intervention to study how teaching financial literacy to 16-year old high-school students affects their behavior in risk and time preference tasks. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that teaching financial literacy makes subjects behave more patiently, more time-consistent, and more risk-averse. These effects persist for up to almost 5 years after our intervention. Behavior in the risk and time preference tasks is related to financial behavior outside the lab, in particular spending patterns. This shows that teaching financial literacy affects economic decision-making which in turn is important for field behavior.
    Keywords: Financial literacy, randomized intervention, risk preferences, time preferences, financial behavior, field experiment
    JEL: C93 D14 I21
    Date: 2023–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2023_03&r=cbe
  2. By: Irene Maria Buso (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari); Lorenzo Ferrari (Italian Competition Authority); Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods,); Luisa Lorè (Department of Economics, Universität Innsbruck); Lorenzo Spadoni (Department of Economics and Law, University of Cassino and Southern Lazio)
    Abstract: In this study, we test whether purely behavioral aspects affect voluntary cooperativeness in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Public Good Games, thereby questioning their isomorphic invariance. The experiment compares games whose identical payoffs are described as of the Prisoners’ Dilemma or as of linear Public Good. Social dilemma frames are compared between subjects whereas 2- or 3-person games are compared within subjects. We either confront participants with the 2-person before the 3-person game or in reverse order, always without feedback information between rounds. The analysis rejects isomorphic invariance and shows less average cooperativeness, especially more likely free riding, in the case of the Public Good type.
    Keywords: Social dilemma experiments, Isomorphic invariance, Public goods game, Prisoners’ dilemma game, Voluntary cooperation.
    JEL: C71 C92 D70 D90
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2023:09&r=cbe
  3. By: Gelden, Victoria
    Abstract: Recently, there has been a growing interest in the use of eye gaze. through a well-established gaze tracking method in psychology. The study of economic decision making. The purpose is to find Behavioral insights that are not basedly available Based only on observed choice data. At the same time, the opposite with expensive and complex procedures such as fMRI; Eye-tracking allows subjects to be tested under certain conditions. Standard tests showed similar conditions. Behavioral experiments.
    Date: 2023–05–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:h6stv&r=cbe
  4. By: Malthouse, Eugene (University of Warwick); Pilgrim, Charlie (University College London); Hills, Thomas (University of Warwick); Sgroi, Daniel (University of Warwick)
    Abstract: Many of our most pressing challenges, from combating climate change to dealing with pandemics, are collective action problems: situations in which individual and collective interests conflict with each other. In such situations people face a dilemma about making individually costly but collectively beneficial contributions to the common good. Understanding which factors influence people's willingness to make these contributions is vital for the design of policies and institutions that support the attainment of collective goals. In this study we investigate how inequalities, and different causes of inequalities, impact individual-level behaviour and group-level outcomes. First, we find that what people judged to be fair was not enough to solve the collective action problem: if they acted according to what they thought was fair, they would collectively fail. Second, the level of wealth (rich vs. poor) altered what was judged to be a fair contribution to the public good more than the cause of wealth (merit vs. luck vs. uncertain). Contributions during the game reflected these fairness judgements, with poorer individuals consistently contributing a higher proportion of their wealth than richer participants, which further increased inequality – particularly in successful groups. Finally, the cause of one's wealth was largely irrelevant, mattering most only when it was uncertain, as opposed to resulting from merit or luck. We discuss implications for policymakers and international climate change negotiations.
    Keywords: public goods, collective action, cooperation, meritocracy
    JEL: C92 D91 D63
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16179&r=cbe
  5. By: Lohmann, Paul M.; Gsottbauer, Elisabeth; You, Jing; Kontoleon, Andreas
    Abstract: We systematically examine the acute impact of exposure to a public health crisis on anti-social behaviour and economic decision-making using unique experimental panel data from China, collected just before the outbreak of COVID-19 and immediately after the first wave was overcome. Exploiting plausibly exogenous geographical variation in virus exposure coupled with a dataset of longitudinal experiments, we show that participants who were more intensely exposed to the virus outbreak became more anti-social than those with lower exposure, while other aspects of economic and social preferences remain largely stable. The finding is robust to multiple hypothesis testing and a similar, yet less pronounced pattern emerges when using alternative measures of virus exposure, reflecting societal concern and sentiment, constructed using social media data. The anti-social response is particularly pronounced for individuals who experienced an increase in depression or negative affect, which highlights the important role of psychological health as a potential mechanism through which the virus outbreak affected behaviour.
    Keywords: anti-social behaviour; coronavirus; natural experiment; panel data; risk preferences; social media data; time preferences; Covid-19
    JEL: C93 D64 D81 D91 I18
    Date: 2023–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:117702&r=cbe

This nep-cbe issue is ©2023 by Marco Novarese. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.