nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2017‒07‒30
seven papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Self-control and crime revisited: Disentangling the effect of self-control on risk taking and antisocial behavior By Friehe, Tim; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
  2. Student Personality, Lecturer Competency, Campus Facilities, and Students? Learning Motivation in Private Univ By Arif Prasetio; Fetty Sary; Bachruddin Luturlean
  3. The Gift and the Centipede By Egbert, Henrik
  4. Predicting norm enforcement: The individual and joint predictive power of economic preferences, personality, and self-control By Friehe, Tim; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
  5. Persistence and Snap Decision Making: Inefficient Decisions by a Reputation-Concerned Expert By Tajika, Tomoya
  6. Too Lucky to Be True: Fairness Views under the Shadow of Cheating By Bortolotti, Stefania; Soraperra, Ivan; Sutter, Matthias; Zoller, Claudia
  7. The Dual Nature of Emotions: Relationships with Motivations and Instructional Changes By Margareta Maria Thomson; Jeannine E Turner

  1. By: Friehe, Tim; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
    Abstract: Low self-control is considered a fundamental cause of crime. The aim of our study is to provide causal evidence on the link between self-control and criminal behavior. We test whether individuals with lower self-control behave in a more antisocial manner and are less risk-averse and thus are, according to both the General Theory of Crime and the economic literature on criminal behavior, more likely to engage in criminal activities. In order to exogenously vary the level of self-control in a laboratory experiment, we use a wellestablished experimental manipulation, a so-called depletion task. We find that subjects with low self-control take more risk. The effect of self-control on antisocial behavior is small and not significant. In sum, our findings are consistent with the proposition that low selfcontrol is a facilitator of crime to the extent that individuals with lower levels of self-control are less effectively deterred by probabilistic sanctions.
    Keywords: self-control,risk taking,antisocial behavior,criminal behavior,ego-depletion,experiment
    JEL: C91 D03 K42
    Date: 2017
  2. By: Arif Prasetio (telkom university); Fetty Sary (telkom university); Bachruddin Luturlean (telkom university)
    Abstract: The aim of the study is to identify the effect of student personality, lecturer competency, and campus facilities toward the student learning motivation. Motivation is an important factor which affects the student?s academic performance. The participants were 187 students from various classes in Telkom University in Bandung. We implemented the mutiple regression analysis to measure the simultaneous and partial relation. 35 items used in the questionnaires which distributed using convenience approach. Simultaneously, all three independent variables had significant and positive effect on student? learning motivation (R2 0.250 and Sig. 0.000). Furthermore, partially, student personality, lecturer competency, and campus facilities also had significant and positive effect on student? learning motivation. Beta? results for those three independent variables are 0.203, 0.285, and 0.154 respectively with the Sig. below 0.000. The university or faculty need to improve the teacher competency and their learning facilities if they want to enhance student motivation. Since the personality of students also played impportant part, the selection process should need to consider types of student personality which help to improve the performance.
    Keywords: Student? Personality, Lecturer Competency, Campus Facilities, Learning Motivation
    JEL: I20 M54
    Date: 2017–07
  3. By: Egbert, Henrik
    Abstract: This paper addresses the similarity between behavioural economics and social anthropology with respect to approaches on repeated reciprocity. The case at hand is the application of the Centipede game to Marcel Mauss’s concept of the Gift. In a Centipede game players interact in an alternating sequence of decisions to take or to pass an endowment. Mauss describes sequences of reciprocal giving in potlatch cultures, in which strict obligations determine choice options. The paper shows that models developed in behavioural economics, such as the Centipede game, can also be applied to prominent contexts in economic anthropology.
    Keywords: Gift, Centipede game, Potlatch game, Marcel Mauss, reciprocity
    JEL: Z13
    Date: 2017–07–23
  4. By: Friehe, Tim; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
    Abstract: This paper explores the individual and joint predictive power of concepts from economics, psychology, and criminology for individual norm enforcement behavior. More specifically, we consider economic preferences (patience and attitudes towards risk), personality traits from psychology (Big Five and locus of control), and a self-control scale from criminology. Using survey data, we show that the various concepts complement each other in predicting self-reported norm enforcement behavior. The most significant predictors stem from all three disciplines: stronger risk aversion, conscientiousness and neuroticism as well as higher levels of self-control increase an individual's willingness to enforce norms. Taking a broader perspective, our results illustrate that integrating concepts from different disciplines may enhance our understanding of heterogeneity in individual behavior.
    Keywords: norm enforcement,economic preferences,personality traits,self-control
    JEL: K42 D81 D90 C21
    Date: 2017
  5. By: Tajika, Tomoya
    Abstract: Behaving consistently is widely observed, which implies that a person clings to his/her initial opinion and ignores future information that may be more accurate. We explain such behavior by proposing a model in which a reputation-concerned expert has two opportunities to recommend a choice to someone. Before making each recommendation, the expert receives a signal whose accuracy depends on his ability; the second signal is always more accurate. Since a high-ability expert is less likely to receive different signals, the expert has an incentive to pretend to have high ability by recommending the same choice throughout all opportunities. This fact results in the persistency of the initial opinion even when following the second signal is the efficient choice. Further, we consider the case that the expert has the option to remain silent at the first opportunity, which enables the sending of only the more accurate signal and concealing the receiving of different signals. Nevertheless, we find that the expert has an incentive to break silence at the first opportunity and also persists with the initial opinion, which is the driving force behind the expert’s snap decision.
    Keywords: Reputation, herding, persistency of the initial opinion, snap decision
    JEL: D82 D83 D90
    Date: 2017–07
  6. By: Bortolotti, Stefania (University of Cologne); Soraperra, Ivan (University of Amsterdam); Sutter, Matthias (University of Cologne); Zoller, Claudia (University of Cologne)
    Abstract: The steady increase in inequality over the past decades has revived a lively debate about what can be considered a fair distribution of income. Public support for the extent of redistribution typically depends on the perceived causes of income inequality, such as differences in effort, luck, or opportunities. We study how fairness views and the extent of redistribution are affected by a hitherto over-looked, but relevant factor: immoral self-serving behavior that can lead to increased inequality. We focus on situations in which the rich have potentially acquired their fortunes by means of cheating. In an experiment, we let third parties redistribute resources between two stakeholders who could earn money either by choosing a safe amount or by engaging in a risky, but potentially more profitable, in-vestment. In one treatment, the outcome of the risky investment is determined by a random move, while in another treatment stakeholders can cheat to obtain the more profitable outcome. Although third parties cannot verify cheating, we find that the mere suspicion of cheating changes fairness views of third parties considerably and leads to a strong polarization. When cheating opportunities are pre-sent, the share of subjects redistributing money from rich to poor stakeholders triples and becomes as large as the fraction of libertarians – i.e., participants who never redistribute. Without cheating opportunities, libertarian fairness views dominate, while egalitarian views are much less prevalent. These results indicate that fairness views and attitudes towards redistribution change significantly when people believe that income inequality is the result of cheating by the rich.
    Keywords: fairness views, redistribution, unethical behavior, inequality, experiment
    JEL: C91 D63 D81 H26
    Date: 2017–07
  7. By: Margareta Maria Thomson (North Carolina State University); Jeannine E Turner (Florida State University)
    Abstract: Recently, researchers called for more research to examine the reciprocal nature of emotions, and how emotions influence individuals? motivations and changes in various learning contexts (Darby, 2008; Poon et al., 2012). In the current mixed-methods study, we examined longitudinally teachers? emotions about their involvement in a professional development program, and how emotions impacted their program motivation and instructional changes. To explain the reciprocal nature of emotions, and the interplay between motivations, emotions and changes, we used the theoretical framework of Control Value (CVT, Pekrun, 2006). The CVT states that individuals? emotions and motivations in academic-related behavior will depend upon the extent to which they believe they have some amount of control and the extent to which they value that behavior. A total of 90 teachers participated in a six-week summer Research Experiences for Teachers (RET) program at the National High Magnetic Field Laboratory (Magnet Lab) in Florida, United States over a period of seven years. Teachers were mentored by a scientist, thus allowing them to learn science and valuable research skills. The RET program was funded through the National Science Foundation (NSF) and has been shown to have a positive impact on teachers? thinking, motivation, and science instruction (Dixon & Wilke, 2007; Pop et al., 2010). These 90 RET attendees were contacted after their attendance and were invited to take part in the current study; 67 teachers responded to the study invitation, and thus completed the study survey. A mixed-methods study design was employed in the current study, in a two-phase approach. In the first phase of the study quantitative data was collected via online surveys, and in the second phase of the study, in-depth interviews were collected from selected participants to augment the quantitative results. Overall, study results showed that emotions played an important role in teachers? engagement in the RET program and triggered changes in thinking and science teaching practices. We found differences in emotions before and after teachers? engagement in the RET program, and differences in emotions between teachers from different grade levels. Positive correlations were found among teachers? motivations, emotions and changes to their teaching practices suggesting the powerful nature of emotions. Further, qualitative results showed how particular individuals view their emotions as a catalyst for change in their motivation for learning, and changes to their instructional practices. Contributions from study findings are discussed in relationship with teacher learning and professional training.
    Keywords: Emotions, Motivation, Instructional Practices
    JEL: I29
    Date: 2017–07

This nep-cbe issue is ©2017 by Marco Novarese. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.