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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2022‒10‒10
seven papers chosen by Marco Novarese Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Alexandros Karakostas (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia); Nhu Tran (Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Australia); Daniel John Zizzo (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia) |
| Abstract: | We conduct two meta-analyses on antisocial behavior in experimental settings in which such behavior is not rationally motivated by pecuniary incentives. We investigate the impact of its potential determinants. The first meta-analysis employs aggregate data across experimental settings from 93 published and unpublished studies (22,200 participants), using laboratory, field and online experiments carried out since 2000. We find that antisocial payoff destruction varies depending on the experimental setting, being highest in vendetta games and possibly lowest in social dilemma games. There is significant heterogeneity across the studies, including within game classes, making inference difficult. The second meta-analysis includes only money burning experiments (for which we have the largest number of observations: 46 studies and around 15,000 participants). It finds evidence of negative discrimination against outsiders, of exogenously disadvantaged subjects destroying more often, and of more antisocial behavior in one-shot interactions. The strategy method biases antisocial behavior upwards. We do not generally find publication bias, either in aggregate or in relation to money burning experiments. Field studies display more antisocial behavior than laboratory experiments. Taken together, our results point to the value of more laboratory experiments that systematically build on paradigmatic experimental designs to enable comparability and the identification of key economic drivers of antisocial behavior. |
| Keywords: | Antisocial Behavior, Meta-Analysis, Money Burning Games, Experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C93 D91 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qld:uq2004:658&r= |
| By: | Adena, Maja (WZB Berlin); Huck, Steffen (WZB Berlin and UCL) |
| Abstract: | In an artefactual field experiment, we implemented a crowdfunding campaign for an institute’s summer party and compared donation and contribution framings. We found that the use of the word ‘donation’ generated higher revenue than the use of ‘contribution’. While the individuals receiving the donation framing gave substantially larger amounts, those receiving the contribution framing responded more strongly to reward thresholds and suggestions. An additional survey experiment on MTurk indicated that the term ‘donation’ triggers more positive emotional responses and that emotions are highly correlated with giving. It appears that making a donation is perceived as a more voluntary act and is thus more successful at generating warm glow than making a contribution. We surmise that this extends to other funding mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | crowdfunding; field experiment; framing; |
| JEL: | C93 D64 D12 |
| Date: | 2022–05–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:326&r= |
| By: | Ahrens, Steffen (FU Berlin); Bosch-Rosa, Ciril (TU Berlin); Meissner, Thomas (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | We replicate Meissner (2016) where debt aversion was reported for the first time in an intertemporal consumption and saving problem. While Meissner (2016) uses a German sample, our subjects are US undergraduate students. All of the main findings from the original study replicate with similar effect sizes. Additionally, we extend the original analysis by correlating a new individual index of debt aversion on individual characteristics such as gender, cognitive ability, and risk aversion. The findings suggest that gender and risk aversion are not correlated with debt aversion. However, cognitive ability is positively correlated with debt aversion. Overall, this paper confirms the importance of debt aversion in intertemporal consumption problems and validates the approach of Meissner (2016). |
| Keywords: | debt aversion; replication; experiment; |
| JEL: | C91 D84 G11 G41 |
| Date: | 2022–01–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:312&r= |
| By: | Brown, Alexander L. (Texas A&M University); Imai, Taisuke (LMU Munich); Vieider, Ferdinand M. (Ghent University); Camerer, Colin F. (California Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | Loss aversion is one of the most widely used concepts in behavioral economics. We conduct a large-scale interdisciplinary meta-analysis, to systematically accumulate knowledge from numerous empirical estimates of the loss aversion coefficient reported during the past couple of decades. We examine 607 empirical estimates of loss aversion from 150 articles in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and several other disciplines. Our analysis indicates that the mean loss aversion coefficient is between 1.8 and 2.1. We also document how reported estimates vary depending on the observable characteristics of the study design. |
| Keywords: | loss aversion; prospect theory; meta-analysis; |
| JEL: | D81 D90 C90 C11 |
| Date: | 2021–01–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:275&r= |
| By: | Castro, M.F.;; Guccio, C.;; Romeo, D.; |
| Abstract: | By employing a large sample of both laboratory and field data, we investigate whether attitudes towards risk significantly vary between physicians, medical students and non-medical students. Also, we look for differences in risk propensity between laboratory and artefactual field experimental sessions and control for individuals’ characteristics that may affect risk attitude. Results show significant variation in risk attitude, regardless of the estimation technique employed (linear regression, interval regression and maximum likelihood estimation), suggesting constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) as a supported representation of risk preferences. Finally, data consistently show that physicians are more risk-seeking in the monetary domain than other subject groups. |
| Keywords: | risk aversion; field experiments; laboratory experiment; physicians’ behaviour; |
| JEL: | I1 C81 C93 D81 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:hectdg:22/26&r= |
| By: | Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta (TU Berlin); Seres, Gyula (HU Berlin) |
| Abstract: | Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents’ intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes. |
| Keywords: | anchoring bias; auctions; games; incomplete information; strategy; |
| JEL: | D01 D91 C72 |
| Date: | 2022–01–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:314&r= |
| By: | Dargnies, Marie-Pierre (University of Paris Dauphine and PSL); Hakimov, Rustamdjan (University of Lausanne and WZB Berlin); Kübler, Dorothea (WZB Berlin and TU Berlin) |
| Abstract: | We run an online experiment to study the origins of algorithm aversion. Participants are either in the role of workers or of managers. Workers perform three real-effort tasks: task 1, task 2, and the job task which is a combination of tasks 1 and 2. They choose whether the hiring decision between themselves and another worker is made either by a participant in the role of a manager or by an algorithm. In a second set of experiments, managers choose whether they want to delegate their hiring decisions to the algorithm. In the baseline treatments, we observe that workers choose the manager more often than the algorithm, and managers also prefer to make the hiring decisions themselves rather than delegate them to the algorithm. When the algorithm does not use workers' gender to predict their job task performance and workers know this, they choose the algorithm more often. Providing details on how the algorithm works does not increase the preference for the algorithm, neither for workers nor for managers. Providing feedback to managers about their performance in hiring the best workers increases their preference for the algorithm, as managers are, on average, overconfident. |
| Date: | 2022–09–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:334&r= |