nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2006‒03‒05
nine papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
Universita del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Convergence: An Experimental Study By Wolf Ze'ev Ehrblatt; Kyle Hyndman; Erkut Y. ÄOzbay; Andrew Schotter
  2. If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question? By Yoav Shoham; Rob Powers; Trond Grenager
  3. Conformity in contribution games: gender and group effects By C. Mónica Capra; Lei Li
  4. Communication and the extraction of natural renewable resources with threshold externalities By C. Mónica Capra; Tomomi Tanaka
  5. Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs By Geoffrey Dunbar; Juan Tu; Ruqu Wang; Xiaoting Wang
  6. Economists and uncertainty By John Quiggin; Robert G. Chambers
  7. A Taxonomy of Consumer Motives through Preferred Brand Personality : Empirical Findings for 11 Countries By N. GEEROMS; I. VERMEIR; P. VAN KENHOVE; H. HENDRICKX
  8. Social capital and political bias in knowledge sharing: An exploratory study By A. WILLEM; H. SCARBROUGH
  9. The 'sponge' organisation: A creativity-based reflection on the innovative and sustainable firm By Rodriguez, Miguel A.; Ponti, Franc; Ayuso, Silvia

  1. By: Wolf Ze'ev Ehrblatt; Kyle Hyndman; Erkut Y. ÄOzbay; Andrew Schotter
    Date: 2006–02–23
  2. By: Yoav Shoham; Rob Powers; Trond Grenager
    Date: 2006–02–27
  3. By: C. Mónica Capra; Lei Li
    Abstract: Psychologists have established that task complexity, gender and group identity affect conformity rates. We test the effects of these variables in contribution games. Our experiments consist of two parts: a public goods and a dictator game, both are played once. After subjects make their initial choices, they can revise them. Before revising, they are allowed to choose among different payoff irrelevant information regarding choices made by other cohorts that differed in class and gender. Our data are consistent with some of the findings in the psychology literature. We find that complexity matters. We find no gender or group effects on conformity rates. However, gender has weak effects when combined with group identity.
    Date: 2006–01
  4. By: C. Mónica Capra; Tomomi Tanaka
    Abstract: Non-binding communication, or cheap talk, has been associated with the resolution of coordination failures and social dilemmas in both laboratory and field experiments (see Cooper, et al., 1992, and Clark, Kay, and Sefton, 2000; Isaac and Walker, 1991, Ostrom and Walker, 1991, Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994, and Cardenas, Ahn, and Ostrom, 2003). In simple coordination games, communication is expected to reduce the uncertainty of what other players are likely to do and hence facilitate coordination in the better equilibrium. In social dilemma games, the reasons why communication works are still unclear. Perhaps communication results in an increased sense of group identity, an enhancement of normative orientations toward cooperation, or a necessity to avoid (seek) verbal reprimand (approval) when promises of cooperation are violated (fulfilled). In this paper we use a simple neoclassical growth model with multiple equilibria to investigate the mechanism by which non-binding communication results in lower equilibrium resource extraction. We use a growth model because it provides an adequate dynamic framework for modeling extraction of a natural resource with threshold externalities.
    Date: 2006–02
  5. By: Geoffrey Dunbar (Simon Fraser University); Juan Tu (Queen's University); Ruqu Wang (Queen's University); Xiaoting Wang (Brock University)
    Abstract: In this paper, we re-examine various previous experimental studies of the Centipede Game in the literature. These experiments found that players rarely follow the subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies of the game, and various modifications to the game were proposed to explain the outcomes of the experiments. We here offer yet another modification. Players have a choice of whether or not to believe that their opponents use subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies. We define a `behavioral equilibrium' for this game. This equilibrium concept can reproduce the outcomes of those experiments.
    Keywords: centipede games, game theory, experimental economics, behavioral economics
    JEL: C72 C91
    Date: 2006–02
  6. By: John Quiggin (Department of Economics, University of Queensland); Robert G. Chambers (Dept of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park)
    Date: 2005–04
    Abstract: This paper presents a circumplex taxonomy of related consumer motives based on valence ratings of 34 preferred brand personality traits. Results of INDSCAL analysis reveal a consistent, replicable preferred brand personality structure across 11 different countries and four different product categories. As preferred brand personality dimensions are considered as behavioral expressions of underlying motives, the found structure was reformulated in terms of a taxonomy of eight fundamental consumer motives i.e. Vitality, Pleasure, Conviviality, Belonging, Security, Control, Recognition and Power, determined by two basic, bipolar dimensions i.e. Intrapersonal versus Interpersonal axis. The proposed taxonomy appears to overlap considerably with prior classifications of human motives. Opportunities in the context of consumer research are discussed, as well as some directions for future research.
    Date: 2005–11
    Abstract: The benefits of social capital for the sharing of knowledge are frequently emphasized in the literature (Burt, 1997; Kostava & Roth, 2003; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai, 2000). However, a few authors have also begun to draw our attention towards the drawbacks of social capital for the working of organizations (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Edelman, Bresnen, Newell, & Scarbrough, 2004). In particular, instrumental social capital –as opposed to consummatory social capital- is seen as linked to power relations, which can inhibit the sharing of knowledge (Burt, 1997; Kale et al., 2000). To contribute to this debate on the role of social capital, we carried out a qualitative study in two Belgian companies. Our findings reveal that social capital tends to enhance the sharing of knowledge but that instrumental social capital in particular reflects opportunistic and political objectives, which causes a selective form of knowledge sharing.
    Keywords: case studies, informal networking, knowledge sharing, politicking, social capital
    Date: 2005–12
  9. By: Rodriguez, Miguel A. (IESE Business School); Ponti, Franc (EADA); Ayuso, Silvia (IESE Business School)
    Abstract: Nowadays, many companies striving for sustainability have developed new and effective communication channels with their stakeholders and, at the same time, successful innovation strategies. However, stakeholder engagement and innovation tend to be managed as parallel rather than interconnected activities within companies, and any link between them seems to be informal and tacit. The aim of this paper is to gain a deeper understanding of how companies' relationship with the environment can be harnessed for sustainable innovation. Given the scant experience of companies linking stakeholder dialogue and sustainable innovation, we decided to adopt an original and innovative research method based on gathering a group of managers from different companies and stimulating their imagination using creativity techniques. In this paper, we first describe the creative research method we used to explore how businesses can integrate stakeholder insights into the process of organisational innovation. Then we present the result of our research experiment: the model of the "sponge" organisation. Based on the experience and intuitively stimulated ideas of the project participants, we propose a definition -a list of values and principles, and important "hard" and "soft" attributes- of the ideal enterprise, i.e., one that uses its relationship with the environment as an essential innovation factor. Finally, we discuss the implications of this business concept and compare it with existing management literature.
    Keywords: sustainable development; stakeholders; environment; innovation; creativity;
    Date: 2006–01–24

This nep-cbe issue is ©2006 by Marco Novarese. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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