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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒10‒25
nine papers chosen by Marco Novarese Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Sharma Smriti |
| Abstract: | We conduct a lab experiment to assess whether gender of dictators and recipients, and distributional preferences affect allocations in a modified dictator game where both parties perform a cognitive task and the resulting pie to be split is the sum of bot |
| Keywords: | Advertising, Discrimination in employment, Equality and inequality, Women |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2015-062&r=all |
| By: | E. Lance Howe (Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage); James J. Murphy (Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage; Institute of State Economy, Nankai University; Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Drew Gerkey (Department of Anthropology, Oregon State University); Colin T. West (Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina) |
| Abstract: | Integrating information from existing research, qualitative ethnographic interviews, and participant observation, we designed a field experiment that introduces idiosyncratic environmental risk and a voluntary sharing decision into a standard public goods game. Conducted with subsistence resource users in rural villages in remote Kamchatka Russia, we find evidence consistent with a model of indirect reciprocity and local social norms of helping the needy. When experiments allow participants to develop reputations, as is the case in most small-scale societies, we find that sharing is increasingly directed toward individuals experiencing hardship, good reputations increase aid, and risk-pooling becomes more effective. Our results highlight the importance of investigating social and ecological factors, beyond strategic risk, that affect the balance between independence and interdependence when developing and testing theories of cooperation. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, field experiment, public goods, risk-pooling, resource sharing, team production |
| JEL: | D70 H41 D81 |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ala:wpaper:2015-04&r=all |
| By: | Klaus Wälde (Johannes-Gutenberg University Mainz and CESifo) |
| Abstract: | Stress is ubiquitous in society. In our model, stressors translate into subjective stress via an appraisal process. Stress reduces instantaneous utility of an individual directly and via a cognitive load argument. Coping can be functional and under the control of the individual or more automatic with dysfunctional features. We predict the occurrence and frequency of uncontrolled coping - emotional outbursts - as a function of an individual's personality and environment. Outbursts cannot always be avoided. Delaying emotional outbursts artifcially can lead to even more outbursts. Looking at the effect of psychotherapy shows that expecting little and being emotional can help maximizing well-being. |
| Keywords: | Stress, coping, personality, controlled vs. automatic reaction, emotional outbursts, optimal stopping problem |
| JEL: | D03 D91 I12 |
| Date: | 2015–10–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvir:2015018&r=all |
| By: | Florian Schneider; Martin Schonger |
| Abstract: | Most models of ambiguity aversion satisfy Anscombe-Aumann’s Monotonicity axiom. This paper proposes a test of Monotonicity, the Allais Horse Race. It is an adaptation of the Allais paradox to a setting with both subjective and objective uncertainty. Viewed as a thought experiment, the Allais Horse Race allows for introspective assessment of Monotonicity. Imple- menting it as an incentivized experiment, we find that the modal choice of subjects violates Monotonicity in a specific, intuitive way. Overall, we find that models of ambiguity aversion that satisfy Monotonicity cannot describe the behavior of about half of all subjects. |
| Keywords: | Ambiguity aversion, monotonicity, Anscombe-Aumann, Allais paradox, experiments |
| JEL: | D81 |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:207&r=all |
| By: | Claudia M. Landeo (University of Alberta); Kathryn E. Spier (Harvard Law School and NBER) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results of an experiment on incentive contracts for teams. The agents, whose efforts are complementary, are rewarded according to a sharing rule chosen by the principal. Depending on the sharing rule, the agents confront endogenous prisoner's dilemma or stag-hunt environments. Our main findings are as follows. First, we demonstrate that ongoing interaction among team members positively affects the principal's payoff. Greater team cooperation is successfully induced with less generous sharing rules in infinitely-repeated environments. Second, we provide evidence of the positive effects of communication on team cooperation in the absence of ongoing team interaction. Fostering communication among team members does not significantly affect the principal's payoff, suggesting that agents' communication is an imperfect substitute for ongoing team interaction. Third, we show that offering low sharing rules can backfire. The agents are willing to engage in costly punishment (shirking) as retaliation for low offers from the principal. Our findings suggest that offering low sharing rules is perceived by the agents as unkind behavior and hence, triggers negative reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | Moral Hazard in Teams, Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag-Hunt Games, Infinitely-Repeated Games, Communication, Reciprocity, Laboratory Experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D86 K10 L23 |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apc:wpaper:2015-052&r=all |
| By: | Sandra E. Black; Paul J. Devereux; Petter Lundborg; Kaveh Majlesi |
| Abstract: | Risk-taking behavior is highly correlated between parents and their children; however, little is known about the extent to which these relationships are genetic or determined by environmental factors. We use data on stock market participation of Swedish adoptees and relate this to the investment behavior of both their biological and adoptive parents. We find that stock market participation of parents increases that of children by about 34% and that both pre-birth and post-birth factors are important. However, once we condition on having positive financial wealth, we find that nurture has a much stronger influence on risk-taking by children, and the evidence of a relationship between stock-holding of biological parents and their adoptive children becomes very weak. We find similar results when we study the share of financial wealth that is invested in stocks. This suggests that a substantial proportion of risk-attitudes and behavior is environmentally determined. |
| Keywords: | Nature versus nurture; Portfolio choice; Risk-taking |
| JEL: | G11 J01 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucn:wpaper:201517&r=all |
| By: | Sergey R. Yagolkovskiy (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Anatoliy V. Kharkhurin (American University of Sharjah) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the effects of the novelty and organization of stimulus material on divergent thinking. Participants were 129 undergraduate students of (84 male and 45 female) aged between 17 and 20. Divergent thinking was assessed by the Unusual Uses test, in which participants had to generate as many uses as possible for a wooden ruler. Participants were primed with either rare or common ideas which were presented either in three sets or simultaneously in one set. We found a significant effect of novelty on originality. Participants primed with rare stimuli significantly outperformed those primed with common stimuli on originality. We also found a significant effect of organization on fluency. Participants primed with the discrete stimulus set significantly outperformed those primed with the concurrent stimulus set on fluency. Finally, we found a marginally significant interactive effect of novelty and organization on fluency and originality. Participants who were primed with rare stimuli in discrete sets tended to obtain higher fluency and originality scores than participants in other groups. This means that the discrete organization of stimuli presentation can serve as a means to strengthen the positive effect of novel stimuli exposure. The results of the study can be applied to procedures and techniques for the stimulation of creativity. |
| Keywords: | divergent thinking, creativity, idea generation, stimulus material |
| JEL: | Z |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:41psy2015&r=all |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Sebastian Goerg (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really deserves their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a recipient leaves the lab with no payoff from the game. |
| Keywords: | Dictator Game, Uncertainty, Donation |
| JEL: | D81 C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2015_15&r=all |
| By: | E. Lance Howe (Department of Economics and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage); James J. Murphy (Department of Economics and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage and Institute of State Economy, Nankai University and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Drew Gerkey (Department of Anthropology, School of Language, Culture & Society, Oregon State University); Colin Thor West (Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina) |
| Abstract: | Integrating information from existing research, qualitative ethnographic interviews, and 3 participant observation, we designed a field experiment that introduces idiosyncratic 4 environmental risk and a voluntary sharing decision into a standard public goods game. Conducted 5 with subsistence resource users in rural villages in remote Kamchatka Russia, we find evidence 6 consistent with a model of indirect reciprocity and local social norms of helping the needy. When 7 experiments allow participants to develop reputations, as is the case in most small-scale societies, 8 we find that sharing is increasingly directed toward individuals experiencing hardship, good 9 reputations increase aid, and risk-pooling becomes more effective. Our results highlight the 10 importance of investigating social and ecological factors, beyond strategic risk, that affect the 11 balance between independence and interdependence when developing and testing theories of 12 cooperation. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, field experiment, public goods, risk-pooling, resource sharing, team production |
| JEL: | D70 H41 D81 C93 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:15-20&r=all |