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on Business Economics |
| By: | Christine Blandhol; Magne Mogstad; Peter Nilsson; Ola L. Vestad (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | Do employees benefit from worker representation on corporate boards? Economists and policymakers are keenly interested in this question – especially lately, as worker representation is widely promoted as an important way to ensure the interests and views of the workers. To investigate this question, we apply a variety of research designs to administrative data from Norway. We find that a worker is paid more and faces less earnings risk if she gets a job in a firm with worker representation on the corporate board. However, these gains in wages and declines in earnings risk are not caused by worker representation per se. Instead, the wage premium and reduced earnings risk reflect that firms with worker representation are likely to be larger and unionized, and that larger and unionized firms tend to both pay a premium and provide better insurance to workers against fluctuations in firm performance. Conditional on the firm’s size and unionization rate, worker representation has little if any effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that while workers may indeed benefit from being employed in firms with worker representation, they would not benefit from legislation mandating worker representation on corporate boards. |
| Keywords: | Worker compensation; Worker representation; Corporate governance; Unions |
| JEL: | G34 G38 J31 J54 J58 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:947&r=all |
| By: | Javier Andrés (Universidad de Valencia); Óscar Arce (Banco de España); Pablo Burriel (Banco de España) |
| Abstract: | The Phillips curve has flattened out over the last decades. We develop a model that rationalizes this phenomenon as a result of the observed increase in polarization in many industries, a process along which a few top firms gain an increasing share of their industry market. In the model, firms compete à la Bertrand and there is exit and endogenous market entry, as well as optimal up and downgrading of technology. Firms with larger market shares find optimal to dampen the response of their price changes, thus cushioning the shocks to their marginal costs through endogenous countercyclical markups. Thus, regardless of its causes (technology, competition, barriers to entry, etc.), the recent increase in polarization in many industries emerges in the model as the key factor in explaining the muted responses of inflation to movements in the output gap witnessed recently. |
| Keywords: | firm heterogeneity, Bertrand competition, Phillips curve, market share |
| JEL: | E31 E52 L1 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:wpaper:2106&r=all |
| By: | Claudiu ALBULESCU; Camélia TURCU |
| Keywords: | , productivity, R&D firms, corporate finance and governance, panel quantile regression, Romania |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:leo:wpaper:2846&r=all |
| By: | Klaus S. Friesenbichler; Agnes Kügler; Andreas Reinstaller |
| Abstract: | We revisit the impact of rising imports from China on within firm labour productivity growth in the EU. The period analysed is 2003 through 2016 and thus covers the recent increase of technology-intensive imports from China. We find that higher fractions of Chinese imports in aggregate imports slow down labour productivity growth of domestic firms in Europe. The adverse effect becomes more pronounced at higher growth rates. Multinationals are able to partly compensate the negative effects of import competition and benefit from Chinese imports at higher productivity growth intensities. The effects are strongest for local firms and firms in low tech industries. No effects were found for firms in high-tech industries. |
| Keywords: | Import Competition, Multinational Firms, Productivity, Manufacturing, EU, China |
| Date: | 2021–02–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2021:i:623&r=all |
| By: | Chowdhry, Sonali; Felbermayr, Gabriel |
| Abstract: | In 2011, the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (EUKFTA) entered into force. With its focus on non-tariff barriers (NTBs), it is a leading example of a deep new generation agreement. Using detailed French customs data for the period 2000 to 2016, we investigate how exporters of different size have gained from the agreement. Applying a diff-in-diff strategy that makes use of the rich dimensionality of the data, we find that firms with larger pre-FTA sizes benefit more from the FTA than firms at the lower end of the size distribution, both at the extensive (product) and the intensive margins of trade. The latter finding is in surprising contrast to leading theories of firm-level behavior. Moreover, we find that our main result is driven by NTB reductions rather than tariff cuts. In shedding light on the distributional effects of trade agreements within exporters, our findings highlight the need for effective SME-chapters in FTAs. |
| Keywords: | Trade Policy,Firm Heterogeneity,Firm Size Distribution,Non-Tariff Barriers |
| JEL: | F13 F14 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2176&r=all |
| By: | KODAMA Naomi; MURAKAMI Yoshiaki; TANAKA Mari |
| Abstract: | The dynasty model, which assumes the presence of intergenerational altruism, implies that business owners will have more incentive to improve the firm performance if they expect their children to take over their firms. This study empirically examines how top managers' expectations about future family succession affect the performance of small businesses. Utilizing the sex of the top manager's first-born child as an instrumental variable for the manager's expectations about business succession by his child, we find that the existence of a potential family successor has a positive effect on profit. We also find that the presence of a potential family successor induces performance-enhancing actions and behaviors on the part of managers, such as improving operational efficiency, selecting better suppliers, and investing in information technology. |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:21013&r=all |