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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2017‒07‒09
six papers chosen by Marco Novarese Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Nicolas Vallois (Université Picardie Jules Verne; CRIISEA); Dorian Jullien (Université Côte d'Azur; GREDEG CNRS) |
| Abstract: | We propose a historical perspective on replication in experimental economics focused on public good games. Our intended contribution is twofold: in terms of method and in terms of object. Methodologically, we blend traditional qualitative history of economics with a less traditional quantitative approach using basic econometric tools to detect unnoticed historical patterns of replication. In terms of our object, we highlight a type of replication that we call "baseline replication", which is not present in explicit methodological discussions, yet central in the specificity of experimental economics regarding replication in economics. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Replication, History of Economic Thought, Methodology, Public Good Experiments |
| JEL: | B20 C83 A14 C90 |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2017-21&r=cbe |
| By: | Terence C. Burnham (Chapman University Argyros School of Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | A laboratory experiment that reports on gender, cooperation, and punishment in two repeated public goods game using high-powered punishment. In a repeated public goods game with punishment, no statistically significant differences between men and women are reported. In a modified game that adds an explicit payoff for relative performance, men punish more than women, men obtain higher rank, and punishment by males decreases payoffs for both men and for women. These results contribute to the debate about the origins and maintenance of cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, Reciprocity, Punishment, Public-Goods, Altruism, Gender |
| JEL: | A13 C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:17-11&r=cbe |
| By: | Melguizo, Isabel |
| Abstract: | We analyze individual decisions of when to face difficult tasks. Although threatening, difficult tasks provide better economic outcomes than easy ones. We argue how individual dispositions, i.e., the expression of some non-cognitive dimensions, might drive timing decisions. Specifically, when experiencing low dispositions, individuals get trapped into low value easy tasks while when experiencing high dispositions, they are willing to always deal with high value difficult tasks. Also, when outcome achievements motivate individuals, they move from low value easy tasks to high value difficult tasks. This finding is interpreted as individuals preparing themselves to cope with difficulties. |
| Keywords: | individual dispositions, task difficulty, avoidance behavior |
| JEL: | D83 D84 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:77303&r=cbe |
| By: | Sivan Frenkel; Yuval Heller (Bar-Ilan University); Roee Teper |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2017-06&r=cbe |
| By: | van Hoorn, Andre |
| Abstract: | Economists are increasingly using primes that make group identity salient to overcome the inferential limitations of behavioral quasi-experiments involving pre-existing groups (e.g., males vs. females). However, while priming group identity provides powerful means for identifying a causal effect of group membership on individuals’ preferences, so far, there has been little methodological reflection on the use of identity primes to identify the causes of group differences in preferences. This note’s main contribution is to offer a framework for thinking systematically about the treatment effects of priming individuals’ group identity and the identification of specific group traits explaining differences in preferences or behavior between pre-existing groups. The framework sets a high bar for studying the causes of group differences in preferences using identity primes but we clarify its usefulness using concrete examples. |
| Keywords: | Experimentation; random assignment; salience; quasi-experiment; group membership; culture |
| JEL: | C36 C90 Z10 |
| Date: | 2017–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80011&r=cbe |
| By: | Siebert, Jan; Yang, Guanzhong |
| Abstract: | This paper combines two strands of the experimental sunspot literature. It extends the rare literature that focuses experimentally on the coordination problems caused by sunspot variables. It also extends the literature that focuses on coordination games that have a payoff-dominant and a divergent risk-dominant equilibrium. To achieve this, we use a repeated three-player stag hunt game with fixed groups. In our experiment, a sunspot variable points randomly at the risk-dominant or the payoff-dominant choice. We find out-of-equilibrium behavior (discoordination) caused by the sunspot variable in the short run. In the long run, the sunspot variable can lead to coordination of the payoff-dominated equilibrium (miscoordination). If the sunspot-generating process points more frequently to the risk-dominant choice, some groups converge to the sunspot equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | sunspot,coordination |
| JEL: | C92 C72 D81 E40 J52 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:udedao:1142017&r=cbe |