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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
| By: | K. Vela Velupillai |
| Abstract: | In this paper I attempt to make a case for promoting the courage of rebels within the citadels of orthodoxy in academic research environments. Wicksell in Macroeconomics, Brouwer in the Foundations of Mathematics,Turing in Computability Theory, Sraffa in the Theories of Value and Distribution are, in my own fields of research, paradigmatic examples of rebels, adventurers and non-conformists of the highest calibre in scientific research within University environments. In what sense, and how, can such rebels, adventurers and nonconformists be fostered in the current University research environment dominated by the cult of picking winners? This is the motivational question lying behind the historical outlines of the work of Wicksell, Brouwer, Hilbert, Bishop, Veronese, Gödel, Turing and Sraffa that I describe in this paper. The debate between freedom in research and teaching and the naked imposition of correct thinking, on potential dissenters of the mind, is of serious concern in this age of austerity of material facilities. It is a debate that has occupied some the finest minds working at the deepest levels of foundational issues in mathematics, metamathematics and economic theory. By making some of the issues explicit, I hope it is possible to encourage dissenters to remain courageous in the face of current dogmas. |
| Keywords: | Non-conformist research, macroeconomics, foundations of mathematics, intuitionism, constructivism, formalism, Hilbertís Dogma, Hilbertís Program, computability theory |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpas:1003&r=cbe |
| By: | Thomas A. Rietz (Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa); Roman M. Sheremeta (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Timothy W. Shields (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Vernon L. Smith (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | We design an experiment to examine welfare and behavior in a multi-level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market. In a repeated game, an Investor invests via an Intermediary who lends to a Borrower. A pre-experiment one-shot version of the game serves as a baseline and to type each subject. We alter the transparency of exchanges between non-adjacent parties. We find transparency of the exchanges between the investor and intermediary does not significantly affect welfare. However, transparency regarding exchanges between the intermediary and borrower promotes trust on the part of the investor, increasing welfare. Further, this has asymmetric effects: borrowers and intermediaries achieve greater welfare benefits than investors. We discuss implications for what specific aspects of financial market transparency may facilitate more efficiency. |
| Keywords: | financial intermediation, financial market transparency, pass through securities, multi-level trust games, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 G14 G21 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-03&r=cbe |
| By: | G. Camera; M. Casari; M. Bigoni |
| Abstract: | Social norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner’s dilemma. The interaction was repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly commit to actions. |
| JEL: | C70 C90 D80 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp751&r=cbe |
| By: | Astrid Matthey (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany); Tobias Regner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Recent research has cast some doubt on the general validity of outcome-based models of social preferences. We develop a model based on cognitive dissonance that focuses on the importance of self-image. An experiment (a dictator game variant) tests the model. First, we find that subjects whose choices involve two psychologically inconsistent cognitions indeed report higher levels of experienced conflict and take more time for their decisions (our proxies for cognitive dissonance). Second, we find support for the main model components. An individual's self-image, the sensitivity to cognitive dissonance, and expected behavior of others have a positive effect on other-regarding behavior. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, other-regarding behavior, self-image, experiments,,cognitive dissonance, social norms, normative beliefs, expectations |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D80 |
| Date: | 2011–05–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-024&r=cbe |
| By: | M. Bigoni; M. Fort; M. Nardotto; T. Reggiani |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives. |
| JEL: | A22 C93 I20 |
| Date: | 2011–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp752&r=cbe |
| By: | Parkinson, S.; Baddeley, M. |
| Abstract: | In a jury decision-making, individuals must compromise in order to reach a group consensus. If individuals compromise for non-rational reasons, such as a preference for conformity or due to erroneous information, then the final decision of the group may be biased. This paper presents original experimental data which shows that groups do have a significant tendency to compromise in jury-like settings. Econometric evidence also shows that features of groups, including the generosity of the group overall, will dictate the extent of compromise. The data also reveal that individual traits such as gender and capacity for empathy are associated with the extent of compromise in a jury-type setting. The implications are that interactions between individual and group characteristics limit the objectivity of decision-making. |
| JEL: | C92 D72 D81 |
| Date: | 2011–03–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1128&r=cbe |
| By: | K. Vela Velupillai; Stefano Zambelli |
| Abstract: | Lehtinen and Kuorikoski ([73]) question, provocatively, whether, in the context of Computing the Perfect Model, economists avoid - even positively abhor - reliance on simulation. We disagree with the mildly qualified affirmative answer given by them, whilst agreeing with some of the issues they raise. However there are many economic theoretic, mathematical (primarily recursion theoretic and constructive) - and even some philosophical and epistemological - infelicities in their descriptions, definitions and analysis. These are pointed out, and corrected; for, if not, the issues they raise may be submerged and subverted by emphasis just on the unfortunate, but essential, errors and misrepresentations |
| Keywords: | Simulation, Computation, Computable, Analysis, Dynamics, Proof, Algorithm |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpas:1002&r=cbe |
| By: | K. Vela Velupillai; Stefano Zambelli |
| Abstract: | This is an attempt at a succinct survey, from methodological and epistemological perspectives, of the burgeoning, apparently unstructured, field of what is often – misleadingly – referred to as computational economics. We identify and characterise four frontier research fields, encompassing both micro and macro aspects of economic theory, where machine computation play crucial roles in formal modelling exercises: algorithmic behavioural economics, computable general equilibrium theory, agent based computational economics and computable economics. In some senses these four research frontiers raise, without resolving, many interesting methodological and epistemological issues in economic theorising in (alternative) mathematical modes |
| Keywords: | Classical Behavioural Economics, Computable General Equilibrium theory, Agent Based Economics, Computable Economics, Computability, Constructivity, Numerical Analysis |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpas:1001&r=cbe |