nep-cba New Economics Papers
on Central Banking
Issue of 2021‒08‒23
twenty papers chosen by
Sergey E. Pekarski
Higher School of Economics

  1. Should Monetary Policy Target Financial Stability? By William Chen; Gregory Phelan
  2. Inflation tolerance ranges in the New Keynesian model By Le Bihan Hervé,; Marx Magali,; Matheron Julien.
  3. Welfare-Based Optimal Macroprudential Policy with Shadow Banks By Gebauer Stefan
  4. Do Central and Eastern Countries benefit from ECB’s unconventional monetary policies? By Nicolae-Bogdan IANC; Adrian-Marius IONESCU
  5. The Bank of Canada’s “Horse Race” of Alternative Monetary Policy Frameworks: Some Interim Results from Model Simulations By José Dorich; Rhys R. Mendes; Yang Zhang
  6. Federal Reserve Communication and the COVID-19 Pandemic By Jonathan Benchimol; Sophia Kazinnik; Yossi Saadon
  7. Seeing the Forest for the Trees: using hLDA models to evaluate communication in Banco Central do Brasil By Angelo M. Fasolo; Flávia M. Graminho; Saulo B. Bastos
  8. Long-Run Evidence on the Quantity Theory of Money By Luca Benati
  9. New and evolving financial technologies implications for monetary policy and financial stability in Latin America By Eswar Prasad
  10. Liquidity Provision and Financial Stability By William Chen; Gregory Phelan
  11. Can Monetary Policy Create Fiscal Capacity? By Vadim Elenev; Tim Landvoigt; Patrick J. Shultz; Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
  12. Green Quantitative Easing as Intergenerational Climate Justice: On Political Theory and Pareto Efficiency in Reversing Now Human-Caused Environmental Damage By Josep Ferret Mas; Alexander Mihailov
  13. Why is the Euro punching below it’s weight? By Ilzetzki, Ethan; Reinhart, Carmen M.; Rogoff, Kenneth S.
  14. Is window dressing by banks systemically important? By Luis Garcia; Ulf Lewrick; Taja Sečnik
  15. What drives inflation and how? Evidence from additive mixed models selected by cAIC By Philipp F. M. Baumann; Enzo Rossi; Alexander Volkmann
  16. Mr. Keynes and the “Classics”; A Suggested Reinterpretation By Gauti B. Eggertsson; Cosimo Petracchi
  17. Does the market believe in loss-absorbing bank debt? By Martin Indergand; Gabriela Hrasko
  18. How do Real and Monetary Integrations Affect Inflation Dynamics in Turkey? By Hulya Saygili
  19. A Few Things You Wanted to Know about the Economics of CBDCs, but were Afraid to Model: a survey of what we can learn from who has done By Marcelo A. T. Aragão
  20. Term structure of interest rates: modelling the risk premium using a two horizons framework By Georges Prat; Remzi Uctum

  1. By: William Chen (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Gregory Phelan (Department of Economics, Williams College)
    Abstract: Monetary policy can promote financial stability and improve household welfare. We consider a macro model with a financial sector in which banks do not actively issue equity, output and growth depend on the aggregate level of bank equity, and equilibrium is inefficient. Monetary policy rules responding to the financial sector are ex-ante stabilizing because their effects on risk premia decrease the likelihood of crises and boost leverage during downturns. Stability gains from monetary policy increase welfare whenever macroprudential policy is poorly targeted. If macroprudential policy is sufficiently well-targeted to promote financial stability, then monetary policy should not target financial stability.
    Keywords: Central bank mandate, Leaning against the wind, Fed Put, Macroprudential policy, Banks, Liquidity
    JEL: E44 E52 E58 G01 G12 G20 G21
    Date: 2021–08–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2021-12&r=
  2. By: Le Bihan Hervé,; Marx Magali,; Matheron Julien.
    Abstract: A number of central banks in advanced countries use ranges, or bands, around their inflation target to formulate their monetary policy strategy. The adoption of such ranges has been proposed by some policymakers in the context of the Fed and the ECB reviews of their strategies. Using a standard New Keynesian macroeconomic model, we analyze the consequences of tolerance range policies, characterized by a stronger reaction of the central bank to inflation when inflation lies outside the range than when it is close to the target, ie the central value of the band. We show that a tolerance band should not be a zone of inaction: the lack of reaction within the band endangers macroeconomic stability and leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria; the trade-off between the reaction needed outside the range versus inside seems unfavorable: a very strong reaction, when inflation is far from the target, is required to compensate a moderately lower reaction within tolerance band; these results, obtained within the framework of a stylized model, are robust to many alterations, in particular allowing for the zero lower bound.
    Keywords: Monetary policy; inflation ranges; inflation bands; ZLB; endogenous regime switching.
    JEL: E31 E52 E58
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:820&r=
  3. By: Gebauer Stefan
    Abstract: In this paper, I show that the existence of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) has implications for the optimal regulation of the traditional banking sector. I develop a New Keynesian DSGE model for the euro area featuring a heterogeneous financial sector allowing for potential credit leakage towards unregulated NBFIs. Introducing NBFIs raises the importance of credit stabilization relative to other policy objectives in the welfare-based loss function of the regulator. The resulting optimal policy rule indicates that regulators adjust dynamic capital requirements more strongly in response to macroeconomic shocksdue to credit leakage. Furthermore, introducing non-bank finance not only alters the cyclicality of optimal regulation, but also has implications for the optimal steady-state level of capital requirements and loan-to-value ratios. Sector-specific characteristics such as bank market power and risk affect welfare gains from traditional and NBFI credit.
    Keywords: Macroprudential Regulation, Monetary Policy, Optimal Policy, Non-Bank Finance,Shadow Banking, Financial Frictions.
    JEL: E44 E61 G18 G23 G28
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:817&r=
  4. By: Nicolae-Bogdan IANC; Adrian-Marius IONESCU
    Keywords: , CEECs, ECB, GVAR, unconventional monetary policy, balance sheet, LTRO, liquidity spread, yield spread
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:leo:wpaper:2898&r=
  5. By: José Dorich; Rhys R. Mendes; Yang Zhang
    Abstract: Since 1991, the Bank of Canada has had an inflation-targeting (IT) framework established by a joint agreement between the Bank and the Government of Canada. The framework is reviewed every five years as part of the process for renewing the inflation-control agreement. This discussion paper summarizes some interim results from Bank staff analysis done for the August 2020 workshop, “Towards the 2021 Renewal of the Bank of Canada’s Monetary Policy Framework.” The Bank will publish updated analysis later in 2021. The core of the current framework—the 2 percent inflation target—has remained unchanged since 1995. This fact reflects its success. Well-anchored inflation expectations contribute to macroeconomic stability while leaving monetary policy with greater flexibility. The 2021 renewal highlights two key challenges facing Canadian monetary policy: (1) the low neutral rate of interest; and (2) the low interest rates associated with a low neutral rate that may encourage excessive risk-taking and debt accumulation To address these challenges, Bank staff are running a “horse race” of alternative monetary policy frameworks (i.e., alternatives to the 2 percent IT framework). Their work evaluates these alternatives using a broad range of qualitative and quantitative criteria and focuses on the macroeconomic performance of the alternative frameworks. The interim results we report in this discussion paper suggest overall that no framework dominates on all margins. As a result, the ranking depends on the relative weight placed on different criteria.
    Keywords: Central bank research; Economic models; Inflation targets; Monetary policy; Monetary policy framework; Monetary policy transmission
    JEL: E58
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocadp:21-13&r=
  6. By: Jonathan Benchimol (Bank of Israel); Sophia Kazinnik (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond); Yossi Saadon (Bank of Israel)
    Abstract: Have the content, sentiment, and timing of the Federal Reserve (Fed) communications changed across communication types during the COVID-19 pandemic? Did similar changes occur during the global financial and dot-com crises? We compile dictionaries specific to COVID-19 and unconventional monetary policy (UMP) and utilize sentiment analysis and topic modeling to study the Fedâs communications and answer the above questions. We show that the Fedâs communications regarding the COVID-19 pandemic concern matters of financial volatility, contextual uncertainty, and financial stability, and that they emphasize health, social welfare, and UMP. We also show that the Fedâs communication policy changes drastically during the COVID-19 pandemic compared to the GFC and dot-com crisis in terms of content, sentiment, and timing. Specifically, we find that during the past two decades, a decrease in the financial stability sentiment conveyed by the Fedâs interest rate announcements and minutes precedes a decrease in the Fedâs interest rate.
    Keywords: Central bank communication, Unconventional monetary policy, Financial stability, Text mining, COVID
    JEL: C55 E44 E58 E63
    Date: 2021–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boi:wpaper:2021.15&r=
  7. By: Angelo M. Fasolo; Flávia M. Graminho; Saulo B. Bastos
    Abstract: Central bank communication is a key tool in managing ination expectations. This paper proposes a hierarchical Latent Dirichlet Allocation (hLDA) model combined with feature selection techniques to allow an endogenous selection of topic structures associated with documents published by Banco Central do Brasil's Monetary Policy Committee (Copom). These computational linguistic techniques allow building measures of the content and tone of Copom's minutes and statements. The effects of the tone are measured in different dimensions such as inflation, inflation expectations, economic activity, and economic uncertainty. Beyond the impact on the economy, the hLDA model is used to evaluate the coherence between the statements and the minutes of Copom's meetings.
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcb:wpaper:555&r=
  8. By: Luca Benati
    Abstract: Evidence from low-frequency regressions for 27 countries since the XVIII century suggests that the relationship between broad money growth and inflation has been mostly one-for-one, and largely invariant to changes in the monetary regime. There is little evidence that the relationship had been weaker under commodity standards than it has been under fiat standards. Only for the period since the mid-1980s, which has seen the introduction of monetary regimes in which inflation is directly targeted, the relationship appears to have materially weakened. Crucially, however, the slope relationship between the trends of money growth and inflation produced by time-varying parameters VARs has been near-uniformly one-for-one for all countries and sample periods, including the one following the end of the Great Inflation. This suggests that, although central banks’ targeting of inflation has weakened its relationship with money growth, time-series methods can still recover the one-for-one longhorizon relationship between the series. There is no evidence that, since WWII, inflation’s low-frequency relationship with credit growth has been stronger than with money growth. The relationship between money growth and nominal interest rates had been non-existent under commodity standards, and it has only appeared under fiat standards.
    Keywords: Quantity theory of money; Lucas critique; frequency domain; timevarying parameters VARs. Classification-JEL
    Date: 2021–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2110&r=
  9. By: Eswar Prasad
    Abstract: This paper provides a broad analytical overview of how technological changes are likely to affect the practice of central banking. While the advent of decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin has dominated the headlines, a broader set of changes wrought by advances in technology are likely to eventually have a more profound and lasting impact on central banks.
    Date: 2020–05–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000566:019463&r=
  10. By: William Chen (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Gregory Phelan (Department of Economics, Williams College)
    Abstract: When financial intermediaries’ key characteristic is provision of liquidity through their liabilities, with financial frictions the financial sector in the aggregate is likely to over-accumulate equity, thus decreasing liquidity provision and household welfare. Aggregate household welfare is therefore decreasing in the level of aggregate intermediary equity even though the individual value of intermediaries is increasing in equity, which is why intermediaries over-accumulate equity. Subsidizing intermediary dividends can improve welfare by encouraging earlier payout and decreasing aggregate equity in the financial sector. This policy increases the likelihood that intermediaries provide more liquidity and improves the stability of the economy, even though asset prices fall.
    Keywords: Financial stability, Macroeconomic instability Macroprudential policy, Banks
    JEL: E44 E52 E58 G01 G12 G20 G21
    Date: 2021–08–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2021-11&r=
  11. By: Vadim Elenev; Tim Landvoigt; Patrick J. Shultz; Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
    Abstract: Governments around the world have gone on a massive fiscal expansion in response to the Covid crisis, increasing government debt to levels not seen in 75 years. How will this debt be repaid? What role do conventional and unconventional monetary policy play? We investigate debt sustainability in a New Keynesian model with an intermediary sector, realistic fiscal and monetary policy, endogenous convenience yields, and substantial risk premia. When conventional monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB during an economic crisis, increased government spending and lower tax revenue lead to a large rise in government debt and raise the risk of future tax increases. We find that quantitative easing (QE), forward guidance, and an expansion in government discretionary spending all contribute to lowering debt/GDP ratio and reducing this fiscal risk. A transitory QE policy deployed during a crisis stimulates aggregate demand.
    JEL: E1 E12 E13 E2 E31 E32 E37 E4 E42 E43 E44 E6 E62 E63 G12 G18 G21
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29129&r=
  12. By: Josep Ferret Mas (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading); Alexander Mihailov (Department of Economics, University of Reading)
    Abstract: The present paper endorses an interdisciplinary approach to the complex and urgent issue of intergenerational climate justice, and proposes a rich menu of policy options, in particular some novel and unconventional ones, to resolve it immediately but flexibly. We incorporate the realistic features of economic growth, nominal interest, expected inflation, and the option for nonrepayment or partial repayment of public debt across generations as well as a central bank institution, or rather the global network of central banks, to implement climate mitigation policy in the stylized model proposed by Sachs (2015). Similarly, but even without repayment, we find such kind of policy, which we label 'green quantitative easing', or 'green QE', to be Pareto-efficient across generations. Differently, we argue that neither the present, nor future generations need to repay the novel greening compensatory transfers (GCTs) to households and firms we envisage to serve as a main financial instrument of central banks in triggering a decisive reversal in environmental deterioration right now, without further delay, given the emergency of the situation. Moreover, and in support of the economic considerations and incentives, we argue from philosophical, legal and political-theory grounds that such a financial scheme intermediated by central banks worldwide serves two types of principles of intergenerational climate justice: (i) principles that tell us to mitigate climate change now and avoid harm for future generations; and (ii) principles that tell us how to share mitigation costs fairly across generations. Our spectrum of suggested pragmatic green QE initiatives includes potential issuance by firms and households of super-long-term coupon bonds to be held by central banks over up to a century, possibly GCT-based only, and allows for much flexibility and complementarity in the practical solutions to be potentially chosen, with voluntary partial repayment or not of the mitigation costs across generations.
    Keywords: green quantitative easing, greening compensatory transfers, central banks, public finance, climate change mitigation policy, intergenerational climate justice, intergenerational social welfare
    JEL: D61 D63 D78 E21 E58 F55 G28 H23 O44 Q54
    Date: 2021–08–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2021-16&r=
  13. By: Ilzetzki, Ethan; Reinhart, Carmen M.; Rogoff, Kenneth S.
    Abstract: On the twentieth anniversary of its inception, the euro has yet to expand its role as an international currency. We document this fact with a wide range of indicators including its role as an anchor or reference in exchange rate arrangements—which we argue is a portmanteau measure—and as a currency for the denomination of trade and assets. On all these dimensions, the euro comprises a far smaller share than that of the US dollar. Furthermore, that share has been roughly constant since 1999. By some measures, the euro plays no larger a role than the Deutschemark and French franc that it replaced. We explore the reasons for this underperformance. While the leading anchor currency may have a natural monopoly, a number of additional factors have limited the euro’s reach, including lack of financial center, limited geopolitical reach, and US and Chinese dominance in technology research. Most important, in our view, is the comparatively scarce supply of (safe) euro-denominated assets, which we document. The European Central Bank’ lack of policy clarity may have also played a role. We show that the euro era can be divided into a “Bundesbank-plus” period and a “Whatever it Takes” period. The first shows a smooth transition from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism and continued to stabilize German inflation. The second period is characterised by an expanding ECB arsenal of credit facilities to European banks and sovereigns.
    JEL: E50 F30 F40 N20
    Date: 2020–07–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:104100&r=
  14. By: Luis Garcia; Ulf Lewrick; Taja Sečnik
    Abstract: We study banks' year-end window dressing in the European Union to assess how it affects the identification of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and the associated capital surcharges. We find that G-SIBs compress their balance sheet at year-end to an extent that they can reduce their surcharges or avoid G-SIB designation altogether. G-SIBs use several levers to adjust their balance sheets. Most notably, they compress intra-financial system assets and liabilities as well as their derivative books at year-end. Moreover, G-SIBs that are more tightly constrained by capital requirements window dress more than their peers. Our findings underscore the importance of supervisory judgement in the assessment of G-SIBs and call for greater use of average as opposed to point-in-time data to measure banks' systemic importance.
    Keywords: systemically important bank, systemic risks, regulatory arbitrage, financial stability
    JEL: G20 G21 G28
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bis:biswps:960&r=
  15. By: Philipp F. M. Baumann; Enzo Rossi; Alexander Volkmann
    Abstract: We analyze the forces that explain inflation using a large panel of 122 countries from 1997 to 2015. Models motivated by the economic theory are compared to a boosting algorithm, and non-linearities and structural breaks are explicitly considered. The boosting algorithm outperforms theory-based models. Further, we provide compelling evidence that the interaction of energy price and energy rents stand out among 37 explanatory variables. Other important determinants are demographic developments. Contrary to common belief, globalization and technology, public debt, central bank independence and transparency as well as countries’ political characteristics, are less relevant. Exchange rate arrangements are more important than inflation-targeting regimes. Moreover, GDP per capita is more relevant than the output gap and credit growth is generally superior to M2 growth. Many predictors exhibit a structural break since the financial crisis. In particular, credit growth has lost its grip on the inflation process.
    Keywords: Theories of inflation, longitudinal data, additive mixed models, model-based boosting, conditional Akaike criterion
    JEL: C14 C33 C52 E31
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snb:snbwpa:2021-12&r=
  16. By: Gauti B. Eggertsson; Cosimo Petracchi
    Abstract: This paper revisits and proposes a resolution to an empirical and theoretical controversy between Keynes and the “classics” (or monetarists). The controversy dates to Keynes’s General Theory (1936)—most famously formalized in Hicks’s (1937) classic Econometrica article, in which the IS-LM model is first formally stated. We first replicate empirical tests formulated in the late 1960s and ’70s and show that more recent data have more statistical power and resolve the empirical debate in favor of the Keynesians, at least according to the criteria of the literature at that time. We then show, using a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, that the empirical tests suffer from the Lucas (1976) critique, as the conclusion fundamentally depends upon the assumed policy regime. Nevertheless, we argue, this new empirical result is useful: it provides evidence for the existence of a “Keynesian policy regime” according to which traditional monetary expansion loses its impact in the absence of a policy regime change, in the sense of Sargent (1982).
    JEL: B0 B1 B22 E0 E12 E13 E4 E5 E50 E51 E52
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29158&r=
  17. By: Martin Indergand; Gabriela Hrasko
    Abstract: We propose a simple model to estimate the risk-neutral loss distribution from the credit spreads of long-term debt instruments with different seniorities. We apply our model to a sample of global systemically important banks that have issued bail-in debt in order to meet the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements established after the global financial crisis. Bail-in debt is a new debt category that absorbs losses in a gone-concern situation and that ranks between subordinated debt and non-eligible senior debt. With a structural model for these three debt layers, we calibrate the tail of the risk-neutral loss distribution such that it is consistent with the observed market prices. Based on this loss distribution, we find that the expected loss in a gone-concern situation exceeds TLAC for most banks and that the risk-neutral probability that TLAC will not be sufficient to cover the losses in such a situation is approximately 50%. The large expected losses that we find with our model are a consequence of the similar pricing of bail-in debt relative to other senior debt. We argue that regulators should promote further clarity about the subordination and the conversion mechanism of bail-in debt to achieve a more differentiated pricing that is more in line with regulatory expectations.
    Keywords: Financial stability, bank regulation, loss-absorbing capacity, creditor hierarchy, bail-in debt, bank resolution
    JEL: G12 G28 G32
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snb:snbwpa:2021-13&r=
  18. By: Hulya Saygili
    Abstract: This paper examines the significance of real and monetary integrations among countries on the inflationary dynamics of an emerging country, Turkey. The analysis accounts for 2-digit items of CPI inflation which can be broadly categorized as tradable/non-tradable and goods/services. The results show that fall in inflation gap between the partners is mainly related with the real integration while co-movement of inflation is prominently driven by the monetary policy co-movement. The product type analysis documents that inflation gap in tradable items shrinks and become more correlated with the convergence and co-movement of real variables.
    Keywords: Globalization, Inflation gap, Co-movement, CPI sub-items, Turkey
    JEL: E31 F14 F4
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcb:wpaper:2121&r=
  19. By: Marcelo A. T. Aragão
    Abstract: To mistarget and to mistime the issuance of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) can be detrimental to welfare. This holds even for tentative experiments under controlled conditions since this may prompt unintended expectations by economic agents. To counteract the uncertainty that is inherent in any innovation, academics and central bank researchers have been active in developing models of a prospective economy, or at least of prospective markets, where a fiat currency in digital form coexists. Irrespective of whether such a proposal entails a positive or negative stance, we contend that it is possible to infer from this body of work: opportunities, risks, and policy guidelines they imply (or fail to address). This paper, therefore, is a survey of this model development activity that, we aim to show, results in a better understanding of the economic implications of a CBDC. For this purpose, we have selected and reviewed twenty-nine proposals. I have classified them with respect to motivations, preoccupations, and foundations, observing what they conclude regarding the potential for coexistence with private alternatives and for harm to policy mandates. I have identified knowns, i.e., what models imply, and unknowns, i.e., what models omit or oversimplify. I have found that our analysis can give focus to further research that can steer the ongoing legal and technical design efforts.
    Date: 2021–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcb:wpaper:554&r=
  20. By: Georges Prat (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Remzi Uctum (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We propose a two-horizon interest rate term structure model where the maturity of the riskless rate is the one of the debt security whose duration equals investor's desired horizon. Our framework thus relaxes the usual assumptions of the literature that the riskless rate is unchangingly the short period rate. A representative investor compares at each of the 3and the 6-month horizons the risk premium offered by the market and the one they require to take a risky position, the latter premium being determined by the portfolio choice theory. Due to market frictions, the deviation between the offered and required risk premium evolves according to a mean-reverting process. Using 3-month ahead survey-based expectations of the US 3-month Treasury Bill rate, we employ Kalman filtering to estimate the market risk premium where the preference parameter of investors for alternative horizons is time-varying. We find that the market comprises both a group of agents with 3-month preferred horizon and a group of agents with 6-month preferred horizon with a weigh of two-thirds for the first group.
    Keywords: interest rates,term structure,risk premium
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03319099&r=

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