nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2021‒01‒18
six papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Debiasing Through Experience Sampling: The Case of Myopic Loss Aversion. By Christian König-Kersting
  2. The Distinct Impact of Information and Incentives on Cheating By Benistant, Julien; Galeotti, Fabio; Villeval, Marie Claire
  3. The Health-Wealth Trade-off during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Communication Matters By Carrieri, Vincenzo; De Paola, Maria; Gioia, Francesca
  4. Parental paternalism and patience By Kiessling, Lukas; Chowdhury, Shyamal K.; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Sutter, Matthias
  5. Detecting Drivers of Behavior at an Early Age: Evidence from a Longitudinal Field Experiment By Marco Castillo; John List; Ragan Petrie; Anya Samek
  6. Nudging Preventive Behaviors in COVID-19 Crisis: A Large Scale RCT using Smartphone Advertising By Daisuke Moriwaki; Soichiro Harada; Jiyan Schneider; Takahiro Hoshino

  1. By: Christian König-Kersting
    Abstract: We study the robustness of Krupka and Weber's method (2013) for eliciting social norms. In two experiments with more than 1200 participants, we find that participants' response patterns are invariant to differences in the salience of the monetarily incentivized coordination aspect. We further demonstrate that asking participants for their personal first and second order beliefs without monetary incentives results in qualitatively identical responses. In addition, we observe that participants give sensible responses whether or not they understand the task or their monetary incentives. Overall, Krupka and Weber's method produces remarkably robust response patterns.
    Keywords: social norms, incentives, beliefs, task comprehension, robustness
    JEL: C72 C90 D90
    Date: 2021–02
  2. By: Benistant, Julien (GATE, University of Lyon); Galeotti, Fabio (CNRS, GATE); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE)
    Abstract: We study a dynamic variant of the die-under-the-cup task where players can repeatedly misreport the outcomes of consecutive die rolls to earn more money, either under a non- competitive piece rate scheme or in a two-player competitive tournament. In this dynamic setting we test (i) whether giving continuous feedback (vs. final ex post feedback) on the opponent's reported outcome to both players encourages cheating behavior, and (ii) to what extent this influence depends on the incentive scheme in use (piece rate vs. tournament). We also vary whether the opponent is able to cheat or not. We find that people lie more when placed in a competitive rather than a non-competitive setting, but only if both players can cheat in the tournament. Continuous feedback on the counterpart's reports increases cheating under the piece-rate scheme but not in a competitive setting. Our results provide new insights on the role that feedback plays on cheating behavior in dynamic settings under different payment schemes, and shed light on the origins of the effect of competition on dishonesty.
    Keywords: dishonesty, feedback, peer effects, competitive incentives, experiment
    JEL: C92 M52 D83
    Date: 2021–01
  3. By: Carrieri, Vincenzo (Magna Graecia University); De Paola, Maria (University of Calabria); Gioia, Francesca (University of Milan)
    Abstract: How do people balance health/wealth concerns during a pandemic? And, how does the communication of this trade-off affect individual preferences? We address these questions using a field experiment involving around 2000 students enrolled in a large university in Italy. We design four treatments where the trade-off is communicated using different combinations of a positive framing that focuses on protective strategies and a negative framing which refers to potential costs. We find that positive framing on the health side induces individuals to give greater relevance to the health dimension. The effect is sizeable and highly effective among many different audiences, especially females. Importantly, this triggers a higher level of intention to adhere to social distancing and precautionary behaviors. Moreover, irrespective of the framing, we find a large heterogeneity in students' preferences over the trade-off. Economics students and students who have directly experienced the economic impact of the pandemic are found to favor wealth-centered policies.
    Keywords: COVID-19, health, economic costs, trade-off, framing
    JEL: D04 D83 D84 D91 H12 I10 J10
    Date: 2020–12
  4. By: Kiessling, Lukas; Chowdhury, Shyamal K.; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Sutter, Matthias
    Abstract: We study whether and how parents interfere paternalistically in their children's intertemporal decision-making. Based on experiments with over 2,000 members of 610 families, we find that parents anticipate their children's present bias and aim to mitigate it. Using a novel method to measure parental interference, we show that more than half of all parents are willing to pay money to override their children's choices. Parental interference predicts more intensive parenting styles and a lower intergenerational transmission of patience. The latter is driven by interfering parents not transmitting their own present bias, but molding their children's preferences towards more time-consistent choices.
    Keywords: Parental paternalism,Time preferences,Convex time budgets,Present bias,Intergenerational transmission,Parenting styles,Experiment
    JEL: C90 D1 D91 D64 J13 J24 O12
    Date: 2021
  5. By: Marco Castillo; John List; Ragan Petrie; Anya Samek
    Abstract: We use field experiments with nearly 900 children to investigate how skills developed at ages 3-5 drive later-life outcomes. We find that skills map onto three distinct factors - cognitive skills, executive functions, and economic preferences. Returning to the children up to 7 years later, we find that executive functions, but not cognitive skills, predict the likelihood of receiving disciplinary referrals. Economic preferences have an independent effect: children who displayed impatience at ages 3-5 were more likely to receive disciplinary referrals. Random assignment to a parenting program reduced disciplinary referrals. This effect was not mediated by skills or preferences.
    Date: 2021
  6. By: Daisuke Moriwaki (AI Division, CyberAgent, Inc.); Soichiro Harada (AI Division, CyberAgent, Inc.); Jiyan Schneider (Faculty of Economics, Keio University); Takahiro Hoshino (Faculty of Economics, Keio University)
    Abstract: Voluntary preventive behaviors are essential to slow the spread of the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19), and such behaviors can be promoted by nudge messaging. In this context, this study investigated the effectiveness of nudge-based messages in increasing individuals' engagement in preventive behaviors. We employed a large-scale randomized controlled trial involving 0.3 million mobile device users from Tokyo; these users were sent nudge-based messages through display advertising. This approach enabled us to track the GPS-based geolocation history of these users through various apps, in July 2020, when the second wave of Covid-19 hit Japan. Specifically, our study is the first attempt to measure the effect of the nudge intervention effects on the spatial movement behavior of people, by using smartphone's GPS information. The results revealed that the nudge-based messages increased users' avoidance of closed spaces, crowded spaces, and close contact during the weekends (characterized by heightened leisure activities, and hence spatial movements). The most effective messages emphasized financial loss aversion. The delivery cost of messages was less than $0.1/person, and the people who received the messages reduced outdoor activities by approximately 52 minutes/weekend day. Our follow-up survey suggests that the nudgebased messages cost 2.5-6.5% of the monetary compensation given for stay-at-home compliance, which achieves the same result. These findings have implications for the development of government marketing strategies and effective nudge-based interventions to overcome the current pandemic.
    Keywords: Covid-19, Heterogeneity, Loss aversion, Nudge, Treatment effect
    JEL: C26 D91 M38
    Date: 2020–11–08

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