nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2023‒06‒19
six papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. To request or not to request: charitable giving, social information, and spillover By Valeria Fanghella; Lisette Ibanez; John Thøgersen
  2. Financial Literacy, Experimental Preference Measures and Field Behavior – A Randomized Educational Intervention By Sutter, Matthias; Weyland, Michael; Untertrifaller, Anna; Froitzheim, Manuel; Schneider, Sebastian O.
  3. Nudging in Complex Environments By Koch, Alexander K.; Monster, Dan; Nafziger, Julia
  4. The Economic Approach to Personality, Character and Virtue By Heckman, James J.; Galaty, Bridget; Tian, Haihan
  5. Promoting in-person attendance for early childhood services after the COVID-19 pandemic using text messages By Andrés Ham; Juanita Ruiz; Oscar Iván Pineda-Diaz; Natalia Iriarte-Tovar; Juan Sebastián Cifuentes; María Fernanda Rodríguez-Camacho; Laura Feliza Vélez
  6. Free to fail? Paternalistic preferences in the United States By Björn Bartling; Alexander W. Cappelen; Henning Hermes; Marit Skivenes; Bertil Tungodden

  1. By: Valeria Fanghella (EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management); Lisette Ibanez (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); John Thøgersen (Aarhus University [Aarhus])
    Abstract: Prosocial behavior is important for a well-functioning society, but many people try to avoid situations where they could act prosocially. This paper studies the avoidance of a prosocial request, how it is affected by social pressure, and whether request avoidance and social pressure generate spillover effects on following prosocial behaviors. To this aim, we conduct an incentivized online experiment (N=1400), where participants play two consecutive dictator games with a charity. In the first game, we vary the type of game and information provided in a 2 x 2 between-subject design: (i) standard dictator game or dictator game with costly opt-out; (ii) with or without social information (mean donation in a previous session). The second game is a standard dictator game for all and aims to capture spillover effects from the first decision. We find that the opt-out option leads to significantly lower donations, especially when social information is present (but this effect is not statistically significant). The negative effect of the opt-out option spills over to the second donation decision. We also observe a negative spillover effect after a standard dictator game. Social information reduces donations in a standard dictator game, but also allows to mitigate the negative spillover effect from the first to the second behavior.
    Keywords: prosocial behavior, opt-out option, social information, spillover, charitable giving, selfimage
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04093001&r=cbe
  2. By: Sutter, Matthias (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Weyland, Michael (Ludwigsburg University of Education); Untertrifaller, Anna (University of Cologne); Froitzheim, Manuel (University of Siegen); Schneider, Sebastian O. (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)
    Abstract: We present the results of a randomized intervention to study how teaching financial literacy to 16-year old high-school students affects their behavior in risk and time preference tasks. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that teaching financial literacy makes subjects behave more patiently, more time-consistent, and more risk-averse. These effects persist for up to almost 5 years after our intervention. Behavior in the risk and time preference tasks is related to financial behavior outside the lab, in particular spending patterns. This shows that teaching financial literacy affects economic decision-making which in turn is important for field behavior.
    Keywords: financial behavior, time preferences, risk preferences, randomized intervention, financial literacy, field experiment
    JEL: C93 D14 I21
    Date: 2023–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16102&r=cbe
  3. By: Koch, Alexander K. (Aarhus University); Monster, Dan (Aarhus University); Nafziger, Julia (Aarhus University)
    Abstract: To study the effects of reminder nudges in complex environments, we apply a novel experimental approach based on a computer game in which decision makers have to pay attention to and perform multiple actions within a short period of time. The set-up allows us, first, to test the effect of reminders both on reminded and non-reminded actions and thus to observe whether reminders have (positive or negative) spillovers. Second, we investigate spillovers between multiple nudges by testing the effect of scaling up the number of reminded actions. Third, we study intertemporal spillovers by investigating whether the effects of having been exposed to reminders persist after reminders are withdrawn. We observe that reminders have positive effects in the short run – multiple reminders more so than single reminders: while reminders lead to crowding-out of non-reminded actions, the positive effect on the reminded actions dominates. Yet, after withdrawal of the reminders, the negative spillover effect persists, while the positive effect partially fades out so that, overall, reminders have no effect.
    Keywords: nudging, spillover effects, attention, reminders, persistence, game-based experiments
    JEL: C9 D91
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16137&r=cbe
  4. By: Heckman, James J. (University of Chicago); Galaty, Bridget (University of Chicago); Tian, Haihan (University of Chicago)
    Abstract: This chapter presents an economic approach to character and personality traits with an application to the study of virtue. Economists interpret psychological traits, including character traits and virtue, as strategies that shape responses to situations (actions) determined by underlying endowments, preferences and resources, as well as incentives to act in situations. Philosophers of virtue consider a more limited set of goals than economists but the same tools can be applied to the economics of virtue ethics. Character traits and personality are not considered immutable in either field. They are shaped by genetics, parents, peers, and schools, as well as life experiences. We develop economic models to interpret and give empirical content to virtue ethics and suggest what virtue ethics contributes to the study of economic models.
    Keywords: traits, philosophy, ethics, economic models
    JEL: J24 J13 I24
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16133&r=cbe
  5. By: Andrés Ham; Juanita Ruiz; Oscar Iván Pineda-Diaz; Natalia Iriarte-Tovar; Juan Sebastián Cifuentes; María Fernanda Rodríguez-Camacho; Laura Feliza Vélez
    Abstract: This paper investigates whether text messages can encourage caregivers of young children to increase their intention to use in-person early childhood services and subsequently, actual attendance. We randomly assign 15, 100 beneficiaries in 719 educational centers into one control and two treatment groups, the first in which caregivers receive four text messages designed to target risk and loss aversion for three weeks, while the second group receives the same number of messages reinforcing social norms that early childhood education is a civic duty. Results show greater reported intent from caregivers who receive text messages for their children to attend but no significant differences by the type of message. However, this increased willingness to attend does not translate into greater effective attendance. These findings suggest that while text messages may be useful to provide information to caregivers, these nudges require additional and complementary efforts to turn their reported intentions into actions. ****** This paper investigates whether text messages can encourage caregivers of young children to increase their intention to use in-person early childhood services and subsequently, actual attendance. We randomly assign 15, 100 beneficiaries in 719 educational centers into one control and two treatment groups, the first in which caregivers receive four text messages designed to target risk and loss aversion for three weeks, while the second group receives the same number of messages reinforcing social norms that early childhood education is a civic duty. Results show greater reported intent from caregivers who receive text messages for their children to attend but no significant differences by the type of message. However, this increased willingness to attend does not translate into greater effective attendance. These findings suggest that while text messages may be useful to provide information to caregivers, these nudges require additional and complementary efforts to turn their reported intentions into actions.
    Keywords: Early childhood education, text messages, intention to attend, attendance, nudges.
    JEL: C93 D90 E70 I12 I20
    Date: 2022–10–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000547:020773&r=cbe
  6. By: Björn Bartling; Alexander W. Cappelen; Henning Hermes; Marit Skivenes; Bertil Tungodden
    Abstract: We study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders’ own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators’ willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder’s freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder’s responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set – whether the source of mistake is internal or external – and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types – libertarian paternalists and welfarists – and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions.
    Keywords: Paternalism, libertarian paternalism, welfarism, freedom to choose
    JEL: C91 C93 D69 D91
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:436&r=cbe

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