nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2007‒07‒27
eight papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
University of the Piemonte Orientale

  1. Do People Plan? By John Bone; John D Hey; John Suckling
  2. Are Experimental Economists Prone to Framing Effects? A Natural Field Experiment By Simon Gaechter; Henrik Orzen; Elke Renner; Chris Starmer
  3. Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation By Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten
  4. Verification of Citations: Fawlty Towers of Knowledge? By Wright, Malcolm; Armstrong, J. Scott
  5. Monitoring In Teams: A Model and Experiment on the Central Monitor Hypothesis By Stefan Grosse; Louis Putterman; Bettina Rockenbach
  6. Ambiguity By Jürgen Eichberger; David Kelsey
  7. The Evolution of Coorporation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence By Pedro Dal Bo; Guillaume R. Frechette
  8. Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy By Pedro Dal Bo; Andrew Foster; Louis Putterman

  1. By: John Bone; John D Hey; John Suckling
    Abstract: We report the results of an experimental investigation of a key axiom of economic theories of dynamic decision making – namely, that agents plan. Inferences from previous investigations have been confounded with issues concerning the preference functionals of the agents. Here, we present an innovative experimental design which is driven purely by dominance: if preferences satisfy dominance, we can infer whether subjects are planning ahead. We implement two sets of experiments: the first (the Individual Treatment) in which the same player takes decisions both in the present and the future; and the second the Pairs Treatment) in which different players take decisions at different times. In both contexts, according to economic theory, the players in the present should anticipate the decision of the player in the future. We find that over half the participants in both experimental treatments do not appear to be planning ahead; moreover, their ability to plan ahead does not improve with experience. These findings identify an important lacuna in economic theories, both for individual behaviour and for behaviour in games.
    Date: 2006–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:06/22&r=cbe
  2. By: Simon Gaechter (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham); Henrik Orzen (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham); Elke Renner (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham); Chris Starmer (Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: An extensive literature demonstrates the existence of framing effects in the laboratory and in questionnaire studies. This paper reports new evidence from a natural field experiment using a subject pool one may consider as particularly resistant to such effects: experimental economists. We find that while the behaviour of junior experimental economists is affected by the description of the decision task they face, this is not the case for the more senior members of our subject pool.
    Keywords: Framing; field experiments
    JEL: C93 D01
    Date: 2007–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-01&r=cbe
  3. By: Dannenberg, Astrid; Riechmann, Thomas; Sturm, Bodo; Vogt, Carsten
    Abstract: We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects’ performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer’s type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects.
    Keywords: individual preferences, inequity aversion, experimental economics, public goods
    JEL: C91 C92 H41
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5693&r=cbe
  4. By: Wright, Malcolm; Armstrong, J. Scott
    Abstract: The prevalence of faulty citations impedes the growth of scientific knowledge. Faulty citations include omissions of relevant papers, incorrect references, and quotation errors that misreport findings. We discuss key studies in these areas. We then examine citations to Estimating nonresponse bias in mail surveys, one of the most frequently cited papers from the Journal of Marketing Research, as an exploratory study to illustrate these issues. This paper is especially useful in testing for quotation errors because it provides specific operational recommendations on adjusting for nonresponse bias; therefore, it allows us to determine whether the citing papers properly used the findings. By any number of measures, those doing survey research fail to cite this paper and, presumably, make inadequate adjustments for nonresponse bias. Furthermore, even when the paper was cited, 49 of the 50 studies that we examined reported its findings improperly. The inappropriate use of statistical-significance testing led researchers to conclude that nonresponse bias was not present in 76 percent of the studies in our sample. Only one of the studies in the sample made any adjustment for it. Judging from the original paper, we estimate that the study researchers should have predicted nonresponse bias and adjusted for 148 variables. In this case, the faulty citations seem to have arisen either because the authors did not read the original paper or because they did not fully understand its implications. To address the problem of omissions, we recommend that journals include a section on their websites to list all relevant papers that have been overlooked and show how the omitted paper relates to the published paper. In general, authors should routinely verify the accuracy of their sources by reading the cited papers. For substantive findings, they should attempt to contact the authors for confirmation or clarification of the results and methods. This would also provide them with the opportunity to enquire about other relevant references. Journal editors should require that authors sign statements that they have read the cited papers and, when appropriate, have attempted to verify the citations.
    Keywords: citation errors; evidence-based research; nonresponse bias; quotation errors; surveys.
    JEL: Y8 C81 B4
    Date: 2007–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:4149&r=cbe
  5. By: Stefan Grosse; Louis Putterman; Bettina Rockenbach
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-4&r=cbe
  6. By: Jürgen Eichberger (University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics); David Kelsey (University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics)
    Abstract: Ambiguity refers to a decision situation under uncertainty when there is incomplete information about the likelihood of events. Different formal models of this notion have been developed with differing implications about the representation of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.
    Keywords: uncertainty, ambiguity, ambiguity attitude
    JEL: D81
    Date: 2007–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0448&r=cbe
  7. By: Pedro Dal Bo; Guillaume R. Frechette
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-7&r=cbe
  8. By: Pedro Dal Bo; Andrew Foster; Louis Putterman
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-4&r=cbe

This nep-cbe issue is ©2007 by Marco Novarese. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.