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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
| By: | Petra Ahrweiler (Research Center Media and Politics, Institute for Political Science, University of Hamburg, Germany); Andreas Pyka (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics); Nigel Gilbert (School of Human Sciences, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom) |
| Abstract: | An agent-based simulation model representing a theory of the dynamic processes involved in innovation in modern knowledge-based industries is described. The agent-based approach allows the representation of heterogeneous agents that have individual and varying stocks of knowledge. The simulation is able to model uncertainty, historical change, effect of failure on the agent population, and agent learning from experience, from individual research and from partners and collaborators. The interactions between the agents occur on two levels: through a market with firms supplying and consuming goods for a price, and through the exchange of knowledge. A brief description of the implementation of the model and its user interface is given. |
| Keywords: | innovation networks, agent-based modelling |
| JEL: | O31 O32 L22 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:0267&r=cbe |
| By: | Bernard Fortin; Guy Lacroix; Marie-Claire Villeval |
| Abstract: | The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated effects). Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, and given those faced by the other members of their group as well as their mean reported income. The estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses is sufficient to identify the model without imposing any exclusion restrictions. Our results are consistent with fairness effects but reject social conformity and correlated effects. |
| Keywords: | Social interactions, tax evasion, simultaneous tobit, laboratory experiments |
| JEL: | H26 D63 C24 C92 Z13 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0432&r=cbe |
| By: | JS Armstrong (The Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania) |
| Abstract: | Previously published research suggested that the typical manager may be expected to harm others in his role as a manager. Further support for this was drawn from the Panalba role-playing case. None of the 57 control groups in this case were willing to remove a dangerous drug from the market. In fact, 79% of these groups took active steps to prevent its removal. This decision was classified as irresponsible by 97% of the respondents to a questionnaire. Because the role exerts such powerful effects, an attempt was made to modify subject’s perceptions of their role so that managers would feel responsible to all of the firm’s interest groups. Some subjects were told that board members should represent all interest groups; other subjects were placed on boards of directors where the different groups were represented. Subjects in both groups also received information on the impact of the decisions upon stockholders, employees, and customers. The percentage of irresponsible decisions was reduced under these conditions as only 22% of the 116 groups selected the highly irresponsible decision. |
| Keywords: | obedience to authority, Panalba, role-playing, social accounting, social responsibility, stakeholder theory |
| JEL: | A |
| Date: | 2004–12–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0412031&r=cbe |
| By: | Deni Khanafiah (Bandung Fe Institute); Hokky Situngkir (Bandung Fe Institute) |
| Abstract: | Cellular phone is one of the most developing technological artifacts today. The evolution occurs through random innovation. Our effort is trying to view the evolution of this artifact from memetics. By constructing a phylomemetic tree based on cellular phone memes to infer or estimate the evolutionary history and relationship among cellular phone. We adopt several methods, which are commonly used in constructing phylogenetic tree, they are UPGMA algorithm and Parsimony Maximum algorithm to construct cellphone phylomemetic tree. Therefore we compare with the innovation tree, which is based on serial number and their appearance time. From phylomemetic tree, we then analyze the process of a cellular phone innovation through looking out on the cellular phone type lies in the same cluster. The comparison of the simulation tree result shows a generally different branching pattern, giving a presumption that innovation in cellular phone is not really relating with their serial number, but occurs merely because of random mutation of allomeme design and competes with its technological development. |
| Keywords: | artifact, innovation, evolution, memetics, phylomemetic tree, cellular phone. |
| JEL: | L |
| Date: | 2004–12–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0412009&r=cbe |
| By: | Gebhard Kirchgässner |
| Abstract: | After presenting some casual evidence about the difference between economists and the rest of the population, first the survey and experimental evidence which has been presented on this topic during the last 20 years is discussed. But can these results really be transferred to real world situations? To show this, examples of referenda results in Switzerland are presented where the citizens decided against recommendations of most economists. But what is so particular in economic theory that causes these different convictions? Some explanations are given with respect to positive economic theory and with respect to the normative convictions of economists. The paper concludes with possible consequences which economists might draw. Nachdem an Fallbeispielen Unterschiede in den Auffassungen von Ökonomen einerseits und dem Rest der Bevölkerung andererseits aufgezeigt wurde, wird zunächst die empirische Evidenz zu diesem Faktum aus Umfragen und Experimenten zusammengefasst. Wie weit sind diese Ergebnisse auf Situationen realen Handelns übertragbar? Um dies zu zeigen, wird auf Ergebnisse von Referenden verwiesen, in welchen sich die Bürger entgegen den Empfehlungen fast aller Ökonomen entschieden haben. Dann wird gezeigt, welche Eigenheiten der (positiven) ökonomischen Theorie wie der normativen Überzeugungen der (meisten) Ökonomen zu diesen Unterschieden führen. Die Arbeit schliesst mit Hinweisen zu Konsequenzen, zu denen sich Ökonomen in dieser Situation veranlasst sehen könnten. |
| Keywords: | Cooperative Behaviour, Indoctrination, Self-Selection, Referenda Results, Economic Model of Behaviour, Commitment, Fairness of the Market |
| JEL: | B40 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:dp2004:2004-18&r=cbe |