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on Central Banking |
| By: | Masahiro Enya (Faculty of Politics, Economics and Law Osaka International University); Akira Kohsaka (Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | We examine dynamic patterns of macroeconomic variables in East Asia immediately after the Asian financial crisis. Particularly, focusing on East Asia, we can identify their distinctive features from those of aggregate cross-country results. Also, we check with the financial crises in East Asia in the 1980s in order to make sure to what extent the contrast between the aggregate cross-country results and that of the Asian financial crisis comes from differences in time (external environment) or in country structure or both. Some distinctive features in East Asia include higher real interest rates in the crisis year, persistent output as well as investment slowdown, and different behaviors of trade and fiscal surpluses after the crisis. The results suggest that initial monetary tightening be responsible for the unexpectedly serious recession and that favorable external conditions and fiscal stimulus did contribute to the post-crisis real recovery even without credit recoveries. |
| Keywords: | macroeconomic dynamics, East Asia, financial crisis |
| JEL: | E5 O11 O53 |
| Date: | 2004–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:0405&r=cba |
| By: | Krishna Gopal Misra (QUALITYMETER.COM) |
| Abstract: | 'Reality of money' is curiously similar to uncertainty theory of (Heisenberg) quantum physics. To some (natural societies), legitimacy of exchange control is derived by associating it with certain physical significance of 'real' goods. Exchange control is thus decided by producers in commodity exchanges. Others (Republicans of Greek civilization) think, money can be only a symbolic or fictitious unit, and any physical significance attached to it will undermine sanctity (in respect to space and time) of money used as unit for measurement of the prices. Under these circumstances, exchange control is monopoly of republics and debt engine produces competition and enterprises in people. There are two worlds. Performance of markets (Republics vs. Natural Societies) is going to test which of the perspective and understanding are true and for how long. A republic is design of a game of Master and Slaves in creating forces of competition with fictitious (unreal or without physical significance) coupons. This is a human nature that people are excited so much about unreal things and they can always produce any amount of real / natural things or sacrifices to pay for unreal or unknowable. Gaming/ gambling unfortunately uses of this human weakness in making slaves compete among themselves. This article describes design of Republican (Greek civilization) monetary system as a NON CO-OPERATIVE GAMES and how the psychograph of ignorant souls is exploited by the state, and how the mess of economics is successfully able to create a form of criminal peace and prosperity. This article discusses the valuation of prices, unit price or measuring unit for prices, legitimacy of exchange control in markets, invention of commodity exchanges using 'real' money, invention of 'fictitious' money, banking, state monopoly of exchange control and mathematical legitimacy of interests and taxation. |
| Keywords: | liberatarians, free markets, ligitimacy of exchange control, natural thinking on economics, human psychology in economics |
| JEL: | A |
| Date: | 2005–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0506006&r=cba |
| By: | S. CLAEYS; G. LANINE; K. SCHOORs |
| Abstract: | We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that violate the individuals’ deposits to capital ratio, because this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability. |
| Keywords: | Bank supervision, bank crisis, Russia |
| JEL: | G2 N2 E5 |
| Date: | 2005–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:05/307&r=cba |