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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒08‒19
four papers chosen by Marco Novarese Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Cubitt, Robin (University of Nottingham); Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham); Quercia, Simone (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject. We find that, among conditional cooperators, only those who expect others to contribute little to the public good are significantly betrayal averse, while there is no evidence of betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in public goods games, as the pessimistic conditional cooperators tend to avoid contribution to avoid exploitation, whereas the optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited. |
| Keywords: | exploitation aversion, betrayal aversion, trust, conditional cooperation, public goods game, free riding, experiments |
| JEL: | H41 C91 C72 D03 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9241&r=cbe |
| By: | Maximilian Hoyer (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - Universiteit van Amsterdam, Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam - Universiteit van Amsterdam); Nadège Bault (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Ben Loerakker (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - Universiteit van Amsterdam, Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam - Universiteit van Amsterdam); Frans Van Winden (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - Universiteit van Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment - like damaging public goods - is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%. Female subjects are found to be more inclined to use destructive decisions. Finally, subjects’ social value orientation turns out to be partly predictive of (at least initial) destructive choices. |
| Date: | 2014–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01090199&r=cbe |
| By: | Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines) |
| Abstract: | Several experiments show that feedback transmission mechanisms mitigate opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, nonetheless remains obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for channels by which feedback may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves aversion to others’ expressed disapproval. The presence of feedback is found to foster pro-social behavior. The data favour the non-monetary sanctioning explanation rather than the signaling hypothesis. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01098775&r=cbe |
| By: | Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Lorini, Emiliano; Moisan, Frédéric |
| Keywords: | Social ties, Group identity, Coordination, Experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:29369&r=cbe |