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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
| By: | José L. B. Fernandes; Juan Ignacio Peña; Benjamin M. Tabak |
| Abstract: | Recent literature has found two behavioral effects - house-money and myopic loss aversion (MLA) - in several experimental designs. We show that although we can find a house-money effect using survey methods this evidence disappears when we study investment decision within a multi-period investment experiment. Loss aversion is found to govern the risk-taking behavior of subjects in dynamic settings, overcoming the house-money effect. These results are robust to experiments conducted in two different countries, Spain and Brazil. |
| Date: | 2006–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcb:wpaper:115&r=cbe |
| By: | Amegashie, J. |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gue:guelph:2007-3&r=cbe |
| By: | Matteo Cervellati; Joan Esteban; Laurence Kranich |
| Abstract: | Moral values influence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially significant instance is the case of moral values concerning work effort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals differ in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which s |
| Keywords: | Social Contract, Endogenous Sentiments, Voting over Taxes, Moral Work |
| JEL: | D64 D72 Z13 H3 J2 |
| Date: | 2007–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:702.07&r=cbe |
| By: | Gilles Le Garrec (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques) |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fce:doctra:0709&r=cbe |
| By: | Nori Tarui (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa); Charles Mason (Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming); Stephen Polasky (Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota); Greg Ellis (Department of Economics, University of Washington) |
| Abstract: | We model a dynamic common property resource game with unobservable actions and non-linear stock dependent costs. We propose a strategy profile that generates a worst perfect equilibrium in the punishment phase, thereby supporting cooperation under the widest set of conditions. We show under what set of parameter values for the discount rate, resource growth rate, harvest price, and the number of resource users, this strategy supports cooperation in the commons as a subgame perfect equilibrium. The strategy profile that we propose, which involves harsh punishment after a defection followed by forgiveness, is consistent with human behavior observed in experiments and common property resource case studies. |
| Keywords: | Common property resource, cooperation, dynamic game, unobservable actions |
| JEL: | D62 Q20 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:200711&r=cbe |
| By: | Sorensen, Morten (University of Chicago GSB) |
| Abstract: | To understand the investment behavior of venture capital (VC) investors, this paper estimates a dynamic model of learning. Behavior reflecting both learning from past investments (exploitation) and anticipated future learning (exploration) are found to be prevalent, and the model's additional predictions about success rates and investment speeds are confirmed empirically. Learning is important, since it can create informational frictions, and it has potential implications for VCs' investments and organizations. VCs are found to internalize the value of learning, and this may help promote exploration beyond the levels sustained in standard capital markets, which is socially valuable. |
| Keywords: | Venture capital; Learning; Multi-armed bandit model |
| JEL: | D49 D83 G31 |
| Date: | 2007–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sifrwp:0053&r=cbe |
| By: | Antonio Cabrales; Raffaele Miniaci; Marco Piovesan; Giovanni Ponti |
| Abstract: | This paper reports experimental evidence on a stylized labor market. The experiment is designed as a sequence of three treatments. In the last treatment, TR3, four principals, who face four teams of two agents, compete by offering the agents a contract from a fixed menu. In this menu, each contract is the optimal solution of a (complete information) mechanism design problem where principals face agents’ who have social (i.e. interdependent) distributional preferences a’ la Fehr and Schmidt [19] with a specific parametrization. Each agent selects one of the available contracts offered by the principals (i.e. he “chooses to work” for a principal). Production is determined by the outcome of a simple effort game induced by the chosen contract. In the first two treatments, TR1 and TR2, we estimate individual social preference parameters and beliefs in the effort game, respectively. We find that social preferences are significant determinants of the matching process between labor supply and demand in the market stage, as well as principals’ and agents’ contract and effort decisions. In addition, we also see that social preferences explain the matching process in the labor market, as agents display a higher propensity to choose to work for a principal with similar distributional preferences. |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we072010&r=cbe |
| By: | Amanda Bell |
| Abstract: | Brisbane Girls Grammar School’s new Creative Learning Centre was conceived to group arts studies which were previously scattered across the campus and to serve all students as a meeting place and technology hub. The building is specifically designed to provide the most flexible and innovative environment for teenaged girls, having special regard for the way girls learn and interact socially. The unique design also helps ensure protection from Brisbane’s hot and humid environment. |
| Keywords: | innovation, technology, secondary schools, school building design, learning environment, educational buildings |
| Date: | 2007–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:eduaaa:2007/5-en&r=cbe |
| By: | Frankel, David M. |
| Abstract: | We propose a novel approach to measuring the causal effect of family structure on a child’s outcomes. In a war, some fathers are killed in action and cannot return to their families. This creates a natural experiment in which the effects of a father’s absence can be tested. Using data from the U.S. Civil War, we find no evidence that a father’s death in the war affected his child’s labor income as a young adult. We also find no effect on labor force participation or the chance of being married in 1880. Daughters of fathers who died were less likely to be students in 1880, although we find no such effect on sons. |
| Keywords: | Family structure, female headed families, Civil War, natural experiments. |
| JEL: | J0 |
| Date: | 2007–05–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12819&r=cbe |