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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
| By: | Ralph-C Bayer (School of Economics, University of Adelaide); Elke Renner (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Rupert Sausgruber (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay of contributions in standard public goods games cannot be fully explained by reinforcement learning. According to our estimates, learning only accounts for 41 percent of the decay in contributions in standard public goods games. The contribution dynamics of subjects, who are identi?ed as conditional cooperators, di®er strongly from the learning dynamics, while a learning model estimated from the limited information treatment tracks behavior for subjects, who cannot be classi?ed as conditional cooperators, reasonably well. |
| Keywords: | public goods experiments, learning, limited information, confusion, conditional cooperation |
| JEL: | C90 D83 H41 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-18&r=cbe |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham); Daniele Nosenzo (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham); Elke Renner (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual’s cooperativeness and the individual’s beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are cooperatively inclined. Partly this reflects a false consensus effect: cooperative leaders are more optimistic than non-cooperators about the cooperativeness of followers. However, cooperative leaders contribute more than non-cooperative leaders even after controlling for optimism. We conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader in large part reflects social motivations. |
| JEL: | A13 C92 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-19&r=cbe |
| By: | Juan-Camilo Cárdenas; Miguel Andrés Espinosa; Sandra Polanía Reyes |
| Abstract: | Altruism, understood as the individual disposition to sacrifice personal income to improve someone else’s income can be a rational choice strategy which responds to different motivations, incentives and institutions, in a consistent way with the donor’s optimization logic. In this article we extend the Andreoni and Miller’s experimental design (2002) using a modified Dictator game and we applied it to 470 students from several universities and different majors, years of study and level of income who can donate part of their income to the Bella Flor Foundation (http://www.bellaflor.org/), a real nonprofit organization founded by a group of college students whose mission is “to promote the integral development of the children from Bella Flor, Paraíso and Mirador neighborhoods through social activities in education, health care, recreation, and exalting human values”. We test the consistency of the player’s decisions with the axioms of revealed preferences, and with the effects of relative prices and income. We also evaluate the violation of consistency of the axioms and estimate the demand functions for altruism towards this charity, with policy implications related to the optimal design for fundraising strategies. Our results confirm that a significant fraction of individuals show consistent decisions, i.e. that donations to these charities behave as “normal goods” in price and income effects and with rather small number of violations of the axioms of revealed preferences. However, the experimental data suggests that revealing the identity of the donor can decrease altruism and induce more violations of the axioms of consistent behavior mentioned. |
| Date: | 2009–11–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:006149&r=cbe |
| By: | Jon D. Wisman |
| Abstract: | Many notable heterodox economists have viewed workplace democracy as essential for the realization of the Enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality, and community. Yet the economics profession has never given their ideal more than a passing and dismissive glance. The reasons for this have been well-covered in the literature. But one reason that has been all but ignored is that the theory of human behavior that is credited to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and that has dominated economic thinking ever since is not supportive of workplace democracy. However, Smith developed a far richer theory of human behavior in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. His fuller theory depicted humans as fully social beings, in need of community. This article outlines the “social approbation” theory of human behavior that Smith developed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments and demonstrates how it is in accord with the findings of contemporary evolutionary psychology. It then examines the manner in which this theory suggests workplace democracy as the appropriate organizational form of control for society's sphere of production. |
| Keywords: | Adam Smith, Self-interest, Altruism, Approbation, Cooperation, Workplace democracy |
| Date: | 2009–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-15&r=cbe |
| By: | Da Silva, Sergio; Baldo, Dinorá; Matsushita, Raul |
| Abstract: | We conducted a questionnaire study with student subjects to look for explicit correlations between selected biological characteristics of the subjects and manifestation of the Allais paradox in the pattern of their choices between sets of two pairs of risky prospects. We find that particular bio-characteristics, such as gender, menstrual cycle, mother’s age, parenthood, digit ratio, perceived negative life events, and emotional state, can be related to the paradox. Women, in particular if not menstruating, are less susceptible to the paradox. Those born to not-too-young mothers are also less prone to the paradox. The same holds true for those who father children, those with high prenatal testosterone exposure, who have reported many negative life events, and those who were anxious, excited, aroused, happy, active, and fresh at the time of the experiment. Further, left-handers and atheists may be less inclined to exhibit the paradox. |
| Keywords: | Allais paradox; choice under risk; biological characteristics |
| JEL: | D81 C91 |
| Date: | 2009–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:18938&r=cbe |
| By: | Elaina Rose (with Yoram Bauman) |
| Abstract: | A substantial body of research suggests that economists are less generous than other professionals and that economics students are less generous than other students. We address this question using administrative data on donations to social programs by students at the University of Washington. Our data set allows us to track student donations and economics training over time in order to distinguish selection effects from indoctrination effects. We find that economics majors are less likely to donate than other students and that there is an indoctrination effect for non-majors but not for majors. Women majors and non-majors are less likely to contribute than comparable men. |
| Date: | 2009–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2009-20&r=cbe |
| By: | Matthias Kräkel |
| Abstract: | We show that in competitive careers based on individual performance the least productive individuals may have the highest probabilities to be promoted to top positions. These individuals have the lowest fall-back positions and, hence, the highest incentives to succeed in career contests. This detrimental incentive effect exists irrespective of whether effort and talent are substitutes or complements in the underlying contest-success function. However, in case of complements the incentive effect may be be outweighed by a productivity effect that favors high effort choices by the more talented individual |
| Keywords: | career competition; contest; mediocracy |
| JEL: | D72 J44 J45 M51 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse25_2009&r=cbe |
| By: | James W. Bono; David H. Wolpert |
| Abstract: | It is known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly re- stricting their possible moves before start of play. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that is contingent on the game's outcome. We explore what happens when external parties (who we call game miners) discover this fact and seek to profit from it by entering an outcome-contingent contract with the players. We analyze various bargaining games between miners and players for determining such an outcome- contingent contract. We establish restrictions on the strategic settings in which a game miner can profit, and bounds on the game miner's profit given various structured bargaining games. These bargaining games include playing the players against one another, as well as allowing the players to pay the miner(s) for exclu- sivity and first-mover advantage. We also establish that when all players can enter contracts with miners, to guarantee the existence of equilibria it is necessary to assume that players can randomize over the contracts they make. |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-10&r=cbe |
| By: | Jose Apesteguia; Miguel Ballester |
| Date: | 2009–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:najeco:814577000000000404&r=cbe |
| By: | Yusufcan Masatlioglu; Daisuke Nakajima; Erkut Ozbay |
| Date: | 2009–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:najeco:814577000000000409&r=cbe |