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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2018‒09‒24
six papers chosen by Marco Novarese Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Oliver Kirchkamp (FSU Jena, School of Economics); Christina Strobel (FSU Jena, School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Humans make decisions jointly with others. They share responsibility for the outcome with their interaction partners. Today, more and more often the partner in a decision is not another human but, instead, a machine. Here we ask whether the type of the partner, machine or human, affects our responsibility, our perception of the choice and the choice itself. As a workhorse we use a modified dictator game with two joint decision makers: either two humans or one human and one machine. We find no treatment effect on perceived responsibility or guilt. We also find only a small and insignificant effect on actual choices. |
| Keywords: | Human-computer interaction, Experiment, Shared responsibility, Moral wiggle room |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D80 |
| Date: | 2018–09–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2018-014&r=cbe |
| By: | Mongin, Philippe (GREGHEC; CNRS & HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences) |
| Abstract: | Whereas many others have scrutinized the Allais paradox from a theoretical angle, we study the paradox from an historical perspective and link our findings to a suggestion as to how decision theory could make use of it today. We emphasize that Allais proposed the paradox as a normative argument, concerned with "the rational man" and not the "real man", to use his words. Moreover, and more subtly, we argue that Allais had an unusual sense of the normative, being concerned not so much with the rationality of choices as with the rationality of the agent as a person. These two claims are buttressed by a detailed investigation – the first of its kind – of the 1952 Paris conference on risk, which set the context for the invention of the paradox, and a detailed reconstruction – also the first of its kind – of Allais's specific normative argument from his numerous but allusive writings. The paper contrasts these interpretations of what the paradox historically represented, with how it generally came to function within decision theory from the late 1970s onwards: that is, as an empirical refutation of the expected utility hypothesis, and more specifically of the condition of von Neumann-Morgenstern independence that underlies that hypothesis. While not denying that this use of the paradox was fruitful in many ways, we propose another use that turns out also to be compatible with an experimental perspective. Following Allais's hints on "the experimental definition of rationality", this new use consists in letting the experiment itself speak of the rationality or otherwise of the subjects. In the 1970s, a short sequence of papers inspired by Allais implemented original ways of eliciting the reasons guiding the subjects' choices, and claimed to be able to draw relevant normative consequences from this information. We end by reviewing this forgotten experimental avenue not simply historically, but with a view to recommending it for possible use by decision theorists today. |
| Keywords: | Allais Paradox; Decision Theory; Expected Utility Theory; Experimental Economics; Positive vs Normative; Rationality; 1952 Paris Conference; Allais; Von Neumann and Morgenstern; Samuelson; Savage |
| JEL: | B21 B31 B41 C91 D80 |
| Date: | 2018–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1299&r=cbe |
| By: | Landeo, Claudia (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Spier, Kathryn (Harvard Law School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an enforcement agency to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With ordered-leniency policies, early cooperators receive reduced sanctions. We replicate the strategic environment described by Landeo and Spier (2018). In theory, the optimal ordered leniency policy depends on the refinement criterion applied in case of multiplicity of equilibria. Our findings are as follows. First, we provide empirical evidence of a "race-to-the-courthouse" effect of ordered leniency: Mild and Strong Leniency induce the injurers to self-report promptly. These findings suggest that the injurers' behaviors are aligned with the risk-dominance refinement. Second, Mild and Strong Leniency significantly increase the likelihood of detection of harmful activities. This fundamental finding is explained by the high self-reporting rates under ordered-leniency policies. Third, as a result of the increase in the detection rates, the averages fines are significantly higher under Mild and Strong Leniency. As expected when the risk-dominance refinement is applied, Mild Leniency exhibits the highest average fine. |
| Keywords: | Law Enforcement; Ordered Leniency; Self-Reporting; Experiments; Leniency; Co-ordination Game; Prisoners Dilemma Game; Risk Dominance; Pareto Dominance; Equilibrium Selection; Non-Cooperative Games; Harmful Externalities; Corporate Misconduct; White-Collar Crime; Securities Fraud; Insider Trading; Market Manipulation; Whistleblowers; Plea Bargaining; Tax Evasion; Environmental Policy Enforcement |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D86 K10 L23 |
| Date: | 2018–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2018_013&r=cbe |
| By: | Gioavnni Di Bartolomeo; Martin Dufwenberg; Stefano Papa; Francesco Passarelli |
| Abstract: | Why do people keep their promises? Vanberg (2008) and Ederer & Stremitzer (2017) provide causal evidence in favor of, respectively, an intrinsic preference for keeping one’s word and Charness & Dufwenberg’s (2006) expectations-based account based on guilt aversion. The overall picture is incomplete though, as no study disentangles effects in a design that provides exogenous variation of both (the key features of) promises and beliefs. We present an experimental design that does so. |
| Keywords: | Promises, expectations, guilt aversion, moral commitment, causation |
| JEL: | A13 C91 D03 D64 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1881&r=cbe |
| By: | Toussaert, Séverine |
| Abstract: | Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Intentions; Reciprocity; Noise; Signaling; Experimental economics |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D64 |
| Date: | 2017–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:69803&r=cbe |
| By: | Anita (A.G.) Kopanyi-Peuker (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | In many real-life situations people face a simple decision whether to volunteer or not to provide some benefit for themselves and also for others. This research investigates the effects of the group size and the magnitude of the volunteering cost in a controlled large-scale laboratory experiment, where subjects play the volunteer’s dilemma only once. The experiment varies group sizes ranging from groups of 3 to about 100, and 2 different cost/benefit ratios. Results show that high cost reduces volunteering probability only in the smallest groups, but not for other group sizes. Furthermore, non-monotonic group size effect is found on the individual volunteering decisions. These findings are not in line with the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium prediction. Subjects volunteer more often in most treatments than the Nash prediction which benefits them on average compared to the Nash prediction. |
| Keywords: | Volunteer's dilemma; coordination; group size; large-scale experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 |
| Date: | 2018–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20180072&r=cbe |