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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2014‒02‒21
seven papers chosen by Marco Novarese Universita' del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro |
| By: | Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Reme, Bjørn-Atle (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Sørensen, Erik Ø. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | We study how leader compensation affects public goods provision. We report from a lab experiment with four treatments, where the base treatment was a standard public goods game with simultaneous contribution decisions, while the three other treatments allowed participants to volunteer to be the leader in their group and make their contribution before the others. In the three leader treatments, we manipulate the level of compensation given to the leader. Our main finding is that a moderate compensation to the leader is highly beneficial, it increases the average contribution by 63% relative to a situation where the leader is not compensated and by more than 90% relative to a situation without a leader. A further increase in the leader compensation, however, is detrimental to public goods provision; it attracts less morally motivated leaders and creates a social crowding-out effect that makes it harder to lead by example. Finally, we report from a survey showing that the social crowding-out effect is also present in the population at large. We argue that the main findings of the paper are important in many real life settings where we would like to use economic incentives to encourage people to lead by example. |
| Keywords: | Lab experiment; leadership; compensation. |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D63 |
| Date: | 2014–02–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2014_002&r=cbe |
| By: | Gerlinde Fellner; Yoshio Iida; Sabine Kröger; Erika Seki |
| Abstract: | We study voluntary contribution behavior of individuals who vary in their ability to contribute to a joint project under different information scenarios. We investigate a situation with two types who vary only in their external marginal return (low and high). Results of a laboratory experiment suggest that, when group members are not aware of the heterogeneity in their group, both types make the same nominal contributions. When agents are informed about the heterogeneity, contributions increase but differently by type. High types contribute only more with sufficient social exposure, i.e., when information on the type of the contributor is available. Low types, on the other hand, contribute only more when they are aware of the distribution of types, but have no information on the type of the contributor. |
| Keywords: | Public goods, Voluntary contribution mechanism, Heterogeneity, Information, Norms |
| JEL: | C9 H41 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1411&r=cbe |
| By: | Schlicht, Ekkehart |
| Abstract: | Abstract This note offers two comments on the article “Social Influences towards Conformism in Economic Experiments” by Hargreaves Heap that is to appear in the Economics e-Journal. One relates to the concept of conformism, the other lines out some phenomena where an explicit recognition of group processes, such as conformism, may be analytically helpful. |
| Keywords: | Conformism; relative income hypothesis; reference group behavior; social multiplier; social preferences; self-classification; group polarization |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D43 H41 J41 D1 |
| Date: | 2014–02–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:18376&r=cbe |
| By: | Buechel, Berno; Mechtenberg, Lydia; Petersen, Julia |
| Abstract: | We conducted a multi-wave field experiment to study the interaction of peer effects and self-control among undergraduate students. We use a behavioral measure of self-control based on whether students achieve study related goals they have set for themselves. We find that both self-control and the number of talented friends increase students’ performance. We then set out to test the theoretical prediction of Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole (2005) that (only) sufficiently self-controlled individuals profit from interactions with peers. We find that peers with high self-control are more likely to connect to others, have a higher overall number of friends and have a higher number of talented friends. Moreover, positive news about self-controlled behavior of their peers increases students’ own perseverance. Hence, our findings are consistent with the model of Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole. In addition, we find that female students are more likely to have high self-control, but do not outperform male students. One reason for this is that female students have a lower number of talented friends than their male counterparts, thereby profiting less from positive peer effects. |
| Keywords: | Self-control; Peer Influence; Social Networks; Goals; Time preferences; Procrastination; Willpower; School Performance; Experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D85 I21 J24 |
| Date: | 2014–01–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:53658&r=cbe |
| By: | Almås, Ingvild (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Salvanes, Kjell G. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Sørensen, Erik Ø. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the role of family background in explaining differences in the willingness to compete. By combining data from a lab experiment conducted with a representative sample of adolescents in Norway and high quality register data on family background, we show that family background is fundamental in two important ways. First, boys from low socioeconomic status families are less willing to compete than boys from better off families, even when controlling for confidence, performance, risk preferences, time preferences, social preferences, and psychological traits. Second, family background is crucial for understanding the large gender difference in the willingness to compete. Girls are much less willing to compete than boys among children from better off families, whereas we do not find any gender difference in willingness to compete among children from low socioeconomic status families. Our data suggest that the main mechanism explaining the role of family background is that the father’s socioeconomic status has a large effect on the boys’ willingness to compete, but no effect on the girls. We do not find any effect on the willingness to compete for boys or girls of the mother’s socioeconomic status or other family characteristic that may potentially shape competition preferences, including parental equality and sibling rivalry. |
| Keywords: | Family background; socioeconomic status; lab experiment. |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D63 |
| Date: | 2014–02–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2014_003&r=cbe |
| By: | Leonardo Becchetti (University of Rome Tor Vergata); Vittorio Pelligra (University of Cagliari, CRENoS) |
| Abstract: | We examine by means of an artefactual field experiment on a representative sample of Italian adults, the impact of information and belief elicitation on charitable-giving when donors know (or express their beliefs on) what the organizations received in terms of aggregate donations in the past. We find that both effects are significant in terms of increase in the share of donors to a health related (bone marrow transplant) organization. The observed findings are consistent with expressed health wellbeing preferences of donors and with the gap between the organization position in the ranking of aggregate donations (last) and the far higher expected position of the same organization in donors’ beliefs. The effect is robust also in gender and age sample splits. Inequity aversion and warm glow depending on the expected marginal benefit of increased donations to the specific charity are two observationally equivalent explanations for our findings. Another related consequence of information disclosure is that the share of participants deciding not to donate at all becomes significantly lower when information on aggregate past donations is provided. |
| Keywords: | altruism, warm glow, strategic information, charitable-giving, artefactual field experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D64 H00 |
| Date: | 2014–02–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:306&r=cbe |
| By: | Arbel, Yuval (School of Business, Carmel Academic Center); Bar-El, Ronen (Open University of Israel); Siniver, Erez (College of Management, Rishon Lezion Campus); Tobol, Yossi (Jerusalem College of Technology (JTC)) |
| Abstract: | We examine the effect of adherence to behavioral codes, as measured by the degree of religiosity, on the level of honesty by conducting under-the-cup die experiments. The findings suggest that behavioral codes, which prohibit lying, offset the monetary incentive to lie. The highest level of honesty is found among young religious females while the lowest is found among secular females. Moreover, when the monetary incentive to lie is removed, the tendency of secular subjects to lie disappears. Given the strict separation between the secular and religious education systems the research findings confirm the importance of education in instilling ethical values. |
| Keywords: | honesty, religion, behavioral codes, ethical values |
| JEL: | C91 D63 Z12 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7946&r=cbe |