nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2016‒12‒04
ten papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Cooperation in Public Good Games. Calculated or Confused? By Goeschl, Timo; Lohse, Johannes
  2. Nudging Online Security Behaviour with Warning Messages: Results from an Online Experiment By René van Bavel; Nuria Rodríguez-Priego
  3. Do All "Bad Apples" Taste the Same? Experimental Analysis of Heterogeneity in Local Public Good Provision By Andrej Angelowski; Daniela Di Cagno; Werner Güth; Francesca Marazzi; Luca Panaccione
  4. The effect of olfactory sensory cues on economic decision making By Andreas C. Drichoutis; Varvara Kechagia
  5. Gamblers or Investors? An Experiment on the Almost-Winning Outcome By Christine Choirat; Daniela Di Cagno; Arianna Galliera
  6. Gender and cooperative preferences on five continents By Furtner, Nadja C.; Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Matzat, Dominik; Wollbrant, Conny
  7. Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for the role of subjective utility differences under time pressure By Merkel, Anna; Lohse, Johannes
  8. Antisocial Attitudes, Gender and Moral Judgments: An Experimental Study By Juergen Bracht; Adam Zylbersztejn
  9. In Gov We Trust: Voluntary compliance in networked investment games By Natalia Borzino; Enrique Fatas; Emmanuel Peterle
  10. The effect of olfactory sensory cues on economic decision making By Kechagia, Varvara; Drichoutis, Andreas C.

  1. By: Goeschl, Timo; Lohse, Johannes
    Abstract: Recent experiments suggest that contribution decisions in a public goods game (PGG) are more likely to be cooperative if based on intuition rather than reflection. This paper (i) reinvestigates the behavioral impact of so-called cognitive style in the PGG; and (ii) connects it with an earlier literature on the role of cognitive failure (confusion). This is motivated by the possibility that the method of time pressure, commonly used to identify cognitive style, invites confusion as a confounding factor. Two channels for such confounds are identified and experimentally tested: A heterogeneous treatment effect of time pressure depending on subject's confusion status and a direct impact of time pressure on subjects' likelihood of being confused. Our reinvestigation on the behavioral impact of time pressure confirms that cognitive style matters, but that deliberation rather than intuition drives cooperation. The confounding effect of confusion is not found to be direct, but to operate through a heterogeneous treatment effect. Time pressure selectively reduces average contributions among those subjects whose contributions can confidently be interpreted as cooperative rather than confused.
    Date: 2016–11–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0626&r=cbe
  2. By: René van Bavel (European Commission - JRC); Nuria Rodríguez-Priego (European Commission - JRC)
    Abstract: This study is part of a larger effort to better understand online behaviour. We tested the effect on people’s security behaviour of different ways of warning them about cybersecurity threats with an online experiment (n=5,065) in Germany, Sweden, Poland, the UK and Spain. Participants had to make a purchase in a mock online store, and their behaviour was observed through 4 behavioural measures. Results show that making users aware of the steps they can take to minimise their exposure to risk is effective in generating more secure behaviour, as posited by protection motivation theory. Gain and loss-framed messages, and a message with a male anthropomorphic character, also had some effect on behaviour compared to the control group. The study included a questionnaire. Results suggest that more risk-averse participants will exhibit more cautious behaviour and that, on the whole, warning messages did not affect their knowledge of how to prevent cyber-attacks. Warning messages based on behavioural insights might not increase consumers' knowledge, but they can help improve their experience and build online trust.
    Keywords: cybersecurity, nudging, online behaviour, behavioural economics
    Date: 2016–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc103223&r=cbe
  3. By: Andrej Angelowski (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Daniela Di Cagno (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Werner Güth (Luiss Guido Carli, Rome; Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt; Max Planck Institute on Collective Goods, Bonn); Francesca Marazzi (Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata); Luca Panaccione (Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata)
    Abstract: In a circular neighborhood, each member contributes repeatedly to two local public goods with the left and the right neighbor. All two-person public good games are structurally independent in spite of their overlapping player sets. Heterogeneity across neighbors is introduced by two randomly selected participants, the "Bad" Apples, either by being less productive or by being excluded from periodic information feedback about their neighbors' contributions. We study how "Bad" Apples affect their neighbors and through them also other group members. Both types of "Bad" Apples spoil the basket, reducing total voluntary contributions compared to a baseline with no "Bad" Apples. Furthermore, we find that "Bad" Apples not only affects their direct neighbors, but also, through behavioral spillovers, the whole neighborhood. However, the two types of "Bad" Apples affect their neighborhood in opposite ways. Whereas less productive "Bad" Apples are least cooperative, "Bad" Apples excluded from feedback information are most cooperative. In the latter case, the reduction of total contributions is caused by the direct neighbors of "Bad" Apples.
    Keywords: Public goods, behavioral spillovers, experiments, voluntary contribution mechanism, heterogeneity.
    JEL: C91 C72 H41
    Date: 2016–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1604&r=cbe
  4. By: Andreas C. Drichoutis (Agricultural University of Athens); Varvara Kechagia (Agricultural University of Athens)
    Abstract: Several studies show that sensory cues influence consumer decision making processes. While scent is a key component of a market's physical environment, it has received far less attention in the academic literature as compared, for example, with visual cues. In addition, most of the studies that examine the e ect of ambient scents fail on one or both of these criteria: to properly control the in infuence of nuisance factors and/or to elicit preferences under real monetary incentives. We collected data from a laboratory experiment where we varied on a between subjects basis the dispersion of a citrus fragrance. We then elicited subjects' willingness to pay for two unbranded products | a mug and a chocolate | by having subjects participate in a 2nd price Vickrey auction. We also elicited subjects' risk preferences using lottery choice tasks. Our results show a statistically and economically signi cant e ect on subjects' willingness to pay: valuations increased between 37% - 43% for subjects who were exposed to a citrus scent as compared to the control group. We do not nd a statistically signi cant effect of the citrus scent on subjects' risk aversion.
    Keywords: scent cues; fragrance; olfactory; willingness to pay; risk preferences; risk aversion; laboratory experiment
    JEL: C91 D44 D81 D87
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aua:wpaper:2016-4&r=cbe
  5. By: Christine Choirat; Daniela Di Cagno; Arianna Galliera
    Abstract: Near-miss outcomes are real-life situations which increase the perceived probability of the occurrence of future successes. The Almost-Winning (AW) bias is the well-known cognitive bias that makes individuals unable to distinguish between situations in which near misses signal ability and situations in which near misses are completely meaningless, in the sense of being unrelated to future (likelihood of) winning. The empirical and neurological evidence shows that a near-miss increases gamblers’ willingness to play: AW triggers a dopamine response similar to winning, in spite of no actual reward. Therefore, in a chance game, a sequence of AW outcomes easily generates an “irrational” willingness to continue playing, and might become a key factor in the development and maintenance of certain betting habits. We implement an experimental setting aimed at checking the relevance of the AW bias among ordinary students on order to evaluate its potential strength in absence of gambling pathologies. Two treatments are implemented in two different frames, an investment game (IG) and a slot machine game (SM), which try to avoid persistence at gaming.
    Keywords: experiment, gambling, decision making under risk and uncertainty
    JEL: C91 L83 D81
    Date: 2015–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1508&r=cbe
  6. By: Furtner, Nadja C.; Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Matzat, Dominik; Wollbrant, Conny
    Abstract: Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative preferences), and beliefs about the level of others’ contributions in variants of the public goods game. We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood and completely explained when controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks based on data from around 450 additional independent observations around the world confirm our main empirical results: Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, and they seem to be more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues for women than for men.
    Keywords: Public goods; conditional cooperation; gender; experiment
    JEL: C91 D64 H41
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:30226&r=cbe
  7. By: Merkel, Anna; Lohse, Johannes
    Abstract: Economists are increasingly interested in the cognitive basis of pro-social behavior. Using response time data, several authors have claimed that "fairness is intuitive". In light of conflicting empirical evidence, we provide theoretical arguments showing under which circumstances an increase in "fair" behavior due to time pressure provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al., 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective difficulty of making a choice affects choices under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous interpretation of time pressure effects contingent on the choice situation. To explore our theoretical considerations and to retest the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis, we analyze choices in two-person prisoner’s dilemma and binary dictator games. As in previous experiments, we exogenously manipulate response times by placing subjects under time pressure or forcing them to delay their decisions. In addition, we manipulate the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair relative to the selfish option across all choice situations. Our main finding is that time pressure does not increase the fraction of fair choices relative to time delay irrespective of the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair option. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive".
    Keywords: distributional preferences; cooperation; response times; time pressure; cognitive processes; drift diffusion models
    Date: 2016–11–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0627&r=cbe
  8. By: Juergen Bracht (University of Aberdeen [Aberdeen] - University of Aberdeen); Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We study questionnaire responses to moral dilemmas hypothetical situations in which sacrificing one life may save many other lives. We demonstrate gender differences in moral judgments: male participants are more supportive of the sacrifice than female participants. We investigate the importance of the previously studied source of the endorsement of the sacrfice: antisocial attitudes. First, we elicit the individual proneness to spiteful behavior using an incentivized experimental game. We demonstrate that spitefulness can be sizable but it is not associated with gender. Second, we find that gender is associated with moral judgments even when we account for individual differences in antisocial attitudes. Our results suggest that the performance of many institutions (related to the distribution of wealth or punishment, for instance) may be affected by the gender of the decision-makers. Abstract We study questionnaire responses to moral dilemmas hypothetical situations in which sacric-ing one life may save many other lives. We demonstrate gender dierences in moral judgments: male participants are more supportive of the sacrice than female participants. We investigate the importance of the previously studied source of the endorsement of the sacrice: antisocial attitudes. First, we elicit the individual proneness to spiteful behavior using an incentivized experimental game. We demonstrate that spitefulness can be sizable but it is not associated with gender. Second, we nd that gender is associated with moral judgments even when we account for individual dierences in antisocial attitudes. Our results suggest that the performance of many institutions (related to the distribution of wealth or punishment, for instance) may be aected by the gender of the decision-makers.
    Keywords: gender,moral dilemmas,moral judgments,spite,antisocial attitudes,experiment
    Date: 2016
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01382464&r=cbe
  9. By: Natalia Borzino (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)); Enrique Fatas (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)); Emmanuel Peterle (UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté)
    Abstract: We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate trust and trustworthiness in a networked investment game in which two senders interact with a receiver. We investigate to what extent senders and receivers comply with an exogenous and non-binding recommendation. We also manipulate the level of information available to senders regarding receiver’s behavior in the network. We compare a baseline treatment in which senders are only informed about the actions and outcomes of their own investment games to two information treatments. In the reputation treatment, senders receive ex ante information regarding the average amount returned by the receiver in the previous period. In the transparency treatment, each sender receives ex post additional information regarding the returning decision of the receiver to the other sender in the network. Across all treatments and for both senders and receivers, the non-binding rule has a significant and positive impact on individual decisions. Providing senders with additional information regarding receiver’s behavior affects trust at the individual level, but leads to mixed results at the aggregate level. Our findings suggest that reputation building, as well as allowing for social comparison could be efficient ways for receivers to improve trust within networks.
    Keywords: Information, Taxation, Trust,Experimental economics, Investment game
    Date: 2016–04–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01375081&r=cbe
  10. By: Kechagia, Varvara; Drichoutis, Andreas C.
    Abstract: Several studies show that sensory cues influence consumer decision making processes. While scent is a key component of a market's physical environment, it has received far less attention in the academic literature as compared, for example, with visual cues. In addition, most of the studies that examine the effect of ambient scents fail on one or both of these criteria: to properly control the influence of nuisance factors and/or to elicit preferences under real monetary incentives. We collected data from a laboratory experiment where we varied on a between subjects basis the dispersion of a citrus fragrance. We then elicited subjects' willingness to pay for two unbranded products - a mug and a chocolate - by having subjects participate in a 2nd price Vickrey auction. We also elicited subjects' risk preferences using lottery choice tasks. Our results show a statistically and economically significant effect on subjects' willingness to pay: valuations increased between 37% - 43% for subjects who were exposed to a citrus scent as compared to the control group. We do not find a statistically significant effect of the citrus scent on subjects' risk aversion.
    Keywords: scent cues; fragrance; olfactory; willingness to pay; risk preferences; risk aversion; laboratory experiment
    JEL: C91 D44 D81 D87
    Date: 2016–10–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75293&r=cbe

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