nep-bec New Economics Papers
on Business Economics
Issue of 2026–03–23
thirteen papers chosen by
Shuichiro Nishioka, West Virginia University


  1. Technology spillovers, diffusion and rivalry in firm networks By Nuriye Melisa Bilgin; Ester Faia; Gianmarco Ottaviano
  2. Lobbying for Regulations: When Big Business Says Yes By Luca Macedoni; Ariel Weinberger
  3. Tax Avoidance by Small Multinationals as a Side Effect of Anti Tax Avoidance Policy By Flora Bellone; Charlie Joyez; Xavier Poulet-Goffard
  4. Sample Bias in Decompositions of Economic Dynamics By Jevan Cherniwchan; Nouri Najjar
  5. Cutting Costs or Cutting Corners: Asset Reallocation in Oil and Gas Production By Sarah C. Armitage; Judson Boomhower; Catherine Hausman
  6. Decomposing the Finance Wage Premium: Contributions of ICT and Risk By Burak Uras; Jose Gabriel Carreno; Harry Huizinga; Ata Can Bertay
  7. College Majors and Earnings Growth By Woosuk Choi; Josh Kinsler; Alexis Orellana; Ronni Pavan
  8. Worker Selection and Skilled Immigration Policy By Caitlin Hegarty; Mishita Mehra; ;
  9. IPO Reform and Venture Capital: Evidence from China By Celine (Yue) Fei; Ulrich Hege; Xiao Jia
  10. Mergers and Non-contractible Benefits: The Employees' Perspective By Wei Cai; Andrea Prat; Jiehang Yu
  11. Hierarchies of Adaptation: Corporate Power in Economic Statecraft By Schmitz, Luuk
  12. Intangible Assets and Imperfections in Product and Labor Markets By Bartelsman, Eric; Dobbelaere, Sabien; Zona Mattioli, Alessandro
  13. Attention (And Money) Is All You Need: Why Universities Are Struggling to Keep AI Talent By Ufuk Akcigit; Craig A. Chikis; Emin Dinlersoz; Nathan Goldschlag

  1. By: Nuriye Melisa Bilgin; Ester Faia; Gianmarco Ottaviano
    Abstract: We examine how upstream firms' technology adoption affects the performance and adoption decisions of downstream partners. Using business-to-business data with administrative records on advanced technology adoption, we find gains in productivity, performance, adoption probabilities of firms connected to the adopter, relatively to those that are not. Identification combines staggered event studies, balanced panels of pre-existing relationships, and recentering methods to address expected exposure within the network. Gains vary along firm size, centrality, technology quality, but do not systematically increase with input exposure, suggesting that knowledge spillovers may induce organizational adjustments. Adoption by competitors is associated with short-run negative effects.
    Keywords: technology diffusion, adoption and propagation, firm networks, firm productivity, imported inputs
    Date: 2026–03–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp2157
  2. By: Luca Macedoni; Ariel Weinberger
    Abstract: Do firms uniformly oppose regulations that increase production costs, or might industry leaders strategically support stricter standards as a competitive tool? We identify a specific mechanism through which large firms strategically support regulations to enhance their competitive position. Extending the Melitz-Chaney model of firm heterogeneity to incorporate government regulations and lobbying following Grossman-Helpman, we derive conditions under which regulations disproportionately burden smaller competitors while benefiting larger survivors through reduced competition. The model predicts that firm size is positively correlated with support for stringent regulations, but that larger sunk investments push firms to oppose such policies. To test these predictions, we develop a text-as-data approach using large language models to classify firm regulatory preferences from lobbying disclosures—a measurement challenge that has limited prior systematic analysis. Applying guided machine learning to over 20, 000 U.S. lobbying reports, we confirm that larger firms are significantly more likely to support stricter regulations, especially in concentrated industries. Capital-intensive firms with high leverage and less redeployable assets tend to oppose regulations, suggesting that operational flexibility is crucial for extracting strategic benefits from regulatory changes.
    Keywords: strategic lobbying, product standard regulations, firm heterogeneity, machine learning
    JEL: F12 D22 D72 L11 L51
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12536
  3. By: Flora Bellone (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France; OFCE, Sciences Po, France); Charlie Joyez (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Xavier Poulet-Goffard (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France)
    Abstract: The OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative, adopted in 2015, introduced country-by-country reporting (CbCR) obligations for multinational groups with consolidated turnover above €750 million. This paper examines whether the reform generated unintended behavioral responses among smaller firms below the reporting threshold. Using firm-level data on French multinationals from OFATS, FARE, and DIANE (2007, 2009, 2014–2022), we estimate difference-in-differences models in a linear probability framework with firm and year fixed effects. We focus on restructuring at the extensive margin, distinguishing entry into and exit from tax-haven jurisdictions. Firms below the threshold significantly increase their probability of opening tax-haven affiliates after 2016, the year CbCR started to be enforced in Europe, while larger firms become more likely to exit. The results are robust to alternative tax-haven definitions and to excluding firms near the cutoff. Heterogeneity analyses show that the post-reform entry in tax havens is concentrated among financially structured small MNEs. Overall, the findings suggest that targeted transparency reforms can reallocate tax-haven activity across the firm size distribution rather than uniformly reduce it.
    Keywords: tax avoidance; multinational enterprises; BEPS; country-by-country reporting; tax havens; firm heterogeneity
    JEL: F23 H26 H32 K34
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2026-10
  4. By: Jevan Cherniwchan; Nouri Najjar
    Abstract: Decompositions are a common method for quantifying within- and across-agent contributions to aggregate economic dynamics. We show that the standard practice of applying decompositions to sample data yields biased estimates of these contributions, and for common sample designs, these biases can be addressed by reformulating the decomposition as an estimation problem and applying standard statistical techniques. An application to India suggests sample bias meaningfully changes our understanding of how firm dynamics contribute to productivity growth. We also demonstrate our method enables the study of settings traditionally impeded by data limitations, such as productivity and firm dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa.
    Keywords: Decomposition; Sample Bias; Economic Dynamics; Firm Dynamics; Productivity
    JEL: C18 D24 E24 O47
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2026-02
  5. By: Sarah C. Armitage; Judson Boomhower; Catherine Hausman
    Abstract: Reallocation of assets across firms can lead to efficiency gains, but it can also lead to distortions via rent-seeking. We examine the link between asset reallocation and rent-seeking enabled by differences in the expected cost of environmental liabilities. Focusing on the US oil and gas industry, we develop a conceptual framework that incorporates both firm specialization in well types and the judgment-proof problem, by which undercapitalized firms can avoid environmental liabilities. We then build a novel dataset with hundreds of thousands of well transfers over 1992 to 2023, showing that oil and gas wells are transferred frequently, particularly as they age and their revenues decline. Moreover, low-value wells are especially likely to be transferred to low-value firms. Transferred wells produce similar amounts in later years, but are less likely to be plugged – thus posing greater environmental risk. We conclude with policy implications related to well plugging, bonding requirements, and decarbonization.
    JEL: G33 G34 L25 L71 Q35 Q58
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34961
  6. By: Burak Uras (Williams College); Jose Gabriel Carreno (Central Bank of Chile); Harry Huizinga (Tilburg University); Ata Can Bertay (Sabanci University)
    Abstract: "On average wages in the finance industry are higher compared to the rest of the economy. Two explanations suggested for this finance wage premium are (1) the positive correlation between risk-taking and wages, and (2) industry differences in ICT intensity. Using a comprehensive worker-firm panel dataset for the Netherlands, we estimate wage models with additive worker and firm fixed effects, and estimate the finance wage premium as the average of the firm fixed effects in an industry. We then relate the estimated cross-section of firm fixed effects to a range of firm charac- teristics, and find that ICT investment, the average level of educational attainment at a firm and the complementarity of the two are the main drivers of the finance wage premium, while firm risk only makes a small contribution."
    Keywords: finance wage premium, worker-firm panels, ICT, firm risk
    JEL: J24 J31
    Date: 2026–02–13
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2026_105
  7. By: Woosuk Choi; Josh Kinsler; Alexis Orellana; Ronni Pavan
    Abstract: We estimate major-specific earnings profiles using matched American Community Survey (ACS) and Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data. Building on Deming and Noray (2020), we exploit a long earnings panel to overcome key limitations of cross-sectional approaches to lifecycle estimation. We find that engineering and computer science majors experience earnings growth that is comparable to or faster than that of other majors, a category including humanities, education, psychology, and similar fields. In contrast, Deming and Noray (2020) use a crosscohort approach and find that earnings for engineering and computer science majors decline relative to other fields over the lifecycle.
    Date: 2026–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:26-14
  8. By: Caitlin Hegarty (Williams College); Mishita Mehra (University of Richmond); ;
    Abstract: "The U.S. H-1B program helps firms hire high-skilled foreign workers, but increasingly faces a binding annual cap that is allocated through lottery-based rationing. When candidates differ in productivity and firms face imperfect information at hiring, workforce productivity and domestic outcomes become endogenous to policy design. We document higher average wages among foreign-born workers in H-1B intensive occupations, consistent with positive selection among applicants. We rationalize this pattern with a quantitative general equilibrium search and matching model with heterogeneous worker productivity, noisy screening, H-1B filing costs, and an endogenously binding cap. The calibrated model explains half of the wage gap we observe in the data. We use the model to evaluate recent reforms that replace uniform lottery selection with wage-weighted selection. Under the existing cap, wage-weighted reallocation increases average foreign-hire productivity by about 4.7%, raises skilled-sector output by about 0.09%, has limited negative impacts on domestic skilled wages, while slightly increasing domestic skilled employment and unskilled wages. Matching the same foreign productivity gain through higher filing costs or a tighter cap instead reduces vacancy creation and generates negative effects on domestic skilled employment and wages. The gains from reallocation are attenuated when the foreign applicant pool shrinks and when firms can strategically bunch wages at tier cutoffs."
    Keywords: High-skilled immigration, Immigration policy, Search and matching, Worker heterogeneity
    JEL: F22
    Date: 2026–02–17
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2026_107
  9. By: Celine (Yue) Fei; Ulrich Hege; Xiao Jia
    Abstract: We study how IPO reforms transmit to venture capital (VC) markets using the introduction of China’s entrepreneurial boards, ChiNext and the registration-based STAR. We document that both boards attract younger, higher-growth firms with weaker fundamentals in levels, but post IPO growth persists for ChiNext firms while decelerating sharply for STAR firms. VC backing plays different roles across regimes: on ChiNext it aligns with valuation premia and long-run outperformance, whereas on STAR it mainly predicts higher first-day returns. To identify causal effects on VC allocation, we construct novel text-based regulatory exposure measures from listing documents using keyword matching and Sentence-BERT semantic similarity, and show that VC financing reallocates toward firms more aligned with “supported” activities.
    Keywords: IPO Reforms; IPO Listing Requirements; Venture Capital; Business Description; BERT; China
    JEL: G24 G28
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_736
  10. By: Wei Cai; Andrea Prat; Jiehang Yu
    Abstract: Incomplete contract theory, supported by anecdotal evidence, suggests that when a firm is acquired, workers may be adversely affected in non-contractible aspects of their work experience. This paper empirically investigates this prediction by combining M\&A events from the Refinitiv database and web-scraped Glassdoor review data. We find that: (a) Controlling for pre-trends, mergers lead to lower satisfaction, especially on non-contractible dimensions of the employee experience (about 6% of a standard deviation); (b) The effect is stronger in the target firm than in the acquiring firm; (c) Text analysis of employee comments indicates that the decline in satisfaction is primarily associated with perceived breaches of implicit contracts. Our findings indicate that mergers may reduce workers' job utility through non-monetary channels.
    JEL: D23 G34 J31
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34920
  11. By: Schmitz, Luuk
    Abstract: As states weaponize supply chains, warnings of deglobalization and aggregate welfare losses have proliferated. But neither has materialized: trade volumes remain high and supply chains continue to span the globe. This paper argues that the surprising resilience of aggregate trade obscures a large-scale redistribution creating K-shaped divergence among firms navigating geoeconomic reordering. Who wins and who loses depends on two dimensions of corporate power: the strategic indispensability of what firms produce and their organizational capacity to reconfigure operations around geopolitical constraints. Because strategic designation attaches to specific outputs rather than broad industry categories, these capacities vary sharply among firms nominally facing identical pressures. Drawing on an original dataset of over 21, 000 corporate earnings calls annotated using large language models alongside firm-level financial data, I demonstrate that sector membership explains remarkably little outcome variance. Adaptation operates hierarchically within industries, not between them. Firms controlling chokepoints or possessing reconfiguration capacity capture concentrated gains; those lacking strategic position bear recurring adjustment costs. As these costs cluster in regions previously affected by deindustrialization, supply chain restructuring risks intensifying the geographic polarization that fueled political demand for economic statecraft in the first place.
    Date: 2026–03–13
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:gwuce_v1
  12. By: Bartelsman, Eric (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Dobbelaere, Sabien (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Zona Mattioli, Alessandro (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
    Abstract: This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing. Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.
    Keywords: price-cost markups, wage markups, rent sharing, intangibles, non-compete agreements
    JEL: J41 L10 O30
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18440
  13. By: Ufuk Akcigit; Craig A. Chikis; Emin Dinlersoz; Nathan Goldschlag
    Abstract: We construct a novel dataset linking academic publication records to U.S. Census employer–employee data to track 42, 000 AI researchers over two decades. We document systematic changes in the allocation of AI talent. Industry increasingly attracts younger and foreign-born researchers, while gender representation improves more in academia. The top 1% of publishing industry scientists now earn $1.5 million more annually than comparable academics, a fivefold increase since 2001. Rising wage premia coincide with greater sorting into large incumbent firms. Researchers who move to industry publish less but patent more, consistent with a shift from open science toward proprietary innovation.
    JEL: I23 J45 L33 O31
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34964

This nep-bec issue is ©2026 by Shuichiro Nishioka. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the Griffith Business School of Griffith University in Australia.