|
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
| By: | Donze, Jocelyn; Gunnes, Trude |
| Abstract: | This paper sheds light on the role of student motivation in the success of schooling. We develop a model in which a teacher engages in the management of student moti- vation through the choice of the classroom environment. We show that the teacher is able to motivate high-ability students, at least in the short run, by designing a com- petitive environment. For students with low ability, risk aversion, or when engaged in a long-term relationship, the teacher designs a classroom environment that is more focused on mastery and self-referenced standards. In doing so, the teacher helps to develop the intrinsic motivation of students and their capacity to overcome failures. |
| Keywords: | Education; Student achievement; Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation |
| JEL: | I21 |
| Date: | 2011–05–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:24739&r=cbe |
| By: | Dessi, Roberta (Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI and GREMAQ), and CEPR); Rustichini, Aldo (University of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | Standard economic models with complete information predict a positive, monotonic relationship between pay and performance. This prediction does not always hold in experimental tests: offering a small payment may result in lower performance than not offering any payment. We test experimentally two main explanations that have been put forward for this result: the "incomplete contract" hypothesis views the payment rule as a signal given to subjects on purpose of the activity. The "informed principal" hypothesis views it as a signal concerning the characteristics of the agent or of the task. The incomplete contract view appears to offer the best overall explanation for our results. We also find that high-powered monetary incentives do not "crowd out" intrinsic motivation, but may elicit "too much" effort when intrinsic motivation is very high. |
| Date: | 2011–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:24943&r=cbe |
| By: | M. Bigoni; M. Casari; A. Skrzypacz; G. Spagnolo |
| Abstract: | When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon is deterministic rather than stochastic. Moreover, a deterministic duration generates different aggregate patterns and individual strategies than a stochastic one. For instance, under a deterministic horizon subjects show high initial cooperation and a strong end-of-period reversal to defection. Moreover, they do not learn to apply backward induction but to postpone defection closer to the end. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C91 C92 D74 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp796&r=cbe |
| By: | Haucap, Justus; Herr, Annika; Frank, Björn |
| Abstract: | It is a persistent phenomenon in many societies that a large proportion of alcohol consumption takes place in company of other people. While the phenomenon of social or public drinking is well discussed in disciplines as social psychology and anthropology, economists have paid little attention to the social environment of alcohol consumption. This paper tries to close this gap and explains social drinking as a trust facilitating device. Since alcohol consumption tends to make some people (unwillingly) tell the truth, social drinking can eventually serve as a signaling device in social contact games. Empirical support is obtained from a cross-country analysis of trust and a newly developed index of moderate alcohol consumption. -- |
| Keywords: | social and public drinking,alcohol consumption,social contact games,trust,signaling |
| JEL: | C72 D71 L14 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:37&r=cbe |
| By: | Centorrino, Samuele; Djemaï, Elodie; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Milinski, Manfred; Seabright, Paul |
| Abstract: | We test the hypothesis that "genuine" or "convincing" smiling is a costly signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees in a trust game made video clips for viewing by potential trusters before the latter decided whether to send them money. Ratings of the genuineness of smiles vary across clips; it is difficult to make convincing smiles to order. We argue that smiling convincingly is costly, because smiles from trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as significantly more convincing, so that rewards appear to induce effort. We show that it induces cooperation: smiles rated as more convincing strongly predict judgments about the trustworthiness of trustees, and willingness to send them money. Finally, we show that it is a honest signal: those smiling convincingly return more money on average to senders. Convincing smiles are to some extent a signal of the intrinsic character of trustees: less honest individuals find smiling convincingly more difficult. They are also informative about the greater amounts that trustees playing for higher stakes have available to share: it is harder to smile convincingly if you have less to offer. |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:24351&r=cbe |
| By: | Simon Halliday (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town) |
| Abstract: | In attempting to understand cooperation, economists have used the methods of experimental economics to focus on spheres of human behavior in which humans display altruism, reciprocity, or other social preferences through giving and through punishment. Recent work has begun to examine whether allowing allocations in the negative domain, that is, allowing subjects to take (or steal) other subjects' endowments, might affect participants' behavior. If participants' behavior is a affected, then our understanding of experimental results generally, and social preferences specifically, should be affected too (List 2007, Bardsley 2008). In this paper we propose an experimental variation on the Dictator Game with third-party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b). We examine, first, a basic Dictator Game with third-party punishment, after which we introduce a treatment allowing the dictator to take from the receiver, in the knowledge that the third party could punish them. The results conict. Many dictators choose the most self-interested option, while, when taking is introduced as an option for the dictator, third parties punish the most self-interested option more than in the baseline. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Social Norms, Punishment, Strong Reciprocity, Social Preferences, Third Party. |
| JEL: | C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:62&r=cbe |
| By: | Abigail Barr (University of Nottingham); Justine Burns (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town); Luis Miller (University of the Basque Country); Ingrid Shaw |
| Abstract: | We present two experiments designed to investigate whether individuals’ notions of distributive justice are associated with their relative (within-society) economic status. Each participant played a specially designed four-person dictator game under one of two treatments, under one initial endowments were earned, under the other they were randomly assigned. The first experiment was conducted in Oxford, United Kingdom, the second in Cape Town, South Africa. In both locations we found that relatively well-off individuals make allocations to others that reflect those others’ initial endowments more when those endowments were earned rather than random; among relatively poor individuals this was not the case. |
| Keywords: | Distributive Justice, Inequality, Laboratory Experiments. |
| JEL: | D63 C91 C93 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:66&r=cbe |
| By: | Mendelski, Martin; Libman, Alexander |
| Abstract: | The paper examines the interdependence of historical legacies and current contextual factors as determinants of economic and political performance. It shows that behavioral patterns based on identical legacies could lead to very different (if not the opposite) results in regions with different contextual socioeconomic characteristics. Specifically, the paper compares the demand for litigation as an important aspect of judicial performance in two different historical and cultural regions of Romania, which have been in the past under indirect Ottoman rule and part of the Habsburg Empire respectively. Although Romania is currently a centralized state with common judicial system, both parts of the country inherited substantially different legacies from the history. We find that while in rich regions Habsburg legacy leads to higher demand for litigation than the Ottoman, in poor regions the situation is reversed. The results remain robust for various specifications, controls and estimation techniques. -- |
| Keywords: | historical legacies,judicial performance,contextual factors,demand for litigation,Habsburg legacy,Ottoman legacy |
| JEL: | K41 K42 N44 O17 P26 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:175&r=cbe |
| By: | Dannenberg, Astrid; Löschel, Andreas; Paolacci, Gabriele; Reif, Christiane; Tavoni, Alessandro |
| Abstract: | We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty. -- |
| Keywords: | Public good,threshold uncertainty,ambiguity,experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 H41 Q54 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11065&r=cbe |
| By: | Martin F. Quaas (Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Germany); Daan van Soest (VU University Amsterdam and Tilburg University, The Netherlands); Stefan Baumgaertner (Department of Sustainability Sciences and Department of Economics, Leuphana University of Lueneburg, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We study how human preferences aect the resilience of economies that depend on more than one type of natural resources. In particular, we analyze whether the degree of substitutability of natural resources in consumer needs may give rise to multiple steady states and path dependence even when resources are managed optimally. This is a major shift in the interpretation and analysis of resilience, from viewing (limited) resilience as an objective property of the economy-environment system to acknowledging its partially subjective, preference-based character. We nd that society tends to be less willing to buer exogenous shocks if resource goods are complements in consumption than if they are substitutes. Hence, the stronger the complementarity between the various types of resource goods, the less resilient the economy is. |
| Keywords: | Resilience; substitutes and complements; discounting; multiple steady states; natural resources; path dependence; regime shifts; tipping points |
| JEL: | C62 O13 Q01 Q20 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lue:wpaper:220&r=cbe |
| By: | Hasan, Dr. Syed Akif; Subhani, Dr. Muhammad Imtiaz; Osman, Ms. Amber |
| Abstract: | It is a universal phenomenon that dressing/clothing has an effect on the personality of an individual. One’s attire/dressing is said to be an important part of the personality representation as it gives the first impression on the others. It has been evident through the studies that the mood has an inborn reflex with respect to the dressing preferences and fashion. Other factors related to the clothing for e.g. emotions, situations, education of a person, design, print, quality of fabric, color can influence mood. |
| Keywords: | Consumer behavior; Fashion; Mood; Clothing |
| JEL: | B3 A1 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34761&r=cbe |
| By: | Barth, Anne-Kathrin; Graf, Julia |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates why consumers choose calling plans that are not always cost-minimizing. Our approach is twofold: we account for general difficulties facing a tariff choice, as well as for biased preferences. We provide evidence from an experiment among German university students and staff, finding that participants are often not aware of their actual consumption. In line with the findings on at-rate biases, respondents systematically overestimate their consumption. On the other hand, they are generally able and willing to detect optimal tariffs. Furthermore, with increasing usage level, consumers' performance improves. However, some participants hold strong preferences for certain tariff forms, seducing them to choose cost-dominated offers. In our setup, we find that respondents prefer tariffs involving subsidies or hire-purchase options for handsets over contracts with buy now options. -- |
| Keywords: | Behavioral Economics,Mobile phone tariffs,Handset subsidy,Hire-purchase of device |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:36&r=cbe |