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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒07‒04
ten papers chosen by Marco Novarese Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Obschonka, Martin; Stuetzer, Michael; Gosling, Samuel D.; Rentfrow, Peter J.; Lamb, Michael E.; Potter, Jeff; Audretsch, David B. |
| Abstract: | In recent years, modern economies have shifted away from being based on physical capital and towards being based on new knowledge (e.g., new ideas and inventions). Consequently, contemporary economic theorizing and key public policies have been based on the assumption that resources for generating knowledge (e.g., education, diversity of industries) are essential for regional economic vitality. However, policy makers and scholars have discovered that, contrary to expectations, the mere presence of, and investments in, new knowledge does not guarantee a high level of regional economic performance (e.g., high entrepreneurship rates). To date, this “knowledge paradox” has resisted resolution. We take an interdisciplinary perspective to offer a new explanation, hypothesizing that “hidden” regional culture differences serve as a crucial factor that is missing from conventional economic analyses and public policy strategies. Focusing on entrepreneurial activity, we hypothesize that the statistical relation between knowledge resources and entrepreneurial vitality (i.e., high entrepreneurship rates) in a region will depend on “hidden” regional differences in entrepreneurial culture. To capture such “hidden” regional differences, we derive measures of entrepreneurship-prone culture from two large personality datasets from the United States (N = 935,858) and Great Britain (N = 417,217). In both countries, the findings were consistent with the knowledge-culture-interaction hypothesis. A series of nine additional robustness checks underscored the robustness of these results. Naturally, these purely correlational findings cannot provide direct evidence for causal processes, but the results nonetheless yield a remarkably consistent and robust picture in the two countries. In doing so, the findings raise the idea of regional culture serving as a new causal candidate, potentially driving the knowledge paradox; such an explanation would be consistent with research on the psychological characteristics of entrepreneurs. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; Personality; Knowledge; Culture; Entrepreneurship; Psychology; Regions; Cities |
| JEL: | L26 M13 O3 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:65323&r=cbe |
| By: | Hélène Couprie; Elisabeth Cudeville; Catherine Sofer (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA) |
| Abstract: | Most household models assume that decisions taken inside the family are Pareto optimal. However, empirical studies cast doubts upon the efficiency assumption. The sharing of time among men and women between market work and household work is highly differentiated by gender. In this paper we examine whether couples deviate from efficiency in household production decisions, using an experimental design in which subjects are real couples. The aim of the experiment is to mimic the sharing of highly-gendered household tasks. We compare the sharing of gendered tasks to that of more neutral tasks. By measuring individual productivity in each task, we can see if couples tend to deviate from efficiency, and by how much in each case. As we show that they deviate more when sharing gendered tasks, we also explore why, looking at different possible explanations, and we find evidence of the impact of stereotypes on inefficiencies. |
| Keywords: | Stereotypes, social norms, household production, time allocation, experiment, production function, household behavior, intra-household decision-making. |
| JEL: | D13 J16 C92 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2015-06&r=cbe |
| By: | Bernd Irlenbusch (University of Cologne); Janna Ter Meer (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study a frequently observed public good setting where accurate contribution feedback is not available and group members can send non-verifiable cheap talk messages about their contributions. As feedback, subjects receive only announced contributions or the announced or actual contribution with 50% probability. In this setting, we explore both information transmission and reception as well as the effectiveness of costly peer punishment. Overall, we find that cooperation breaks down in all announcement treatments except when actual contribution feedback is provided some of the time and punishment is available. We identify various constraints to full cooperation relative to the standard public good game. First, subjects make errors in adjusting their beliefs for the announcements of others and, on average, adjust their beliefs downward for a given announcement. Second, we find that significantly more punishment is assigned to high contributors compared to the standard public good game. Furthermore, punishment for low contributors appears to have a smaller disciplining effect. When actual contribution information is provided some of the time we find that these constraints are less severe compared to the setting where only announcements are available. |
| Keywords: | public goods, punishment, lying, credibility, communication |
| JEL: | C92 D03 H41 D02 |
| Date: | 2015–05–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgr:cgsser:06-02&r=cbe |
| By: | Yann Algan (Département d'économie); Quoc-Anh Do (Département d'économie); Nicolò Dalvit (Departement d'Economie de Sciences Po, LIEPP); Alexis Le Chapelain (Département d'économie); Yves Zenou (Research Institute of Industrial Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper shows how a public policy shapes convergence of beliefs through newly-formed social networks, with a focus on political opinion. We use a unique natural experiment that randomly assigns students into first-year groups at a French college that forms future top politicians. Pairs of students in the same group are much more likely to become friends. The randomized group membership serves as instrumental variable in a dyadic regression of differences in beliefs on friendship. We find that students’ political opinions converge particularly strongly between friends, reaching 11% of a standard deviation only after 6 months. Convergence is strongest among pairs least likely to become friends without the randomized exposure, or friends whose characteristics are the most different. While there is evidence of homophily in network formation, it does not seem to affect the estimates of convergence, except among very similar friends. The same strategy shows that a longer network distance implies slower convergence. |
| Keywords: | Political Beliefs; Peers; Social Networks; Convergence; Homophily; Belief Transmission; Learning; Diffusion; Natural Experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/78vacv4udu92eq3fec89svm9uv&r=cbe |
| By: | Matthias Greiff (University of Giessen) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a method to integrate affective reponses into game theoretical models. We illustrate our method in a team production framework. The model analyzes how concave and convex status preferences for esteem solve the problem of team production under complete and incomplete information about workers’ abilities. Using a dual selves model, we model the choice of effort as a deliberative decision and the expression of esteem as an affective response. Modeling an individual’s affective system as a seperate player allows us to apply standard game-theoretic solution concepts to analyze affective responses. |
| JEL: | D03 D21 D8 M5 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201517&r=cbe |
| By: | Julian Conrads (University of Cologne); Tommaso Reggiani (University of Cologne); Rainer Michael Rilke (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | Ambiguity about the chances of winning represents a key aspect in lotteries. By means of a controlled field experiment, we exogenously vary the degree of ambiguity about the winning chances of lotteries organized to incentivize the contribution for a public good. In one people have been simply informed about the maximum number of potential participants (i.e., the number of lottery tickets released). In a second treatment this information has been omitted as in all traditional lotteries. Our general finding shows that simply reducing the degree of ambiguity of the lottery leads to a sizable and significant increase (67%) in the participation rate. This result is robust to alternative prize configurations. |
| Keywords: | ambiguity, lottery, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D03 D81 |
| Date: | 2015–03–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgr:cgsser:06-03&r=cbe |
| By: | Urs Fischbacher; Simeon Schudy; Sabrina Teyssier |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether risk, time, environmental, and social preferences affect single family homeowners’ investments in energy efficient renovations and energy quality of their house using established experimental measures and questionnaires. We find that homeowners who report to be more risk taking are more likely to have renovated their house. Pro-environmental and future-oriented renovators, i.e. renovators with lower discount factors, live in homes with higher energy efficiency. Controlling for the energy efficiency of houses, we further find that energy consumption as measured by heating and energy costs are lower for future-oriented and pro-environmental individuals. Social preferences measured in a dictator and a generosity game play a mixed role for investments in energy efficiency and energy consumption. |
| Keywords: | Risk Preferences, Time Preferences, Environmental Preferences, Social Preferences, Energy Efficiency, Artefactual Field Experiment |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0095&r=cbe |
| By: | Franz Dietrich; Christian List |
| Abstract: | Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people’s behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states. |
| Keywords: | mentalism; behaviourism; revealed preference; decision theory; scientific realism |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:62444&r=cbe |
| By: | COMBRIS Pierre; SEABRA PINTO Alexandra; GIRAUD HERAUD Eric |
| Abstract: | We study the relative willingness-to-pay (WTP) of consumers according to the diversity of supply in a market and we show how the presence of substitutes for a given product leads to question the incentive mechanisms commonly used in experimental auctions. We propose a Surplus Comparison Mechanism (SCM) in order to yield WTP estimates which better take into account the choice set available to consumers. After showing the efficiency of this mechanism we test the SCM in a laboratory experiment, reconsidering WTP for food environmental certifications (Integrated Pest Management and Organic certification). It appears that WTPs are decreasing when more alternative certifications are offered to consumers. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Auctions, Willingness to pay, Consumers’ surplus, Choice alternatives, Food certification. |
| JEL: | C91 D44 Q51 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2015-20&r=cbe |
| By: | Michele Berardi |
| Abstract: | Bounded rationality requires assumptions about ways in which rationality is constrained, and different assumptions are likely to lead to different economic predictions. In a simple forward-looking model we compare adaptive learning and evolutionary dynamics as means to model the process of beliefs' adaptation in response to observed outcomes. We show that the two methods deliver different conclusions about equilibrium and transition dynamics, and we try to shed some light on the reasons for such discrepancies. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:man:cgbcrp:206&r=cbe |