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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
| By: | Michel André Maréchal; Christian Thöni |
| Abstract: | A substantive amount of lab experimental evidence suggests that the norm of reciprocity has important economic consequences. However, it is unclear whether the norm of reciprocity survives in a natural and competitive environment with experienced agents. For this purpose we analyze data from a natural field experiment conducted with sales representatives who were instructed to randomly distribute product samples as gifts to their business partners. We find that distributing gifts to store managers boosts sales revenue substantially, which is consistent with the notion of reciprocity. However, the results underline that the nature of the relationship between market participants crucially affects the prevalence of reciprocal behavior. |
| Keywords: | reciprocity, gift exchange, field experiment |
| JEL: | D63 C93 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:dp2007:2007-09&r=cbe |
| By: | Alan Kirman; Sheri Markose; Simone Giasante; Paolo Pin |
| Abstract: | We study the formation of social networks that are based on local interaction and simple rule following. Agents evaluate the profitability of link formation on the basis of the Myerson-Shapley principle that payoffs come from the marginal contribution they make to coalitions. The NP-hard problem associated with the Myerson-Shapley value is replaced by a boundedly rational 'spatially' myopic process. Agents consider payoffs from direct links with their neighbours (level 1) which can include indirect payoffs from neighbours' neighbours (level 2) and up to M-levels that are far from global. Agents dynamically break away from the neighbour to whom they make the least marginal contribution. Computational experiments show that when this self-interested process of link formation operates at level 2 neighbourhoods, agents self-organize into stable and efficient network structures that manifest reciprocity, equity and segregation reminiscent of hunter gather groups. A large literature alleges that this is incompatible with self-interested behaviour and market oriented marginality principle in the allocation of value. We conclude that it is not this valuation principle that needs to be altered to obtain segregated social networks as opposed to global components, but whether it operates at level 1 or level 2 of social neighbourhoods. Remarkably, all M>2 neighbourhood calculations for payoffs leave the efficient network structures identical to the case when M=2. |
| Date: | 2007–04–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esx:essedp:629&r=cbe |
| By: | Adegbesan, Tunji (IESE Business School); Ricart, Joan E. (IESE Business School) |
| Abstract: | Most approaches to innovation bear the implicit assumption that increased innovativeness leads to improved organizational performance. Thus, more attention has been focused on innovativeness than on innovation performance; on novelty than on value. However, recent empirical evidence calls into question the unqualified optimism surrounding innovation, and leads us to ask what we really know about when technological innovation improves performance. In this paper, we seek to make a contribution by presenting the results of an exhaustive review of extant knowledge on the outcomes of technological innovation. Our synthesis of the literature allows us to relate in one parsimonious model the drivers and moderators of the antecedents, technical outcomes, and performance outcomes of technological innovation and technological change. We also make sense of the proliferation of terms, and consequent terminological ambiguity, which characterizes a lot of work on technological innovation. Finally, in the light of the model presented and recent developments in work on firm capabilities, we indicate possible avenues for further development of this critical area of research. |
| Keywords: | Technological innovation; organizational performance; innovation and innovativeness; |
| Date: | 2007–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0668&r=cbe |