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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
| By: | Bouckenooghe, Dave; Van den Broeck, Herman; Cools,Eva; Vanderheyden, Karlien |
| Abstract: | n this article we reopen the search for those features that distinguish entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. Because the trait psychology approach failed to fulfill this promise the cognitive psychology approach was adopted. The exploration of cognitive styles among 497 entrepreneurs and 521 non-entrepreneurs in Flanders distinguishes six profiles: omnipotent thinkers, lazy thinkers, pacesetters, experts, inventors, and implementors. A comparison of both groups yields differences in the prevalence of inventors and implementors. We find significantly more inventors in the group of entrepreneurs and significantly more implementors in the group of non-entrepreneurs. Finally, the results of this study also indicate that entrepreneurs may differ in the cognitive style profiles they hold. |
| Keywords: | cognitive styles, entrepreneurs, non-entrepreneurs, cluster analysis Note |
| Date: | 2005–05–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vlg:vlgwps:2005-4&r=cbe |
| By: | De Vos, Ans; Meganck, Annelies; Buyens, Dirk |
| Abstract: | This article examines HR managers’ and employees’ views on the factors affecting employee retention. This is done by integrating findings from the literature on retention management with the theoretical framework of the psychological contract. In a first study a sample of HR managers from a diverse group of public and private firms described the factors they believed to affect employee retention and the retention practices set up in their organization. In a second study, a large and diverse sample of employees reported on the importance attached to five types of employer inducements commonly regarded as retention factors. They also evaluated their employers’ delivery of these inducements and provided information on their loyalty, intentions to stay and job search behaviors. The results of both studies are discussed and implications for HR managers are highlighted. |
| Keywords: | Note |
| Date: | 2005–05–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vlg:vlgwps:2005-5&r=cbe |
| By: | Myrna Wooders (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University); Edward Cartwright (Department of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent); Reinhard Selten (Department of Economics, University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such behavior can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few societies, each consisting of similar individuals playing the same or similar strategies. In this paper we introduce a notion of a society and characterize a family of games admitting the existence of such an equilibrium. We also introduce the concept of 'crowding types' into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player -- those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others -- and his tastes, taken to directly affect only that player. With the assumptions of 'within crowding type anonymity' and 'linearity of taste-types' we show that the number of groups can be uniformly bounded. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral conformity, noncooperative games, pregames, Nash equilibrium, purification, social norms, behavioral norms |
| JEL: | C72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:0513&r=cbe |
| By: | John P. Conley (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University); Myrna Wooders (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) |
| Abstract: | We consider the classic puzzle of why people turn out for elections in substantial numbers even though formal analysis strongly suggests that rational agents would not vote. If one assumes that voters do not make systematic mistakes, the most plausible explanation seems to be that agents receive a warm glow from the act of voting itself. However, this begs the question of why agents feel a warm glow from participating in the electoral process in the first place. We approach this question from an memetic standpoint. More specifically, we consider a model in which social norms, ideas, values, or more generally, "memes" influence the behavior of groups of agents, and in turn, induce a kind of competition between value systems. We show for a range of situations that groups with a more public-spirited social norm have an advantage over groups that are not as public-spirited. We also explore conditions under which the altruistic behavior resulting from public-spiritedness is disadvantageous. The details depend on the costs of voting, the extent to which different types of citizens agree or disagree over the benefits of various public policies, and the relative proportions of various preference types in the population. We conclude that memetic evolution over social norms may be a force that causes individuals to internalize the benefits that their actions confer on others. |
| Keywords: | Memetics, evolution, voting, warm glow, civic duty, free riding, public choice, public goods |
| JEL: | C7 D7 |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:0514&r=cbe |
| By: | Giovanni Dosi; Giorgio Fagiolo; Andrea Roventini |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we present an evolutionary model of industry dynamics yielding en- dogenous business cycles with 'Keynesian' features. The model describes an economy composed of firms and consumers/workers. Firms belong to two industries. The first one performs R&D and produces heterogeneous machine tools. Firms in the second industry invest in new machines and produce a homogenous consumption good. Consumers sell their labor and fully consume their income. In line with the empirical literature on investment patterns, we assume that the investment decisions by firms are lumpy and constrained by their financial structures. Moreover, drawing from behavioral theories of the firm, we assume boundedly rational expectation formation. Simulation results show that the model is able to deliver self-sustaining patterns of growth characterized by the presence of endogenous business cycles. The model can also replicate the most important stylized facts concerning micro- and macro-economic dynamics. Indeed, we find that investment is more volatile than GDP; consumption is less volatile than GDP; investment, consumption and change in stocks are procyclical and coincident variables; employment is procyclical; unemployment rate is countercyclical; firm size distributions are skewed but depart from log-normality; firm growth distributions are tent-shaped. |
| Keywords: | Evolutionary Dynamics, Agent-Based Computational Economics, Animal Spirits, Lumpy Investment, Output Fluctuations, Endogenous Business Cycles. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2005/04&r=cbe |
| By: | Giorgio Fagiolo |
| Abstract: | We study equilibrium selection in coordination games played by a population whose size increases over time. In each time period, a new player enters the economy, observes current strategy shares and irreversibly chooses a strategy on the basis of expected payoffs. We employ a simple Polya-Urn scheme to discuss the efficiency of long-run equilibria under alternative individual decision rules (e.g. best-reply, logit, etc.). We show that the system delivers a predictable outcome only when agents employ either a linear or a logit probability rule. If agents employ deterministic best-reply rules, Pareto-efficient coordination can occur, but the actual outcome depends on initial conditions and chance. In all other cases, coexistence of strategies characterizes equilibrium configurations. |
| Keywords: | Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection, Pareto-Efficient vs. Risk- Dominant Equilibrium, Polya-Urn Schemes. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2005/05&r=cbe |