| Abstract: |
We experimentally study the social transmission of "inconvenient" information
about the externalities generated by one's own decision. In the laboratory, we
pair uninformed decision makers with informed senders. Compared to a setting
where subjects can choose their information directly, we find that social
interactions increase selfish decisions. On the supply side, senders suppress
almost 30 percent of "inconvenient" information, driven by their own
preferences for information and their beliefs about the decision maker's
preferences. On the demand side, about one-third of decision makers avoids
senders who transmit inconvenient information ("shooting the messenger"),
which leads to assortative matching between information-suppressing senders
and information-avoiding decision makers. Having more control over information
generates opposing effects on behavior: selfish decision makers remain
ignorant more often and donate less, while altruistic decision makers seek out
informative senders and give more. We discuss applications to information
sharing in social networks and to organizational design. |