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on Central Banking |
| By: | Michael McLeay (Bank of England); Silvana Tenreyro (Bank of England; Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM); London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research) |
| Abstract: | This note explains why inflation follows a seemingly exogenous statistical process, unrelated to the output gap. In other words, it explains why it is difficult to empirically identify a Phillips curve. We show why this result need not imply that the Phillips curve does not hold – on the contrary, our conceptual framework is built under the assumption that the Phillips curve always holds. The reason is simple: if monetary policy is set with the goal of minimising welfare losses (measured as the sum of deviations of inflation from its target and output from its potential), subject to a Phillips curve, a central bank will seek to increase inflation when output is below potential. This targeting rule will impart a negative correlation between inflation and the output gap, blurring the identification of the (positively sloped) Phillips curve. |
| Date: | 2018–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1815&r=cba |
| By: | Mario González; Raúl Tadle |
| Abstract: | The latest financial crisis has increased the interest in understanding how monetary policy announcements impact financial markets. For the US there are several studies that cover this area of research, however, for emerging markets the number of studies is scarce. This paper studies how the Chilean stock market is affected by monetary policy announcements made by the Central Bank of Chile. In their monthly monetary policy meetings the Central Bank of Chile decides the monetary policy rate and circulates press releases that effectively explain their decision. The information contained in those documents include policy decisions for the current month, the central bank's economic outlook, and the signals about likely future central bank policy decisions. We therefore examine these monetary policy changes and the corresponding additional information from the meeting statements. Using Automated Content Analysis, we identify qualitative information from the statement releases of the Central Bank of Chile and create a quantitative measure for the signals indicating likely future monetary policy. This quantitative measure, which we call them sentiment score - proxies for the monetary policy tilt. We then evaluate how the surprise component of the sentiment scores - together with unexpected policy changes - impact Chilean financial assets. |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chb:bcchwp:817&r=cba |
| By: | Andrea Colciago; Anna Samarina; Jakob de Haan |
| Abstract: | This paper takes stock of the literature on the relationship between central bank policies and inequality. A new paradigm which integrates sticky-prices, incomplete markets and heterogeneity among households is emerging, which allows to jointly study how inequality shapes macroeconomic aggregates and how macroeconomic shocks and policies affect inequality. While the new paradigm features multiple distributional channels of monetary policy, most empirical analyses analyse each potential channel of redistribution in isolation. Our review suggests that empirical research on the effect of conventional monetary policy on income and wealth inequality yields very mixed findings, although there seems to be a consensus that higher inflation, at least above some threshold, increases inequality. In contrast to common wisdom, the conclusions concerning the impact of unconventional monetary policies on income inequality are also not clear cut. This is so since these policies may reduce income inequality by stimulating economic activity, but may also increase inequality by boosting asset prices. Similarly, results concerning the impact of unconventional monetary policies on wealth inequality are rather mixed. The scant literature on the impact of macro-prudential policies on inequality finds evidence for redistributive effects, but in view of its limitations it may be too early to come to conclusions. |
| Keywords: | income inequality; wealth inequality; monetary policy; macro-prudential policy |
| JEL: | D63 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:594&r=cba |
| By: | Ivo Maes (National Bank of Belgium and Robert Triffin Chair, Université catholique de Louvain and ICHEC Brussels Management School, Boulevard de Berlaimont 14, 1000 Brussels, Belgium); Piet Clement (Bank for International Settlements.) |
| Abstract: | The 1970s were a turbulent period in postwar monetary history. This paper focuses on how central bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), especially Alexandre Lamfalussy, the BIS’s Economic Adviser, responded to the Great Inflation. The breakdown of Bretton Woods forced central bankers to look for new monetary policy strategies as the exchange rate lost its central role. Lamfalussy, in his early years a Keynesian in favour of discretionary policies, moved to a "conservative Keynesian" position, acknowledging that a medium term orientation and the credibility of monetary policy were important to break inflationary expectations. However, Lamfalussy never moved to “monetarist” positions. Lamfalussy certainly acknowledged that monetary targets could reinforce the credibility and independence of monetary policy. However, he rejected mechanical rules. In essence he aimed for a middle position: rules applied with a pragmatic sense of discretion. In the early 1980s, with the rise of financial innovations, Lamfalussy would stress even more the limitations of monetary targeting. His focus turned increasingly to systemic financial stability risks, preparing the ground for the macroprudential approach of the BIS. In Lamfalussy's view, central banking remained an art, not a science. |
| Keywords: | Great Inflation, monetary policy, central banking, Alexandre Lamfalussy, BIS |
| JEL: | B22 E58 F44 |
| Date: | 2018–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:201804-341&r=cba |
| By: | Dolado, Juan J. (European University Institute); Motyovszki, Gergö (European University Institute); Pappa, Evi (European University Institute) |
| Abstract: | In order to improve our understanding of the channels through which monetary policy has distributional consequences, we build a New Keynesian model with incomplete asset markets, asymmetric search and matching (SAM) frictions across skilled and unskilled workers and, foremost, capital-skill complementarity (CSC) in the production function. Our main finding is that an unexpected monetary easing increases labor income inequality between high and low-skilled workers, and that the interaction between CSC and SAM asymmetry is crucial in delivering this result. The increase in labor demand driven by such a monetary shock leads to larger wage increases for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled workers, due to the smaller matching frictions of the former (SAM-asymmetry channel). Moreover, the increase in capital demand amplifies this wage divergence due to skilled workers being more complementary to capital than substitutable unskilled workers are (CSC channel). Strict inflation targeting is often the most successful rule in stabilizing measures of earnings inequality even in the presence of shocks which introduce a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and aggregate demand. |
| Keywords: | monetary policy, search and matching, capital-skill complementarity, inequality |
| JEL: | E24 E25 E52 J64 |
| Date: | 2018–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11494&r=cba |
| By: | Laurence Deborgies Sanches; Marno Verbeek |
| Abstract: | The paper investigates how the mix of credit risk measurement methodologies under Basel capital adequacy rules influenced banking stability in the Netherlands during 2008-2015. It presents a first descriptive analysis that helps to examine the micro-regulation of individual banks and the macro-regulation of the banking system in one unified framework. Its goal is to draw regulators' and researchers' attention to interesting issues based on the comparison of the literature highlighting the weak points of the regulatory framework with what is observed in the dataset. Its purpose is to stimulate discussions on certain methodological and policy options. |
| Keywords: | macro-regulation; banks; credit rating; Basel methodology |
| JEL: | G21 G24 G28 |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:593&r=cba |
| By: | Roch, Francisco; Uhlig, Harald |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the recent European debt crisis, this paper investigates the scope for a bailout guarantee in a sovereign debt crisis. Defaults may arise from negative income shocks, government impatience or a "sunspot"-coordinated buyers strike. We introduce a bailout agency, and characterize the strategy with the minimal actuarially fair intervention which guarantees the no-buyers-strike fundamental equilibrium, relying on the market for residual financing. The intervention makes it cheaper for governments to borrow, inducing them borrow more, leaving default probabilities possibly rather unchanged. The maximal backstop will be pulled precisely when fundamentals worsen. |
| Keywords: | Bailouts; default; Endogenous Borrowing Constraints; Eurozone Debt Crisis; long-term debt; OMT; Self-fulfilling Crises |
| JEL: | F34 F41 |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12921&r=cba |
| By: | Ralf Fendel; Frederik Neugebauer |
| Abstract: | This paper employs event study methods to evaluate the effects of ECB’s non-standard monetary policy program announcements on 10-year government bond yields of euro area member states. It covers data from 11 euro area countries from January 1, 2007 to August 31, 2017 and distinguishes between the more solvent countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands) and the less solvent ones (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). The paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it is the first paper to reveal that measurable effects of announcements arise with a one-day delay meaning that government bond markets take some time to react to ECB announcements. Second, it quantifies the country-specific extent of yield reduction which seems inversely related to the solvency rating of the corresponding countries. The reduction of the spread between both groups in response to an event is due to a stronger decrease in the less solvent group. Third, this result is confirmed by letting the announcement variable interact with the spread level, which is an innovation in this strand of literature. By employing different data as control variables, it turns out that the results are robust for a given event set. |
| Keywords: | ECB, non-standard monetary policy, government bond yields, event study |
| JEL: | E44 E52 E58 G14 |
| Date: | 2018–06–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:whu:wpaper:18-02&r=cba |
| By: | Klaus Adam; Henning Weber |
| Abstract: | Sticky price models featuring heterogeneous firms and systematic firm-level productivity trends deliver radically different predictions for the optimal inflation rate than their popular homogenous-firm counterparts: (1) the optimal steady-state inflation rate generically differs from zero and (2) inflation optimally responds to productivity disturbances. We show this by aggregating a heterogenous-firm model with sticky prices in closed form. Using firm-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we estimate the historically optimal inflation path for the U.S. economy. In the year 1977, the optimal inflation rate stood at 1.5%, but subsequently declined to around 1.0% in the year 2015. Inflation rates up to twice these numbers can be rationalized if one considers product demand elasticities more in line with the trade literature or if one considers firms that (partially) index prices to lagged inflation rates. |
| Keywords: | optimal inflation rate, sticky prices, firm heterogeneity |
| JEL: | E52 E31 E32 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7028&r=cba |
| By: | Altermatt, Lukas (University of Basel) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a model where money and savings are essential and asset markets matter. The model is able to match some stylized facts about the correlation of real interest rates and stock price-dividend ratios. The results show that fiscal policy can improve welfare by increasing the amount of outstanding government debt. If the fiscal authority is not willing or able to increase debt, the monetary authority can improve welfare of current generations by reacting procyclically to asset return shocks; however, this policy affects welfare of future generations if it is not coordinated with fiscal policy measures. The model also shows that policies like QE reduce welfare of future generations. |
| Keywords: | New monetarism, overlapping generations, zero lower bound, optimal stabilization |
| JEL: | E43 E44 E52 G12 G18 |
| Date: | 2018–05–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2018/13&r=cba |
| By: | Beechey, Meredith (Örebro University School of Business); Österholm, Pär (Örebro University School of Business) |
| Abstract: | Inflation targets come in different shapes and sizes. We explore the choice of a point or band target for inflation in a stylised economy in which agents learn about the inflation-generating process. We simulate under two conditions, namely i) a point inflation target and ii) a band inflation target from within which the central bank chooses its current spe-cific target. In many parameterizations of the model, the preferred target type rests on the inflation-output stabilization preferences of the central bank. A band target tends to be associated with higher volatility of inflation and lower volatility of the output gap than a point target. As such, a very strong preference for output stabilisation speaks in favour of a band inflation target.With preferences for inflation stabilisation closer to those thought to prevail in practice, a point target almost always outperforms a band target. |
| Keywords: | Inflation targeting; Learning; Constant gain least squares |
| JEL: | E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2018–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:oruesi:2018_008&r=cba |
| By: | James Cloyne (University of California Davis, NBER and CEPR); Clodomiro Ferreira (Banco de España); Paolo Surico (London Business School and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | How do changes in monetary policy affect consumption? Using household data for the US and the UK, we show that most of the aggregate response of consumption to interest rates is driven by households with a mortgage. Outright home owners do not adjust expenditure at all and renters change their spending but by less than mortgagors. Income rises for all households as interest rate cuts directly affect firm investment and household consumption, boosting aggregate demand. A key dierence between these housing tenure groups is the composition of their balance sheets: mortgagors hold sizable illiquid assets but little liquid wealth, consistent with a higher marginal propensity to consume. |
| Keywords: | monetary policy, household balance sheets, liquidity constraints |
| JEL: | E21 E32 E52 |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:wpaper:1813&r=cba |
| By: | Ryan, John; Loughlin, John |
| Abstract: | This article examines three historical monetary unions: the Latin Monetary Union (LMU), the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU), and the Austro-Hungarian Monetary Union (AHMU) in an attempt to derive possible lessons for the European Monetary Union (EMU). The term ‘monetary union’ can be defined either narrowly or broadly depending on how closely it conforms to Mundell’s notion of ‘Optimal Currency Area’. After examining each of the historical monetary unions from this perspective, the article concludes that none of them ever truly conformed to Mundell’s concept, nor does the EMU. Nevertheless, the article argues that some lessons may be learned from these historical experiences. First, it is necessary that there exist robust institutions such as a common central bank and a unified fiscal policy in order to withstand external shocks. The three early unions could not withstand the shock of WWI. Another important lesson is that continuing national rivalries can undermine any monetary union. |
| Keywords: | Latin monetary union; Scandinavian monetary union; Austro-Hungarian monetary union; European monetary union; Eurozone crisis; European Central Bank |
| JEL: | E42 E50 E52 F02 F50 |
| Date: | 2018–04–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:87955&r=cba |
| By: | Ristolainen, Kim |
| Abstract: | The recent financial crises have brought into focus questions regarding the quality of banks' assets. We study the patterns in banks reserving for and reporting of loan losses in the EU before and after implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). We find that banks that 1) have less tier 1 capital, 2) are smaller, 3) are less liquid and 4) have smaller net interest margins either report relatively smaller loan loss reserves or less loan losses, even after including various controls. This supports the hypothesis that financially weaker banks may have a larger incentive to engage in balance sheet window dressing. We further find that the SSM has reduced but not eliminated the under-reserving and under-reporting bias. In addition, there has been a separate positive effect on the overall proportion of nonperforming loans (NPLs) that are realised as losses among the banks that have been under direct supervision by the SSM since implementation of the SSM. |
| JEL: | G18 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2018–05–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bof:bofrdp:2018_011&r=cba |
| By: | Deepal Basak; Yunhui Zhao |
| Abstract: | Consistent with the Minsky hypothesis and the “volatility paradox” (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged periods of financial stability and investor optimism. But does financial tranquility always call for more stringent regulation over time? We examine this question using a simple portfolio choice model that features the interaction between learning and externality. We evaluate the potential of a macroprudential policy to restore efficiency, and characterize the necessary and sufficient condition for the countercyclicality of the optimal regulation/macroprudential policy. Our paper implies that policymakers should not only consider the cyclical indicators “on the surface” (for example, credit growth), but also closely examine the deep structural change of the resilience of the system. The paper also highlights the importance of assigning the macroprudential policy function to independent agencies with technical expertise. |
| Date: | 2018–05–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:18/123&r=cba |
| By: | Hans-Werner Sinn |
| Abstract: | While the ECB helped mitigate the euro crisis in the aftermath of Lehman, it has stretched its monetary mandate and moved into fiscal territory. This text describes and summarises the crucial role played by the ECB in the intervention spiral resulting from its bid to manage the crisis. It also outlines ongoing competitiveness problems in southern Europe, discusses the so-called austerity policy of the Troika, comments on QE and presents two alternative paths for the future development of Europe. |
| JEL: | E02 E50 E52 E58 H50 H60 H63 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7019&r=cba |
| By: | Melchisedek Joslem Ngambou Djatche (Université Côte d'Azur; GREDEG CNRS) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyse the link between monetary policy and banks’ risk-taking behaviour. Some theoretical and empirical studies show that monetary easy whet banks’ risk appetite through asset valuation and search for yield process. However, since 2010, the low interest rate environment has cast doubt on these results. Our study deepens the analysis of the monetary risk-taking channel considering non-linearity, especially through threshold effects model. Using a dataset of US banks, we find that the impact of low interest rates on banks risk depend on the regime of the monetary stance, i.e on the deviation of monetary rate from the Taylor rule. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy, financial stability, bank risk-taking, non-dynamic panel threshold model |
| JEL: | E44 E58 G21 |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-12&r=cba |
| By: | Stephanie E. Curcuru; Michiel De Pooter; George Eckerd |
| Abstract: | In this paper we estimate the magnitude of spillovers between bond markets in the U.S. and Germany following monetary policy communications by the FOMC and the ECB. The identification of policy-related co-movements following FOMC announcements, in particular, can be difficult because many foreign bond markets, including those in Germany, are closed at the time of the announcement. To address this issue we use intraday futures market data to estimate spillovers during a narrow and overlapping event window. We find that about half of the reaction in German domestic yields spills over to U.S. yields following ECB announcements, which is nearly identical to the spillover from U.S. yields to German Bund yields following FOMC announcements. This result contrasts with the conventional wisdom that FOMC announcements spill over to other countries but that there is not much effect in the other direction. We also find that spillover estimates are slightly higher in the post-crisis period, but that there is little difference in the spillover impact of conventional versus unconventional monetary policy. Our results based on futures prices differ noticeably from those using daily prices, which suggests that spillover estimates based on cash market data can be misleading. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy ; Quantitative easing ; Interest rate differentials |
| JEL: | E5 F3 |
| Date: | 2018–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgif:1226&r=cba |
| By: | Schulhofer-Wohl, Sam (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago); Clouse, James A. (Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System) |
| Abstract: | We model bargaining between non-bank investors and heterogeneous bank borrowers in the federal funds market. The analysis highlights how the federal funds rate will respond to movements in other money market interest rates in an environment with elevated levels of excess reserves. The model predicts that the administered rate offered through the Federal Reserve's overnight reverse repurchase agreement facility influences the fed funds rate even when the facility is not used. Changes in repo rates pass through to the federal funds rate, but by less than one-for-one. We calibrate the model to data from 2017 and find in an out-of-sample test that the model quantitatively matches the increase in the federal funds rate in the first four months of 2018. The rise in the fed funds rate in 2018 is attributed to movements in repo rates and not to changes in the scarcity value of reserves. |
| Keywords: | Federal funds market; federal funds rate; Federal Reserve; interest rates; money market |
| JEL: | E42 E43 E47 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2018–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-2018-08&r=cba |
| By: | Barthelemy, Jean; Plantin, Guillaume |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a full-fledged strategic analysis of Wallace's "game of chicken". A public sector facing legacy nominal liabilities is comprised of fiscal and monetary authorities that respectively set the primary surplus and the price level in a non-cooperative fashion. We find that the post 2008 feature of indefinitely postponed fiscal consolidation and rapid expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet is consistent with a strategic setting in which neither authority can commit to a policy beyond its current mandate, and the fiscal authority has more bargaining power than the monetary one at each date. |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12903&r=cba |
| By: | Sergi Lanau; Adrian Robles; Frederik G Toscani |
| Abstract: | We study inflation dynamics in Colombia using a bottom-up Phillips curve approach. This allows us to capture the different drivers of individual inflation components. We find that the Phillips curve is relatively flat in Colombia but steeper than recent estimates for the U.S. Supply side shocks play an important role for tradable and food prices, while indexation dynamics are important for non-tradable goods. We show that besides allowing for a more detailed understanding of inflation drivers, the bottom-up approach also improves on an aggregate Phillips curve in terms of forecasting ability. In the baseline forecast scenario, both headline and core inflation converge towards the Central Bank’s inflation target of 3 percent by end-2018 but these favorable inflation dynamics are vulnerable to large supply shocks. |
| Date: | 2018–05–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:18/106&r=cba |
| By: | Christiane Baumeister; James D. Hamilton |
| Abstract: | Reporting point estimates and error bands for structural vector autoregressions that are only set identified is a very common practice. However, unless the researcher is persuaded on the basis of prior information that some parameter values are more plausible than others, this common practice has no formal justification. When the role and reliability of prior information is defended, Bayesian posterior probabilities can be used to form an inference that incorporates doubts about the identifying assumptions. We illustrate how prior information can be used about both structural coefficients and the impacts of shocks, and propose a new distribution, which we call the asymmetric t distribution, for incorporating prior beliefs about the signs of equilibrium impacts in a nondogmatic way. We apply these methods to a three-variable macroeconomic model and conclude that monetary policy shocks were not the major driver of output, inflation, or interest rates during the Great Moderation. |
| Keywords: | structural vector autoregressions, set identification, monetary policy, impulse-response functions, historical decompositions, model uncertainty, informative priors |
| JEL: | C11 C32 E52 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7048&r=cba |
| By: | Lorenzo Pandolfi (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in policies on banks’ funding cost, incentives for loan monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two investment stages, a full bail-in turns out to be, ex post, the first-best policy to deal with failing banks. As a consequence, however, investors expect bail-ins rather than bailouts. Ex ante, this raises banks’ cost of debt and depresses bankers’ incentives to monitor. When moral hazard is severe, this time inconsistency leads to a credit market collapse unless the government pre-commits to an alternative resolution policy. The optimal policy is either a combination of bail-in and bailout or liquidation, depending on the severity of moral hazard and the shadow cost of the partial bailout. |
| Keywords: | bail-in; bailout; moral hazard, resolution policies; bank regulation. |
| JEL: | D82 E58 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2018–05–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:499&r=cba |
| By: | Ferrero, Andrea (Oxford University); Harrison, Richard (Bank of England); Nelson, Ben (Bank of England) |
| Abstract: | The inception of macro-prudential policy frameworks in the wake of the global financial crisis raises questions of how macro-prudential and monetary policies should be coordinated. We examine these questions through the lens of a macroeconomic model featuring nominal rigidities, housing, incomplete risk-sharing between borrower and saver households, and macro-prudential tools in the form of mortgage loan-to-value and bank capital requirements. We derive a welfare-based loss function which suggests a role for active macro-prudential policy to enhance risk sharing. Macro-prudential policy faces trade-offs, however, and complete macro-prudential stabilization is not generally possible in our model. Nonetheless, simulations of a house price boom and subsequent correction suggest that macro-prudential tools could alleviate debt-deleveraging and help avoid zero lower bound episodes, even when macro-prudential tools themselves impose only occasionally binding constraints on debt dynamics in the economy. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy; macro-prudential policy; time-consistent policy; policy coordination; occasionally binding constraints |
| JEL: | E32 E61 |
| Date: | 2018–05–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:0727&r=cba |