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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2016‒03‒29
seven papers chosen by Marco Novarese Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Julija Michailova (Kozminski University); Christoph Bühren (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | We examine the effects of money priming and solidarity on individual behavior in three simple experiments: dictator game, ultimatum game, and prisoner’s dilemma. Our study comprises two money treatments and two neutral (control) treatments. Additionally, we control for the strength of social ties between experimental participants. Although our priming procedure is sufficient to remind people of the concept of money, it is not sufficient to induce systematically different behavior of the treatment groups compared to the control groups. Moreover, we do not find any significant differences between groups with strong vs. weak social ties. Since our findings contradict previous research, it calls for further investigation on the topic of how money priming influences economic behavior. |
| Keywords: | money priming; bargaining; dilemma; social behavior; natural groups; economic experiment |
| JEL: | C78 C9 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201530&r=cbe |
| By: | Davide Dragone (UNIBO - Università di Bologna [Bologna]); Fabio Galeotti (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Raimondello Orsini (UNIBO - Università di Bologna [Bologna]) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study and compare the behavior of workers and students in a linear voluntary contribution mechanism in which subjects can assign immaterial sanctions or rewards to the other group members. We find that both students and workers sanction group members who contribute less than the group average, and reward those who contribute more. In both subject samples, the use of non-monetary sanctions and rewards induces more cooperation. The magnitude of the effect, however, is heterogeneous, as feedback has more impact among students who, contrary to workers, respond positively to sanctions. Students also tend to use sanctions more than workers. We discuss the implications of these findings for social cohesion, cooperative spirit and organizational efficiency in the workplace. |
| Keywords: | public good, field experiment, non - monetary sanctions and rewards, communication, external validity |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01282844&r=cbe |
| By: | Scott Barrett (Columbia University); Astrid Dannenberg (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public good provided enough other players contribute, and a prisoners’ dilemma, the classic cooperation game. In the prisoners’ dilemma, the first best outcome is attainable, but cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. In the tipping game, only a second best outcome may be attainable, but there exists a Nash equilibrium that is strictly preferred to the one in the prisoners’ dilemma. We show that groups do significantly better when they choose the tipping game, and yet many groups repeatedly choose the prisoners’ dilemma, indicating a mistaken and persistent tendency to prefer a game with potentially higher payoffs to one having a strategic advantage. |
| JEL: | C72 C92 F53 H41 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201529&r=cbe |
| By: | Sibilla Di Guida; The Anh T.A.H. Han; Georg Kirchsteiger; Tom Lenaerts; Ioannis Zisis |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates experimentally how the endogenous group formation combined with the possibility of repeated interaction impacts cooperation levels and surplus distribution. We developed a Surplus Production Distribution Game where the cooperation of four agents is needed to produce a surplus. In case of cooperation, two of the four subjects, the distributors, decided how much of surplus each of them wanted to give to the two other agents, the receivers. This game was played repeatedly with different matching procedures. In the Re-match Treatment (RT) the subjects got randomly re-matched every round, while in the Endogenous-match Treatment (ET) a group was maintained as long as its members cooperated. There was also a Base treatment (BT) where cooperation was exogenously enforced. We found that the distributor's contributions were higher in the ET and the RT than in the BT - unsurprisingly, receivers' possibility to refuse cooperation led to more equal surplus distributions. But contrary to commonly hold beliefs, the possibility of repeated interaction did not lead to higher cooperation levels and more equal allocations of the surplus. Instead, endogenous group formation combined with the possibility of repeated interaction led to self-selection of the subjects in the ET. The endogenous group duration varied drastically between different groups in the ET, with long-lived groups exhibiting contributions and cooperation levels higher than in the RT, while short-lived groups showed contributions and cooperation levels lower than in the RT. Furthermore, for given contribution levels, receivers were more likely to refuse cooperation when their average relationship length was short. This shows that long-lived groups consisted of generous distributors and not so demanding receivers, while ungenerous distributors and demanding receivers formed short-lived groups. Hence, the possibility of repeated interaction does not necessarily increase cooperation and efficiency levels when combined with endogenous group formation. Rather, such a situation might lead to self-selection of agents. |
| Keywords: | repeated cooperation; surplus distribution; group formation |
| JEL: | C92 D30 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/228058&r=cbe |
| By: | Philipp Huebler (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics); Andreas Kucher (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Intergenerational correlations of risky health behaviors such as tobacco consumption are well established. However, there is still limited empirical evidence about the underlying process through which the transmission is driven. This paper aims at analyzing parental time discounting and its role in the intergenerational transmission of smoking. The analysis is based on longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 2006, 2008 and 2010. We use a linear panel regression model to estimate the child’s likelihood of being a current smoker. The SOEP contains a great many of socio-economic characteristics and also meaningful measures of individual discounting behavior, namely, general patience and impulsivity. This enables us to distinguish between time preference and self-control, respectively. We ï¬ nd signiï¬ cant effects of time preference for both, mothers and fathers. That is, an increasing level of patience of parents is associated with a lower smoking probability of the child. Regarding self-control, only father’s impulsivity has a similar decreasing impact. Stratifying the sample by gender reveals substantial mother-daughter, mother-son and father-son effects. Additionally, we estimate the influence of health-related mediating factors such as parental smoking and alcohol consumption. It turns out that role modeling as well as time discounting of the parents are highly relevant in this transmission process. |
| Keywords: | family economics, intergenerational transmission, smoking, time discounting, time preference, patience, self-control, impulsivity |
| JEL: | D9 D10 I12 J13 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:0326&r=cbe |
| By: | Joël Berger; Debra Hevenstone |
| Abstract: | In laboratory experiments people are willing to sanction norms at a cost – a behavioral tendency called altruistic punishment. However, the degree to which these findings can be generalized to real-world interactions is still debated. Only a small number of field experiments have been conducted and initial results suggest that punishment is less frequent outside of the lab. This study replicates one of the first field experiments on altruistic punishment and builds ties to research on norm compliance and the broken windows theory. The original study addressed the enforcement of the anti-littering norm in Athens. We replicate this study in Bern, Zurich, and New York City. As an extension, we investigate how the experimental context (clean vs. littered) impacts social norm enforcement. As a second extension, we investigate how opportunity structure impacts the maintenance of the anti-littering norm. Findings indicate that norms are universally enforced, although significantly less than in the standard laboratory experiment, and that enforcement is significantly more common in Switzerland than in New York. Moreover, individuals prefer more subtle forms of enforcement to direct punishment. We also find that enforcement is less frequent in littered than in clean contexts, suggesting that broken windows might not only foster deviant behavior but also weaken informal social control. Finally, we find that opportunity structure can encourage people to maintain norms, as indicated by the fact that people are more likely to voluntarily pick up litter when it is closer to a trash bin. |
| Keywords: | broken windows, field experiment, norm enforcement, punishment, social control |
| JEL: | H41 |
| Date: | 2016–03–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ets:wpaper:11&r=cbe |
| By: | Davide Dragone (University of Bologna, Department of Economics, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna, Italy); Fabio Galeotti (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France); Raimondello Orsini (University of Bologna, Department of Economics, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study and compare the behavior of workers and students in a linear voluntary contribution mechanism in which subjects can assign immaterial sanctions or rewards to the other group members. We find that both students and workers sanction group members who contribute less than the group average, and reward those who contribute more. In both subject samples, the use of non-monetary sanctions and rewards induces more cooperation. The magnitude of the effect, however, is heterogeneous, as feedback has more impact among students who, contrary to workers, respond positively to sanctions. Students also tend to use sanctions more than workers. We discuss the implications of these findings for social cohesion, cooperative spirit and organizational efficiency in the workplace. |
| Keywords: | public good, field experiment, non-monetary sanctions and rewards, communication, external validity |
| JEL: | C92 C93 H41 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1612&r=cbe |