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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
| By: | Robert Dur (Erasmus University Rotterdam, CESifo, and IZA); Ben Vollaard (Tilburg University, CentER, and TILEC) |
| Abstract: | Field-experimental studies have shown that people litter more in more littered environments. Inspired by these findings, many cities around the world have adopted policies to quickly remove litter. While such policies may avoid that people follow the bad example of litterers, they may also invite free-riding on public cleaning services. This paper reports the results of a natural field experiment where, in a randomly assigned part of a residential area, the frequency of cleaning was reduced from daily to twice a week during a three-month period. Using high-frequency data on litter at treated and control locations before, during, and after the experiment, we find strong evidence that litter begets litter. However, we also find evidence that some people start to clean up after themselves when public cleaning services are diminished. |
| Keywords: | littering; public services; free-riding; field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 H40 K42 |
| Date: | 2012–07–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120061&r=cbe |
| By: | Robert Böhm (Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Sciences (CEREB), University of Erfurt, Germany); Tobias Regner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a real-effort task experiment where subjects' performance translates into a donation to a charity. In a within-subjects design we vary the visibility of the donation (no/private/public feedback). Confirming previous studies, we find that subjects' performance increases, that is, they donate more to charity, when their relative performance is made public. In line with the competitive altruism hypothesis, a biology-based explanation for status-seeking behavior, especially male subjects increase performance in the public setting. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, other-regarding behavior, charitable giving, social-image concerns, competitive altruism, experiments, social status |
| JEL: | C91 D03 J16 |
| Date: | 2012–07–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-038&r=cbe |
| By: | Lambarraa, Fatima; Riener, Gerhard |
| Abstract: | Charitable giving is one of the major obligations Islam and a strong Muslim norm endorses giving to the needy, but discourages public displays of giving. This norm is puzzling in light of previous evidence, suggesting that making donations public often increases giving. We report the results two field experiments with 534 and 186 participants at Moroccan educational institutions (among them two religious schools) to assess the effects this moral prescription on actual giving levels in anonymous and public settings. Subjects who participated in a paid study were given the option to donate from their payment to a local orphanage, under treatments that varied the publicity of the donation and the salience of Islamic values. In the salient Islamic treatment, anonymity of donations significantly increased donation incidence from 59% to 77% percent as well as average donations for religious subjects from 8.90 to 13.00 Dh. This findings stand in stark contrast to most previous findings in the charitable giving literature and suggest to rethink fundraising strategies in Muslim populations. -- |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving,Islam,Social pressure,Priming,Religion,Norms,Field experiment |
| JEL: | H40 C93 D01 Z12 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:59&r=cbe |
| By: | Paolo Crosetto (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena); Antonio Filippin (University of Milan, Department of Economics, and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET), an intuitive procedure aimed at measuring risk attitudes. Subjects decide how many boxes to collect out of 100, one of which containing a bomb. Earnings increase linearly with the number of boxes accumulated but are zero if the bomb is also collected. The BRET requires minimal numeracy skills, avoids truncation of the data, allows to precisely es- timate both risk aversion and risk seeking, and is not affected by the degree of loss aversion or by violations of the Reduction Axiom. We validate the task and test its robustness in a large-scale experiment. Choices react significantly to the stakes and to the size of the choice set. Our experiment rationalizes the gender gap that often characterizes choices under uncertainty by means of a higher loss rather than risk aversion. |
| Keywords: | Risk Aversion, Loss Aversion, Elicitation method |
| JEL: | C81 C91 D81 |
| Date: | 2012–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-035&r=cbe |
| By: | Alexander K. Koch, (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark); Julia Nafziger (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark); Anton Suvorov (CEFIR and New Economic School); Jeroen van de Ven (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute) |
| Abstract: | Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended to increase personal motivation. We show that in a model with time-inconsistent and reference-dependent preferences, self-rewards can be a credible and effective tool to overcome self-control problems. We also characterize the type of self-rewards that can be used, such as vice goods and virtue goods, and analyze which types of goods will be preferred by the individual. |
| Keywords: | Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, reference-dependent preferences, loss aversion, self-control, self-rewards, goals |
| JEL: | D03 D81 D91 |
| Date: | 2012–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-14&r=cbe |
| By: | Gabrielle Gayer (Department of Economics [Israël] - Bar-Ilan University); Itzhak Gilboa (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - GROUPE HEC - CNRS : UMR2959, Tel-Aviv University - Tel-Aviv University) |
| Abstract: | We consider the dynamics of reasoning by general rules (theories) and specific cases (analogies). When an agent faces an exogenous process, we show that, under mild conditions, if reality happens to be simple, the agent will converge to adopt a theory and discard analogical thinking. If, however, reality is complex, the agent may rely on analogies more than on theories. By contrast, when the process is generated by agents' predictions, convergence to a theory is much more likely, as in the emergence of norms in a coordination game. Mixed cases, involving noisy endogenous processes are likely to give rise to complex dynamics of reasoning, switching between theories and analogies. |
| Keywords: | analogies, theories, simplicity, norms |
| Date: | 2012–06–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00712917&r=cbe |
| By: | Leonardo Becchetti (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Stefano Castriota (University of Perugia); Pierluigi Conzo (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata" and CSEF) |
| Abstract: | Natural disasters have been shown to produce effects on social capital, risk and time preferences of victims. We run experiments on altruistic, time and risk preferences on a sample of Sri Lankan microfinance borrowers affected/unaffected by the tsunami shock in 2004 at a 7-year distance from the event (a distance longer than in most empirical studies). We find that people who suffered at least a damage from the event behave in dictator games less altruistically as senders (and expect less as receivers) than those who do not report any damage. Interestingly, among damaged, those who suffered also house damages or injuries send (expect) more than those reporting only losses to the economic activity. Since the former are shown to receive significantly more help than the latter we interpret this last finding as a form of indirect reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | tsunami, disaster recovery, social preferences, altruism, development aid |
| JEL: | C90 D03 O12 |
| Date: | 2012–07–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:239&r=cbe |
| By: | Cid, Alejandro; Cabrera, José María |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the impact of joint-liability incentives in the classroom using a randomized field experiment. The instructor design groups of three students in the classroom and provides a premium to their homework's grade only if all three members of the group accomplish some requirements. To isolate the joint liability effect from selfish motivations, we design also an individual incentives treatment. We find that joint-liability incentives impact positively on the grades accomplished in homework and midterm exams both in the experimental courses and in the other courses taken by the students in the semester. Though the positive average effect seems to disappear in the final exams, the overall impact of joint-liability incentives on the academic achievements in the semester is still positive. A drawback of this program is a decrease in the satisfaction with classmates. The significant effectiveness of the peer monitoring developed by the joint liability of group incentives provides novel implications for the design of the grading policies in the classroom and for other social settings where incentives may be based in peer monitoring or joint liability. |
| Keywords: | field experiment; randomization; education; joint liability; student incentives |
| JEL: | I20 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39907&r=cbe |